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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cable median barrier crashes from a total of 12 states were analyzed. Crash data included
scene diagrams, photographs, and field measurements, crash narratives, although the availability
of data in each crash varied.
Major contributors to penetration crash propensity were identified: diving underride, in
which the front end of the vehicle dropped below the bottom cable; prying, in which the vehicle
profile caused cable separation or lifting; override; bouncing override, in which the vehicle
rebounded after contact with the back slope and bounced over the top of the barrier; system
failure, in which one component failure or design failure prevented the cables from adequately
engaging the vehicle; and large vehicle crashes, such as tractor trailers, buses, and single-unit
trucks into TL-3 systems.
Major contributors to rollover were identified: steep median slopes, in which the slope
caused unstable bouncing or abrupt changes in slope profiles acted as trip points for the tires;
broadside skid, in which the vehicle was skidding with a sideslip angle of nearly 90 degrees prior
to contact with the barrier; contact with post, in which the post acted as a trip point; and other
factors such as towing trailer units, median anomalies, or with large vehicles such as tractortrailers, buses, or motor homes.
Recommended improvements to cable median barrier systems included: minimum top
cable height of 35 in. (890 mm); maximum top cable height of 15 in. (381 mm); minimum of 4
cables supported by posts; higher lateral cable-to-post attachment strength at bottom and lower
strength at top; low strong-axis strength post sections; and to eliminate cable entrapment in a
vertical slot in the post when initial cable contact occurs at a post location.
A summary of factors and how they contributed to penetration, rollover, and severe crash
probability is shown in Table 1.
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Table 1. Major Conclusions, Cable Median Barrier Systems
Factor

Penetration

Effect of Factor on Rate of
Rollover
Severe Crashes

Weather/Road Conditions
Clear, Dry
Increase
Increase
Increase
Rain/Snow
Decrease
Decrease
Decrease
System Type
Generic 3-Cable
Lowest
Highest
Lowest
Brifen TL-3
Unk
Low
Moderate
CASS TL-3
High
High
Moderate
CASS TL-4*
Moderate
High
Moderate
Nucor TL-3 at 15' Post Spacing
High
Moderate
High
Nucor TL-4*
Moderate
Unk
Moderate
Safence*
Unk
High
Low
Gibraltar*
High
Unk
Low
Season
Winter
Lowest
Lowest
Lowest
Summer
Highest
Highest
Highest
Wide Median Approach Slopes**
Flatter than 10:1
High
Moderate
Unk
10:1-8:1
Low
Moderate
Unk
8:1-6:1
Lowest
Lowest
Unk
Steeper than 6:1
Higher at Steeper Slopes Higher at Steeper Slopes
Unk
Barrier Placement
Near Shoulder
High
Highest
Highest
On Approach Slope/Back Slope
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Center of Median
Highest
Lowest
Lowest
CG Velocity Vector
Below 20 Degrees
Low
Moderate
Low
20-40 Degrees
Moderate
Moderate
Moderate
Above 40 Degrees
High
High
High
Orientation Angle
Greater than Velocity Vector
Highest
Moderate
High
Similar to Velocity Vector
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Less than Velocity Vector*
Low
Moderate
Unk
Vehicle Type
Small/Mid-Size Car
Moderate
Low
Low
Large Car
High
Lowest
Moderate
SUV
Moderate
Highest
Moderate
Pickup
Moderate
High
Low
Van
Moderate
High
High
Large Truck/Tractor Trailer
High
High
Very High
Vehicle Weight Relative to Type of Vehicle (i.e. cars, utility vehicles)
Heavier than Average
High
Low
No Effect
Approximately Average
Moderate
Moderate
No Effect
Lighter than Average
Low
High
No Effect
Vehicle Roll and Yaw Moments of Inertia Relative to Type of Vehicle (i.e. cars, utility vehicles)
Higher than Average
High
Low
Unk
Approximately Average
Moderate
Moderate
Unk
Lower than Average
Low
High
Unk
* Data not statistically significant. Actual average result may vary from what is shown.
** Data was collected relative to TL-3 Nucor NU-CABLE system with 15 ft post spacing.
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2 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Problem Statement
A cross-median crash is the most severe type of run-off-road event in the United States.
Cross-median crashes represent approximately 2% to 5% of all divided interstate crashes; yet
fatalities and serious injuries occur in as much as 30% of these crashes. With the significantly
disproportionate number of severe crashes occurring due to cross-median crash events, many
states have turned to cable median barriers to reduce the risk of these types of severe crashes.
Cable median barriers have been extensively studied to determine the cost-effectiveness
of installation, in-service performance, rates of severe injury and fatality reduction, and
maintenance and post-impact performance evaluation. For examples of these studies, the reader
is encouraged to review those references noted in Chapter 16.
However, cable median barriers are median obstacles as well. They can place occupants
at increased risk of severe injury or fatality if the barriers fail to adequately contain and redirect
errant vehicles, resulting in rollover or vehicular penetration through the barrier. Furthermore,
these barriers are also involved in many non-rollover, non-penetration fatalities and serious
injuries, though no concerted effort has yet been made to determine the causes of these serious
and fatal injuries.
Many industry experts expect the total mileage of cable median barrier to double within
the next 10 years. As total cable median barrier mileage continues to climb, there is an
opportunity to prevent many penetration, rollover, and serious injury or fatality crashes by
improving barrier design, installation guidelines, and crash-testing guidelines to mitigate crash
concerns with these barrier types.
2.2 Research Objective
The objective of this study was to evaluate a significant number of cable median barrier
crashes across a broad spectrum of states to determine containment failure causality, design
improvements, placement guidelines, and improved full-scale testing procedures to improve
motorist safety performance.
2.3 Scope
In order to accomplish the research objective, a series of tasks were undertaken, and are
summarized as follows:
(1) Cable barrier crash data were requested from many states with prominent histories of
studying cable median barrier;
(2) Crash data were analyzed and segregated by state, vehicle type, vehicle class, impact
conditions, median geometry, barrier type, crash result, crash severity, and
containment failure mechanism; and
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(3) Containment failure mechanisms of cable barriers were evaluated extensively using a
combination of scene diagrams, crash narratives, photographic evidence, site
measurements, and crash reconstruction techniques.
Additional studies are planned in the future to address specific vehicle types in vehicleto-barrier interactions which may aggravate penetration or rollover tendencies.
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW
Much of the U.S. freeway system was designed and constructed in the 1950s and 1960s.
During this time, it was common to build high-speed facilities with 30-ft (9-m) and 40-ft (12-m)
wide medians. With the low traffic volumes found on those freeways during this period, the
frequency of tragic cross median crashes was low. The California Department of Transportation
(Caltrans) conducted a study to determine the benefits of using median barriers in these relatively
narrow medians [1]. This study indicated that barriers could not be justified in medians wider
than 50 ft (15 m). Caltrans repeated this study several times between 1967 and 1997. Each time,
the authors arrived at the same conclusion; barriers were not cost-effective when installed in
medians wider than 50 ft (15.2 m), despite rising traffic volumes. However, findings from the
1997 version of this study were quite different and recommended that barriers be placed in
medians as wide as 75 ft (22 m) [2]. The primary change between the 1997 report and earlier
reports reflected the method of measuring real roadway departure data and travel speeds. Despite
a mandated maximum speed of 55 mph through 1994 due to the National Maximum Speed Limit
(NMSL) Law, actual travel speeds were between 15 to 20 mph higher (24 to 32 km/h).
Following the repeal of this law, travel speeds in California were largely unchanged. This
magnitude of speed increase observed between the 1968 and 1997 studies could easily explain
the large increase in cross-median crashes and the differences in the benefits of using median
barriers.
Following a trend of a high rate of cross-median crashes and associated fatalities, the
North Carolina Department of Transportation (DOT) investigated the use of median barriers
between 1997 and 2004, to mitigate the severity of median crashes and to reduce the frequency
of cross-median crash events [3-4]. This pilot study analyzed 400 miles (644 km) of interstate
with barrier, which included 175 miles (282 km) of cable barrier and an additional 44 miles (71
km) of cable barrier and W-beam combinations. Researchers observed a 71% drop in the number
of cross-median crashes and associated fatalities or serious injuries due to the introduction of
these cable median barriers. The total drop in severe and fatal injuries was 35% over this same
period, while moderate injuries increased by 26%. The reason for the disparity between the drops
in cross-median crash rates and severe crash rates is that any barrier system which can be struck
by an errant motorist is a roadside obstacle. Every roadside obstacle can contribute to the number
and frequency of severe crashes. Researchers postulated that by installing cable median barriers,
95 cross-median crashes were prevented and more than 100 lives were saved annually. The
barriers prevented a large number of cross-median crashes and were ultimately successful in
significantly reducing cumulative severe injury or fatality (A+K) crash frequency.
A similar study was conducted at Rowan University in 2005, identifying types of median
barriers and crash histories for New Jersey Department of Transportation [5]. Although a net
safety improvement was noted after median barrier installations, the crash frequency increased.
Also, researchers noted that after cable barrier hits, maintenance personnel were slow to repair
barriers often allowing the cables to sag to the ground in impact regions for up to several weeks.
The Wisconsin DOT investigated the correlation between cross-median crashes on the
number of cross-median fatalities [6]. Researchers observed that between 2001 and 2003,
Wisconsin roads and highways experienced 53 fatalities and more than 600 injuries in 631 crossmedian crashes. Although most divided roadways were consistent with Wisconsin and American
Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) design standards, cross5
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median crashes were observed to be relatively independent of median width, average daily traffic
(ADT), and lane width. The study was further expanded to determine median barrier warrants
based on median widths [7]. Results were similar to the studies in North Carolina and California,
in which many roadways with medians as wide as 70 ft (21 m) were applicable for median
barrier installation.
A statistical analysis was conducted on cross-median crashes in the state of Minnesota
between 2005 and 2008 to determine effectiveness of countermeasures as well as to validate or
change the recommendations provided by AASHTO in the 2002 and 2006 Roadside Design
Guides. Cross-median events were tabulated based on site statistics and used to generate
statistical models of median encroachment frequencies [8]. The encroachment frequencies were
then applied to models of freeway and rural expressway roads in the Roadside Safety Analysis
Program (RSAP), and used in a benefit-to-cost analysis of median barrier types. Because
Minnesota did not tabulate cross-median events directly on crash report forms, statistical data
selection methods were used to determine frequency of cross-median encroachments based on
subsamples. Based on the data analysis, cross-median events were most common during the
period between December and February, when snowfall and ice formation was prevalent on
Minnesota roads and medians. By reducing friction, vehicles that departed the roadway were
unable to come to a stop before entering opposing travel lanes, despite typically lower travel
speeds. Probabilities of vehicle collision, median encroachment, cross-median encroachment,
and ADT were factored into a simulation using the Monte Carlo technique, and the model was
recommended for evaluation against existing crash studies.
Cable barriers have long been recognized as an effective way of preventing vehicles from
encountering side slopes which increase the risk of serious crashes as well as embankments and
separating traffic on high-speed facilities. Crash data analysis has indicated that cable barriers
provide the highest overall level of safety when compared to concrete safety shapes and steel
beam guardrails [9-10]. Further, study of guardrail performance on slopes indicated that cable
barriers can perform effectively when installed on slopes as steep as 5:1 [11], while metal beam
guardrails did not demonstrate crashworthy performance on 6:1 slopes. Finally, cable barriers
were the least expensive barrier option for use in medians of high-speed freeways. In view of the
positive safety performance, capability of performing when installed on sloping medians, and
low construction costs, it was not surprising that many highway agencies in the U.S. have
decided to implement cable barriers whenever it was necessary to prevent cross-median crashes
through depressed median ditches. As of today, the DOTs in more than 40 states have adopted
this policy, and many of them have installed more than 100 miles of barrier. Industry experts
have begun to predict that the installed base of cable median barrier in the U.S. will more than
double over the next 7 to 10 years.
Even though cable median barrier has garnered a positive performance record, the high
number of crashes that occur in narrow medians on high-speed, high-volume freeways still
produces significant numbers of serious injury and fatal crashes involving cable barrier. A study
of more than 5,000 cable barrier crashes over a two-year period found 12 fatal and 25 serious
injury crashes [12]. Surprisingly, only half of the fatal crashes involved vehicles penetrating
through the barrier and entering opposing traffic lanes. The remaining fatalities appeared to be
related to impact with the cable barrier itself. Although the rate of six fatal crashes per year
represented a 90% reduction in fatal crash rates when compared to the time prior to installation
6
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of cable barrier, these six fatal crashes per year would indicate that as many as 250 fatal crashes
occur annually when extrapolated to data nationwide. Furthermore, crashes into the barriers
indicated in this study had a lower-than-average rate of severe and fatal crashes compared to the
national average of states surveyed in this study.
Further, if industry experts are correct and the installed base of cable barrier doubles over
the next decade, up to 500 motorists could die annually during cable median barrier crashes
within 10 short years. If this situation is to be avoided, improved cable barrier designs and
deployment guidelines must be developed while construction of the barriers is still ongoing. The
first step in developing better barrier designs and placement guidelines is to discover the primary
causes associated with cable barrier crashes that produce fatalities and serious injuries.
In recognition of the critical need for a better understanding of the causes of cable barrier
penetrations and serious injury and fatal crashes, the Mid-America Transportation Center
(MATC) funded the study described herein. The goal of this study was to take the first step
toward improving cable median barrier performance by determining the factors, such as impact
conditions, vehicle type, median slope, and barrier placement, which tend to produce cable
barrier penetrations and serious injury and fatal crashes. The Mid-America Transportation Center
and the Midwest Roadside Safety Facility expect to utilize the findings from this study to
develop better barrier designs and prepare guidelines for barrier implementation that can
significantly reduce serious injury and fatal crash rates involving cable median barrier.
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4 STATE BARRIER INSTALLATION GUIDELINES
4.1 Summary of Barrier Installation Practice by State
Each state surveyed in this study indicated guidelines by which cable median barriers
were to be installed in the states. While all current state design standards are reflective of the
state-of-the-art with respect to cable median barrier placement in divided medians to mitigate
barrier underride, override, and rollover frequency, some historical systems were constructed
prior to this important guidance. Those systems may not reflect the standards identified in this
chapter.
The information presented in this report is accurate and current to the best knowledge of
the reporting authors. However, state design and installation guidelines are available from state
DOTs and should be consulted for the most up-to-date, accurate, and detailed design standards
available. This guide is not intended for use as a reference manual. It is intended to summarize
the current practices of states for overall comparison.
Iowa DOT currently requires cable median barriers to be placed 12 ft (3.7 m) from the
edge of the travel way. Iowa requires that on narrow ditches approximately 30 ft (9.1 m) or less,
that ditches be filled and slopes graded to 8:1 in front of the cable median barrier. The barrier is
then installed adjacent to the median centerline. On wider medians, Iowa DOT requires that the
approach slope to the barrier from the adjacent travel lanes be graded to 8:1, and the slope behind
the barrier be tapered to match the existing slope with a slope shallower than or equal to 4:1. The
grading in front of the cable median barrier is 10 ft (3.0 m) or wider.
Missouri DOT permits the use of high-tension cable median barriers on 4:1 slopes when
those systems were eligible for installation based on acceptable crash testing results. Lowtension cable median barriers on steep slopes are eligible for replacement, and new or existing
low-tension, 3-cable median barriers may only be installed on 6:1 or flatter slopes. Barriers are
installed on slopes based on median widths. For medians greater than 30 ft (9.1 m) wide, barriers
could be installed at least 8 ft (2.4 m) from the edge of the travel way and up to 4 ft (1.2 m) down
the approach slope. For medians less than 30 ft (9.1 m) wide, median barriers are placed within 1
ft (0.3 m) of the center of the ditch. Vegetative barriers are located up to 2 ft (0.6 m) behind the
barrier system.
Ohio DOT requires barrier installation a minimum of 12 ft (3.7 m) from the travel way
and 8 ft (2.4 m) from the center of the ditch, on 6:1 or flatter V-ditches. Cable median barrier
could also be placed adjacent to the shoulder if the shoulder was sufficiently wide. Shoulder
placement is required on slopes steeper than 4:1. The maximum slope behind the barrier relative
to adjacent travel lanes is 4:1. The maximum post spacing permitted is 15 ft (4.6 m).
Oklahoma DOT permits cable median barrier installation on 6:1 V-ditches or flatter.
Generally, cable median barriers are only placed on medians which permitted at least 8 ft (2.4 m)
on both sides of the median barrier without encroaching into adjacent travel lanes, but there is
consideration for narrower medians on the grounds that small encroachments into opposing
travel lanes are more desirable than cross-median crashes. Barriers are not permitted between 1 ft
(0.3 m) and 8 ft (2.4 m) of the center of the ditch.
8
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Oregon DOT permits limited installations in 4:1 V-ditches where crash testing indicated
acceptable performance. Oregon DOT prohibited the use of cable median barriers in median Vditches between 1 and 8 ft (0.3 and 2.4 m) from the center of the ditch. Barriers are always
recommended to be placed as far from the travel was as could be practically installed. Median
slopes are generally clear of debris, smooth, and frequently seeded with grass.
Texas DOT recommends barrier placement as far from the roadway as practical. Barriers
may be placed within 1 ft (0.3 m) of the center of the median, or more than 8 ft (2.4 m) from the
center of the median. Barriers are not permitted for installation in medians less than 24 ft (7.3 m)
wide. Also, slopes in front of and behind the barrier are not permitted to be steeper than 6:1. On
tight curves with radii of 650 to 2,500 ft (198 to 762 m), post spacing is required to be 6 ft – 8 in.
(2.0 m) on center. For radii between 2,501 and 5,500 ft (762 to 1,676 m), cable barrier post
spacing is 10 ft (3.0 m) on center, and for larger radii standard post spacing was utilized.
Utah DOT requires that cable median barriers be placed 1 ft (0.3 m) from the ditch
center, 8 ft (2.4 m) from the ditch center, or between 8 and 16 ft (2.4 and 4.9 m) from one edge
of the travel way. Utah DOT complies with recommendations from studies which indicated that
the best capture behavior and rollover management indicated that the optimum placement was
between 8 and 15 ft (2.4 and 4.6 m) from the edge of the road. In stepped medians, offsets are
usually made with respect to the higher-elevated roadway. Cable median barriers are not used on
medians with slopes steeper than 6:1.
Washington DOT required that cable median barriers be located 0 to 1 ft (0 to 0.3 m) of
the center of the ditch, beyond 8 ft (2.4 m) from the center of the ditch, or near roadway
shoulders. Barriers located at ditch shoulders are required to have a minimum clearance of 8 ft
(2.4 m) from the roadway, and barriers were not permitted between 1 ft and 8 ft (0.3 m and 2.4
m) of the center of the ditch for slopes between 10:1 and 6:1. Cable median barriers could be
installed on approach slopes of 6:1 or flatter, but required a minimum of 1 ft (0.3 m) lateral offset
from the slope break point of a slope steeper than 6:1. Cable median barriers are also required to
have a minimum top cable height of 35 in. (889 mm) and a bottom cable height not greater than
19 in. (483 mm). In general, cable barriers are always recommended to be located as far from the
roadway as practicable.
Wisconsin DOT required that cable median barrier be placed 4 ft (1.2 m) from the slope
break point in 4:1 V-ditches, although frequently cable median barrier is not selected for such
steep terrain. Currently, cable median barrier is limited to installations on 6:1 V-ditches, and
when cable median barrier is necessary on roadways with 4:1 V-ditches, typically two
installations of cable median barrier are used adjacent to each shoulder. On 6:1 V-ditches, cable
median barriers are located a minimum of 8 ft (2.4 m) from the center of the ditch, due to
drainage and erosion concerns and to reduce risk of underride or override from vehicles
traversing through the center of the median.
4.2 Reference Definitions
Unless defined explicitly, the following definitions were utilized:
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1. Shoulder
The shoulder was defined as relatively flat extension of the roadway outside of the travel
lanes in which no hazards were located. Shoulders could be paved or unpaved. The edge of the
shoulder was defined as a transition in slopes from the roadway to the median. If no transition
was present, the median was described as “flat” and the entire median was treated as if the two
roadway shoulders intersected.
2. Approach Slope
Approach slopes were defined as the first slopes encountered by errant vehicles departing
the roadway into the median after traversing the shoulder. In stepped medians in which there was
only one median slope, the entire slope was considered an approach slope. Vehicle travel
direction was always consulted in crash data analysis to determine the correct approach slope and
vertical grade encountered. The barrier was considered to be on the approach slope if the barrier
was more than 3 ft (0.9 m) from the edge of the shoulder.
3. Center of Ditch
The center of ditch referred to the area of the ditch spanning between 4 ft (1.2 m) on
either side of the ditch slope transition between approach and back slopes. This definition does
not necessarily refer to the physical centerline of the V-ditch. For ditches with flat centers more
than 4 ft (1.2 m) wide and less than 15% of the ditch width, the entire flat center of the ditch was
considered the ditch center.
4. Back Slope
The back slope, if present, was the slope encountered by a vehicle after crossing the
center of the V-ditch. Back slopes were not relevant on all crashes involving cable median
barrier redirection if the barriers were installed on traffic-side shoulders, approach slopes, or near
the center of the ditch. In sawtooth medians in which back slopes had different slope rates than
the approach slope, distinctions were made between each slope rate. As with approach slopes,
travel direction of the errant vehicle was consulted when identifying which slope was an
approach slope and which slope was a back slope. A barrier was considered to be on the back
slope if the barrier was more than 3 ft (0.9 m) from the opposite-side shoulder.
5. Penetration
A barrier penetration was defined as a crash in which the impacting vehicle traversed
completely from one side of the barrier to the other side, such that no cables were in
advantageous positions to redirect the vehicle if it continued to move toward opposite travel
lanes. A potential penetration was similar, except that the vehicle came to a stop before
completely passing from one side of the cable median barrier to the other; nonetheless, no cables
were in advantageous positions to redirect the vehicle.
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6. Rollover
A rollover was defined as a crash in which the impacting vehicle made a minimum of one
quarter-revolution about the longitudinal axis. In addition, to be considered a rollover, the
vehicle must have had at least one side or the top/roof contact the ground to be considered a
rollover.
7. Failure
Cable median barriers are generally designed to safely redirect or capture vehicles with
controlled lateral displacement of the barrier. As such, barrier failures were defined as crashes in
which any of the following events occurred: penetration, rollover, or serious injury or fatality of
an occupant in a vehicle striking the cable median barrier.
However, a barrier failure does not necessarily indicate a poor crash result. For example,
a barrier containment failure consisting of a penetration may result in property damage only to
the impacting vehicle and potentially one or two cable median barrier posts. If the occupant of
the impacting vehicle is unharmed, the barrier containment failure would not be considered
hazardous. Furthermore, if the vehicle which was involved in a penetration event did not traverse
into opposing travel lanes and the crash injury level was not severe, the barrier may have
satisfactorily prevented a cross-median crash; in this instance, the barrier containment failure still
resulted in acceptable overall performance and the crash outcome was positive.
Though the nature of cross-median crash prevention can be speculative, history has
shown that even with penetration rates as high as 10% and rollover frequency as high as 8% of
all crashes, overall median severity on many roadways improved after cable median barrier was
installed. This was particularly true if a relatively high rate of fatalities was already present due
to cross-median crashes. Neither penetration nor rollover containment failures indicate that the
barrier is unsafe, but instead refer only to the breach in containment experienced by the
impacting vehicle.
Barrier systems were located consistent with the state design standards. The only
exceptions to this identification were with respect to systems installed before newer design
guidelines became available between 2004 and 2007. Such barrier systems were analyzed and
included in the results because of potential significance to the outcome of this report.
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5 SUMMARY OF CABLE BARRIER CRASHES
5.1 Description of Study
A total of 12 states responded to a survey request for crash data regarding cable median
barrier crashes. A total of more than 25,000 crashes were received which documented periods
between 1996 and 2010. In addition, approximately 6,000 crashes with sufficient information
were extracted for further evaluation. The state DOTs which provided data for this study were:
Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Washington, Iowa, Illinois, Texas, Oregon, Utah,
Kentucky, and Wisconsin.
Between 2007 and 2009, 7,093 cable median barrier crashes were reported in Missouri,
and of those crashes, 174 involved serious injuries or fatalities. Hence, the combined serious
injury and fatal crash rate for cable barrier in Missouri was found to be 2.5%. This finding was
consistent with prior crash studies of cable barriers that indicated low crash severities for cable
barriers when compared to other types of barriers. For example, the combined serious and fatal
injury rates for guardrail and bridge rail crashes in Kansas were 4.9% and 3.6% respectively
[13].
Crash reports were obtained for all 174 crashes involving serious or fatal injuries in the
Missouri database, of which 169 of the crash reports contained detailed drawings of the crash
scene, including measurements of vehicle position near points of departure and impact and
vehicle tire marks laid down as the vehicle approached the barrier. A careful examination of
these crashes revealed that the cable barrier significantly contributed to occupant injury in 128 of
the crashes. The remaining 46 crashes involved other mechanisms for occupant injury, including
vehicle rollover prior to the barrier impact, impacts with another vehicle before leaving the
travelway or after coming to rest, and acute health problems of the driver and occupants
unrelated to the crash. In addition, some crashes were misreported as cable barrier crashes when
other barriers, such as W-beam or concrete barriers, were actually involved. After eliminating
cases which were unrelated to cable barrier performance, the combined serious and fatal injury
crash rate was reduced to 1.8%.
Using reported lengths and widths measured by investigating officers at points of vehicle
departure from the road and at the point of impact with the cable median barrier, crash scene
diagrams were scaled to account for varying longitudinal and lateral compression to fit the
boundaries of the scene diagram, which generated approximate, dimensionally representative
crash scene drawings. Then, approximate scaled crash scenes were used to generate vehicle
trajectory information up to the point of impact with the barrier system. Trajectory data included
the vehicle CG trajectory angle, sideslip angle, and the angle between the vehicle's longitudinal
axis and the barrier. This information was used to build a database of crash impact conditions to
evaluate vehicle/barrier interaction.
A set of 22 crashes in North Carolina were provided and had exact scene measurements,
photographs of the vehicle and system, median slope measurements, median widths, and vehicle
information. The CG trajectory and orientation angles were also recorded for these crashes. The
22 crashes consisted only of penetrations; this dataset was not a random sample.
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An additional 890 cases were extracted from a crash database in the state of Ohio, whose
locations were observable using the Google Street View application. Slope data digitized from
topographical surveying were used to obtain median geometries at each crash location, which
was located using a combination of mile markers, latitudes and longitudes, feature references,
and information from indicative scene diagram representations. As with the Missouri database,
unrelated crashes were excluded from the analysis. Photographs of the crash scene and vehicle
were requested for all crashes in which photographs were taken of the scene, and those photos
were released through the Ohio Department of Public Safety, with additional cooperation from
the Ohio State Patrol.
A tabulated database of crashes was obtained from the Oklahoma DOT, including crash
results, roadway locations, and barrier types that were struck. Crash reports were not available
for the crashes listed, and vehicle year, make, and model were not available for release under
Oklahoma law. Due to limited funding, the purchase of crash report copies was not pursued.
A tabulated database of cable median barrier crashes was received from the State of
Washington and covering a period between 1996 and 2008, with an additional tabulated list of
model, make, and year of the vehicles involved in cable barrier crashes. Crash reports for serious
injury and fatal crashes in the state were also provided. The database included information
regarding the crash result and the manner of collision, along with an extensive investigation of
injury tabulation. As with Oklahoma, the majority of crashes did not have a scene diagram or a
narrative available to definitively identify crash injury causation, mechanisms of barrier
containment failures, and potential data overlap. Nonetheless the database was useful for
evaluating crash statistics, overall barrier performance, and installation practices.
The Iowa DOT provided a tabulated database of cable median barrier crashes and results
between 2006 and 2009, along with scene diagrams and crash narratives. Although precise scene
diagram measurements were not available, make, model, and year of vehicles striking the cable
median barrier were provided. Precise geographical locational measurements were provided for
each crash to identify the exact location of the crash site for further investigation.
The Illinois DOT provided a crash database to evaluate propensities for cross-median
collisions, as well as a tabulated list of cable barrier crashes between 2005 and 2008 in the state
of Illinois. Scene diagrams and narratives were not provided, and no median information was
available. However, precise geographical location measurements were also available and the
crash sites were located, allowing precise determination of barrier usage at each site.
The Texas DOT provided a large block of crash data regarding all crashes, not only cable
median barrier crashes on divided median roadways between 2003 and 2009. Unfortunately
Texas law, which is similar to Oklahoma, does not permit the free exchange of sensitive crash
data such as scene diagrams, crash narratives, and occupant information. Because the crash data
could not be used to determine crash causation or object struck, the Texas data were limited in
scope to crash statistics for only broad evaluations.
The Oregon DOT provided a crash summary database for cable median barrier crashes in
Oregon through 2007. This information included crash severity and relative risk based on the
total number of crashes, as well as crash statistics measured by DOT researchers.
13
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Similarly, the Kentucky Department of Public Safety (DPS) provided lists of crash
reports available for sorting. However, since this information was received later in the analysis,
the crash results were only used for generating statistical comparisons.
The Utah DOT provided a database of scene diagrams, crash narratives, impacting
vehicle makes, models, and years, road segment traffic volumes, and crash statistics. Photos and
annotated scene diagrams with survey measurements were available for purchase through the
Department of Public Safety, but the available funding for the project prohibited this extra
expense. Utah also provided information regarding barrier type for installations throughout the
state.
The Wisconsin DOT provided crash reports, scene diagrams, and a webcam video of a
single cable barrier penetration event in the state of Wisconsin. Each cable barrier crash was
located using a geographical state surveying tool, and locations of each crash were identified.
Included in the crash reports were vehicle make, model, and year.
It is possible that a number of critical injury and fatal crashes involving cable median
barriers were incorrectly coded and therefore excluded from the database. However, prior
experience with crash reports associated with barrier crashes would indicate that it is not
common that a police officer fails to indicate the barrier was struck for a crash involving serious
injuries and fatalities. Therefore, it was assumed that the number of crashes missing from the
database was relatively low. Further, even if a significant number of unreported severe crashes
do occur, there is no reason to believe that omitted cases would have a bias in any characteristic
other than injury severity. Because police officers are likely to spend more time investigating
serious injury and fatal crashes, the bias would reduce the risk of case omission as the severity
increased.
5.2 Cable Barrier Impacts
In each state, cable barrier crashes were examined to determine if the barrier failed to
adequately capture or redirect the vehicle without subjecting occupants to serious injury or
fatality. For the purpose of analysis, three categories were created: penetration crashes, rollover
crashes, and severe injury or fatality (A+K) crashes.
Severe A+K crashes were defined as crashes when at least one occupant of the vehicle
impacting the cable barrier experienced a severe or disabling injury or fatality. An effort was
made to exclude crashes in which the fatality or severe injury was not caused at least in part by
the reaction of the cable barrier. Cable barrier crashes in which the vehicle was not redirected
and passed from the impact side to non-impact side of the barrier were classified as penetration
crashes. Crashes in which the vehicle either protruded under, between, or over the top of the
barrier but came to rest before all four tires passed to the non-impact side were classified as
potential penetrations, which displayed the propensity for a penetration to occur. Rollover
crashes were defined as those in which impacting vehicles experienced at least a one-quarter
revolution about the longitudinal axis before coming to rest. Rollover crashes in which the
vehicle tripped before impacting the barrier or in which the rollover was unrelated to cable
barrier performance were excluded.
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The crash set was further segregated in the event that a rollover occurred contingently
with a penetration. The overlapping data set was segregated into mutually exclusive causative
factors, using scene diagrams, crash narratives, vehicles, and median information to determine
which factor was the predominant or causative factor in penetration and rollover crashes. If a
vehicle penetrated through the barrier before rolling over on the median back slope, opposing
travel lanes, or other post-penetration impact location, the major causative factor was determined
to be a penetration. However, if it was determined that the vehicle overturning caused or
contributed to the vehicle penetrating through or over the top of the barrier, the major causative
factor was identified to be a rollover. Separate efforts were made to determine the injury causes
of A+K crashes due to contact with a barrier element, rollover, ejection, or other factors.
5.2.1 Weather and Road Conditions
Cable barrier crashes tabulated from each state DOT were investigated to evaluate the
frequency of weather-related crashes compared to annual numbers of days with rainfall and
snowfall in each state. The frequency of adverse weather effects in surveyed states are shown in
Tables 2 and 3. Some states were characterized by a wide variation in regional annual snowfall
and rainfall, based on data by NOAA National Climate Data Center for annual precipitation.
The standard deviations in average days with snowfall were as large as the average
number of days with snowfall for some states. In some locations, the number of days with snow
or rain could vary from one region to another by a factor of 10 [14]. Conversely, states in the
lower Midwest and coastal regions did not have large variations in days with rainfall or snowfall,
such as Missouri, North Carolina, and Washington.
Oklahoma averaged only 61 days with minimum rainfall of 0.01 in. (0.25 mm) and three
days with minimum snowfall of 0.1 in. (2.5 mm). States with the lowest relative deviation based
on the norm were located in the Midwest, including Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, and Iowa, with the
one notable exception of Washington.
Table 2. Average Number of Days with Rainfall in Select Surveyed States
Average Number of Days with Minimum Rainfall of
0.01 in. (0.3 mm) 0.1 in. (3 mm)
0.5 in. (13 mm)
Illinois
94.5
64.1
26.2
Iowa
82.2
53.1
21.4
Missouri
89.6
63.8
28.5
North Carolina
115.5
79.1
33.1
Ohio
118.7
75.4
25.5
Oklahoma
61.4
44.6
24.2
Utah
55.0
25.1
4.9
Washington
104.9
62.1
19.9
Wisconsin
123.3
75.4
23.3
State
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Frequency of Days with Minimum Rainfall of
Average
0.01 in. (2.5 mm) 0.1 in. (2.5 mm) 0.5 in. (2.5 mm) Deviation
25.9%
17.5%
7.2%
10.2%
22.5%
14.5%
5.9%
11.1%
24.6%
17.5%
7.8%
10.4%
31.6%
21.7%
9.1%
11.9%
32.5%
20.6%
7.0%
10.4%
16.8%
12.2%
6.6%
21.6%
15.1%
6.9%
1.3%
57.7%
28.7%
17.0%
5.5%
8.9%
33.8%
20.7%
6.4%
66.0%
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Table 3. Average Number of Days with Snowfall in Select Surveyed States
State
Illinois
Iowa
Missouri
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Utah
Washington
Wisconsin

Average Number of Days with Minimum Snowfall of
Frequency of Days with Minimum Snowfall of
Average
0.1 in. (3 mm)
1.0 in. (25 mm) 5.0 in. (127 mm) 0.01 in. (2.5 mm) 0.1 in. (2.5 mm) 0.5 in. (2.5 mm) Deviation
11.9
6.9
0.8
3.3%
1.9%
0.2%
47.6%
16.9
11.0
1.3
4.6%
3.0%
0.4%
22.6%
6.5
4.2
0.5
1.8%
1.2%
0.1%
42.5%
2.7
1.9
0.4
0.7%
0.5%
0.1%
172.2%
17.9
9.4
0.8
4.9%
2.6%
0.2%
68.9%
3.0
2.1
0.3
0.8%
0.6%
0.1%
75.2%
19.2
15.5
3.0
5.3%
4.3%
0.8%
113.6%
27.2
17.2
2.1
7.5%
4.7%
0.6%
39.3%
11.8
8.4
1.9
3.2%
2.3%
0.5%
195.0%

Monthly and annual precipitation totals of each participating state were also recorded, as
shown in Tables 4 and 5. Since most states surveyed were in the central plains to Midwest
region, the annual yearly precipitation is similar for Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, and Wisconsin,
though Wisconsin had locally larger rain and snow accumulation due to proximity to Lakes
Superior and Michigan. However, because Wisconsin is west and south of the Great Lakes, the
additional precipitation is highly localized, with as much as 140 in. (3,556 mm) of snow falling
annually at the southern-central portion of Lake Superior and 40 to 50 in. (1,016 to 1,270 mm)
falling in most of the remainder of the state. Most cable median barrier crash data available from
Wisconsin occurred in close proximity to Fon du Lac, Wisconsin.
Table 4. Average Monthly Precipitation in Select Surveyed States
State
Illinois
Iowa
Missouri
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Utah
Washington
Wisconsin

Jan
1.8
0.9
1.8
3.8
2.3
1.5
1.0
5.9
1.0

Feb
1.9
1.0
2.0
3.5
2.1
1.6
1.1
3.7
1.0

Mar
2.6
1.8
2.9
4.1
2.9
2.8
1.3
3.9
1.7

Average Monthly Precipitation, 50th Percentile (in.)
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
3.4
4.4
3.8
3.6
3.2
2.7
2.7
3.2
3.2
4.3
4.5
3.9
3.6
3.0
2.2
1.8
3.8
4.8
4.2
3.7
3.3
3.3
3.1
3.2
3.4
3.6
4.1
4.7
4.6
3.9
3.2
3.4
3.5
4.3
3.9
3.8
3.2
2.8
2.6
3.0
3.1
4.6
4.2
2.6
2.6
3.2
2.9
2.2
1.2
1.1
0.6
0.7
0.9
1.0
1.3
1.0
2.9
2.3
1.8
0.7
0.7
1.5
3.6
6.2
2.8
3.4
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.3
2.6
1.9

Dec
2.3
1.2
2.4
3.6
2.8
1.8
1.0
5.6
1.3

Annual
35.7
31.3
38.7
45.8
37.1
33.0
12.2
38.9
30.1

Dec
3.8
6.5
1.7
0.3
4.3
0.6
9.0
6.9
9.8

Annual
13.1
23.7
6.2
2.0
19.1
1.7
40.5
20.4
40.6

Table 5. Average Monthly Snowfall in Select Surveyed States
State
Illinois
Iowa
Missouri
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Utah
Washington
Wisconsin

Jan
5.1
6.7
2.3
0.7
7.0
0.8
9.1
5.6
10.6

Feb
3.0
5.6
2.0
0.6
4.3
0.2
8.2
2.9
8.7

Mar
1.1
3.5
0.3
0.2
2.9
0.2
5.8
1.5
7.0

Apr
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.0
2.8
0.7
1.3

Average Monthly Snowfall, 50th Percentile
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
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(in.)
Oct
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.7
0.2
0.1

Nov
0.1
1.3
0.0
0.0
0.5
0.0
4.5
2.4
3.0
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Whereas the average precipitation in Oklahoma varied from moderate annual rainfall to
relatively arid conditions, most of the cable median barrier was located around the Norman and
Oklahoma City areas. Rainfall in these regions is less frequent and with lower accumulation
compared to the eastern parts of the state.
The approximate geographical distribution of cable median barrier locations with
surveyed crash data were located on a NOAA precipitation map and is shown in Figure 1. Ohio’s
annual precipitation was higher because of close proximity to Lake Erie, which occasionally
resulted in more than 5 in. (127 mm) of rain or 12 in. (305 mm) of snow within a span of a few
days in some cable median barrier locations. In general, southern parts of the state recorded
higher precipitation totals, due to contributions from gulf and coastal storm systems.

Figure 1. Selected Approximate Barrier Locations with Annual Precipitation Estimates [15]
Besides Ohio, both Washington and North Carolina experienced higher cumulative
precipitation than other states in this survey. Both Washington and North Carolina are coastal
states which experience significant rainfall, without much snowfall in the areas around cable
barrier locations. In contrast, Utah was largely dry, except for the I-15 corridor. However, the I15 corridor was also the site of much of the cable median barrier installed in Utah.
Barrier performance was tabulated for each impact in the available database of crashes;
however, crashes in which a penetration or rollover occurred were subjected to additional
scrutiny to identify the cause of the poor barrier performance. The process of selection and
causality used in this study is described in greater detail in Chapters 8 and 11.
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Results of each state were segregated by weather conditions (i.e., snowing, raining), road
conditions at the time of the crash (i.e., wet, snow-covered, slush), crash severity, type of cable
barrier system that was struck, the date of crash, and the barrier’s performance. The results are
tabulated in Tables 6 through 11. Primary barrier containment failures were identified and
segregated by predominant weather and road conditions. By considering only primary barrier
failures, secondary events such as penetration following rollover were excluded from the
analysis. Primary barrier failure segregation also served the purpose of establishing mutually
exclusive categories of penetration or rollover crashes; this was useful in determining what
driving conditions were associated with the predominant cause of barrier containment failures.
Since some states had significant volumes of data and others had smaller data sets, a
crash volume weighting factor was used to bias results toward states with more crashes when
each state’s crash results were averaged together. Weighting factors applied to determine the
approximate average rate of cable barrier containment failures consisted of an average of the
individual percentage of failures occurring in each state with the total percentage of failures of
all states based on all crash data. This process weighted data from states with large volumes of
crash data, but still incorporated data from states with limited available crash databases to draw
from. The average rate of vehicular penetration through the barrier was approximately 9.3%
when penetrations were the primary barrier containment failure. In contrast, the composite
average rate of vehicle rollover as a primary containment failure mechanism was approximately
5.1%. When considering the rates of actual vehicle rollover and penetration over the barrier and
relaxing the mutually-exclusive primary failure mechanism restriction, the composite rate of
penetrations and rollovers rose to approximately 9.9% and 8.1%, respectively.
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Table 6. Crash Result in States by Predominant Weather Condition
Weather Condition
at Time of Crash Crashes
No Adverse Effects
150
Rain
48
Snow or Sleet
100
Fog or Mist
4
Strong Crosswind
2
Unknown or Other
1
Total
305

Illinois
Penetration1
-

Rollover Crashes
8
60
0
10
3
52
0
1
0
3
0
0
11
126

Iowa
Penetration
4
1
4
0
0
0
9

Rollover
1
0
1
0
0
0
2

Crashes
404
164
274
7
0
9
858

Ohio
Penetration
46
10
18
2
0
2
78

Rollover
30
3
1
1
0
2
37

Oklahoma
Crashes Cross-Median2
1147
26
415
7
190
1
13
0
4
0
11
0
1780
34

Rollover Crashes
48
479
6
43
4
397
1
3
1
3
0
2
60
927

Utah
Penetration
26
2
10
0
0
0
38

Rollover Crashes
42
1105
1
290
8
225
0
20
0
1
0
6
51
1647

Washington
Penetration Rollover Crashes
139
94
44
45
7
3
24
11
49
2
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
210
115
97

Wisconsin
Penetration
7
0
5
0
0
0
12

Rollover
4
0
2
0
0
0
6

Weather Condition
at Time of Crash Crashes
No Adverse Effects
150
Rain
48
Snow or Sleet
100
Fog or Mist
4
Strong Crosswind
2
Unknown or Other
1
Total
305

Illinois
Penetration1
-

Rollover Crashes
5.3%
60
0.0%
10
3.0%
52
1
3
0
3.6%
126

Iowa
Penetration
6.7%
10.0%
7.7%
7.1%

Rollover
1.7%
0.0%
1.9%
1.6%

Crashes
404
164
274
7
0
9
858

Ohio
Penetration
11.4%
6.1%
6.6%
28.6%
22.2%
9.1%

Rollover
7.4%
1.8%
0.4%
14.3%
22.2%
4.3%

Oklahoma
Crashes Cross-Median2
1147
2.3%
415
1.7%
190
0.5%
13
4
11
1780
1.9%

Rollover Crashes
4.2%
479
1.4%
43
2.1%
397
7.7%
3
25.0%
3
2
3.4%
927

Utah
Penetration
5.4%
4.7%
2.5%
4.1%

Rollover Crashes
8.8%
1105
2.3%
290
2.0%
225
20
1
6
5.5%
1647

Washington
Penetration Rollover Crashes
12.6%
8.5%
44
15.5%
2.4%
3
10.7%
4.9%
49
10.0%
15.0%
0
0
1
12.8%
7.0%
97

Wisconsin
Penetration
15.9%
0.0%
10.2%
12.4%

Rollover
9.1%
0.0%
4.1%
6.2%

Table 7. Crash Result in States with Complete Data Sets by Predominant Weather Condition
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Iowa
Penetrations
4
1
4
0
0
0
9

Ohio
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
1
404
46
0
164
10
1
274
18
0
7
2
0
0
0
0
9
2
2
858
78

Utah
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
30
479
26
3
43
2
1
397
10
1
3
0
0
3
0
2
2
0
37
927
38

Rollovers Crashes
42
44
1
3
8
49
0
0
0
0
0
1
51
97

Wisconsin
Penetrations
7
0
5
0
0
0
12

Total
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
4
987
83
0
220
13
2
772
37
0
11
2
0
6
0
0
12
2
6
2008
137

Rollovers
77
4
12
1
0
2
96

Crashes
60
10
52
1
3
0
126

Iowa
Penetrations
6.7%
10.0%
7.7%
0.0%
0.0%
7.1%

Ohio
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
1.7%
404
11.4%
164
6.1%
1.9%
274
6.6%
7
28.6%
0
9
22.2%
1.6%
858
9.1%

Utah
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
7.4%
479
5.4%
1.8%
43
4.7%
0.4%
397
2.5%
14.3%
3
3
22.2%
2
4.3%
927
4.1%

Rollovers Crashes
8.8%
44
2.3%
3
2.0%
49
0
0
1
5.5%
97

Wisconsin
Penetrations
15.9%
10.2%
12.4%

Total
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
9.1%
987
8.4%
220
5.9%
4.1%
772
4.8%
11
18.2%
6
12
16.7%
6.2%
2008
6.8%

Rollovers
7.8%
1.8%
1.6%
9.1%
16.7%
4.8%
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Crashes
60
10
52
1
3
0
126

Table 8. Crash Result in States by Predominant Road Condition
Crashes
127
63
113
2
305

Illinois
Iowa
Penetrations1 Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
8
44
4
1
15
2
2
67
3
0
0
0
0
11
126
9

Ohio
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
2
333
40
0
260
18
0
261
20
0
4
0
2
858
78

Oklahoma
Utah
Rollovers Crashes Cross-Median2 Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
30
1575
24
56
364
21
5
39
9
0
99
5
2
164
1
4
457
12
0
2
0
0
7
0
37
1780
34
60
927
38

Washington
Wisconsin
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers
35
888
115
79
26
5
1
3
398
57
12
7
1
0
13
344
38
23
63
6
5
0
17
0
1
1
0
0
51
1647
210
115
97
12
6

Crashes
127
63
113
2
305

Illinois
Iowa
Penetrations1 Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
6.3%
44
9.1%
1.6%
15
13.3%
1.8%
67
4.5%
0
0.0%
3.6%
126
7.1%

Ohio
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
4.5%
333
12.0%
260
6.9%
261
7.7%
4
1.6%
858
9.1%

Oklahoma
Utah
Rollovers Crashes Cross-Median2 Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
9.0%
1575
1.5%
3.6%
364
5.8%
1.9%
39
23.1%
99
5.1%
0.8%
164
0.6%
2.4%
457
2.6%
2
7
4.3%
1780
1.9%
3.4%
927
4.1%

Washington
Wisconsin
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers Crashes Penetrations Rollovers
9.6%
888
13.0%
8.9%
26
19.2%
3.8%
3.0%
398
14.3%
3.0%
7
14.3%
2.8%
344
11.0%
6.7%
63
9.5%
7.9%
17
1
5.5%
1647
12.8%
7.0%
97
12.4%
6.2%

Table 9. Crash Result in States with Complete Data Sets by Predominant Road Condition
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Iowa
Penetrations
4
2
3
0
9

Ohio
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
2
333
40
0
260
18
0
261
20
0
4
0
2
858
78

Utah
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
30
364
21
5
99
5
2
457
12
0
7
0
37
927
38

Rollovers Crashes
35
26
3
7
13
63
0
1
51
97

Wisconsin
Penetrations
5
1
6
0
12

Total
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
1
767
70
0
381
26
5
848
41
0
12
0
6
2008
137

Rollovers
68
8
20
0
96

Road Conditions
at Time of Crash Crashes
No Adverse Effects
44
Wet or Pooling Water
15
Snow, Slush, or Ice
67
Unknown or Other
0
Total
126

Iowa
Penetrations
9.1%
13.3%
4.5%
7.1%

Ohio
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
4.5%
333
12.0%
260
6.9%
261
7.7%
4
1.6%
858
9.1%

Utah
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
9.0%
364
5.8%
1.9%
99
5.1%
0.8%
457
2.6%
7
4.3%
927
4.1%

Rollovers Crashes
9.6%
26
3.0%
7
2.8%
63
1
5.5%
97

Wisconsin
Penetrations
19.2%
14.3%
9.5%
12.4%

Total
Rollovers Crashes Penetrations
3.8%
767
9.1%
381
6.8%
7.9%
848
4.8%
12
6.2%
2008
6.8%

Rollovers
8.9%
2.1%
2.4%
4.8%
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Road Conditions
at Time of Crash Crashes
No Adverse Effects
44
Wet or Pooling Water
15
Snow, Slush, or Ice
67
Unknown or Other
0
Total
126
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Table 10. Average Rates of Barrier Containment Failure by Predominant Weather Condition
Weather Condition

Penetration Rollover

No Adverse Effects
Rain
Snow or Sleet
Average Failure Rate

9.8%
6.9%
6.7%
9.3%

6.7%
2.1%
2.1%
5.1%

Table 11. Average Rates of Barrier Containment Failure by Predominant Road Condition
Road Condition

Penetration Rollover

No Adverse Effects
Wet or Pooling Water
Snow, Slush, or Ice
Average Failure Rate

11.5%
9.9%
6.1%
9.3%

6.8%
2.5%
3.8%
5.1%

Three key conclusions were drawn from the data:
(1) Dry, clear conditions were associated with the highest rates of penetration or rollover.
Travel speeds and vehicle-to-ground friction values were the highest during dry, clear
weather and road conditions. The increased travel speeds and greater friction
generally contributed to more energetic impacts with cable median barrier systems
due to a combination of high speed and high CG trajectory and orientation angles at
impact.
(2) Reduced tire ground friction, which is the reason for lower travel speeds during
inclement weather, also affected barrier interaction by influencing impact CG
trajectory and orientation angles. When contact friction was decreased, the roll
moment applied to the vehicle in sliding conditions was significantly reduced, which
largely explains the reduction in rollover occurrences. The largest rate of reduction of
penetration crashes related to adverse weather events is due to reduced travel speeds
and a reduction in the CG trajectory angle present at the time of the crash, which is
caused by less tire-ground friction. However, after storms struck and the roadsides
were snowy or wet but road conditions improved, travel speeds were typically
increased. Errant vehicles departing the road during these conditions were unable to
slow down as quickly before impacting the barrier, which could explain the
discrepancy observed between road and predominant weather condition data relevant
to penetration rates.
(3) Although states with higher annual precipitation experienced higher annual rates of
vehicle penetration through the barrier systems, the locations of the cable median
barriers in wetter states affected crash likelihood. States with significant rainfall or
snowfall and with relatively narrow medians frequently installed cable median
barriers at or near roadside shoulders to accommodate generally steeper median
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slopes. Cable median barrier installations near shoulders had higher rates of
penetration and rollover than barrier installations placed on approach or back slopes.
5.2.2 Weather Conditions and Barrier Type
Rates of barrier containment failures by type of barrier were also investigated to evaluate
the effect of weather on vehicle redirection by system type. A comparison of crash results by
barrier make and weather condition is shown in Table 12. Additionally, a comparison of crash
result by barrier make and road condition is shown in Table 13. Since rollovers were frequently
coded with crash results in DPS reports, rollover characteristics were available even when no
scene diagrams were provided in some states. However, penetrations are not currently tabulated
explicitly by most responding officers or DOTs, and thus a scene diagram was required to make
the proper crash result determination. As a result, the total number of applicable crashes in the
penetration database was substantially lower than the number of crashes in the rollover database.
It was observed that various proprietary barrier systems had markedly different rates of
penetration and rollover. Although its database was limited in scope, the Brifen Wire Rope
Safety Fence (WRSF) had the lowest rate of penetration when compared to other high-tension
systems. Conversely, Nucor Marion Steel’s NU-CABLE system with three cables had a large
database of hits and a considerable number of penetrations, with a penetration frequency of
9.7%. Additionally, the CASS and generic systems had intensive crash histories covering a broad
geographical area, whereas the Nucor, Brifen, and Gibraltar systems were largely restricted to
narrow geographical regions which affected distributions of weather patterns. Although
Gibraltar’s penetration frequency was higher than the Nucor system, the Gibraltar database too
small in size to concretely determine penetration frequency and thus potential “outlier” cases
contributed significant uncertainty. Other recent studies involving individual state data indicated
penetration rates for Gibraltar and CASS systems as high as 16% [30].
Unfortunately, it was misleading to separate barrier statistics by manufacturer without a
more intensive investigation into site details and state crash histories. Some states primarily use
one type of barrier system. Since impact conditions and vehicle type can vary widely, these
factors can lead to different propensities for penetration or rollover due to median geometries,
traffic volumes, weather patterns, and barrier placement.
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Table 12. Crash Result per System in States with Complete Data Sets by Predominant Weather Condition
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Weather Conditions
at Time of Crash
No Adverse Effects
Rain
Snow or Sleet
Fog or Mist
Strong Crosswind
Unknown or Other
Total

Low-Tension 3-Cable
Crashes Penetrations Frequency
3020
224
7.4%
969
59
6.1%
243
13
5.3%
28
6
21.4%
0
0
8
0
4268
302
7.1%

Brifen WRSF
Nucor NU-CABLE
Trinity CASS
Crashes Penetrations Frequency Crashes Penetrations Frequency Crashes Penetrations Frequency
56
3
5.4%
333
40
12.0%
1134
112
9.9%
29
2
6.9%
131
8
6.1%
189
26
13.8%
33
3
9.1%
213
15
7.0%
652
33
5.1%
0
0
7
2
28.6%
16
2
12.5%
1
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
8
2
25.0%
5
0
119
8
6.7%
692
67
9.7%
2002
173
8.6%

Weather Conditions
at Time of Crash
No Adverse Effects
Rain
Snow or Sleet
Fog or Mist
Strong Crosswind
Unknown or Other
Total

Low-Tension 3-Cable
Crashes
Rollovers
Frequency
542
53
9.8%
159
7
4.4%
81
3
3.7%
8
2
25.0%
0
0
5
0
795
65
8.2%

Crashes
991
338
194
9
3
9
1544

Brifen WRSF
Nucor NU-CABLE
Rollovers
Frequency Crashes
Rollovers
Frequency Crashes
39
3.9%
446
29
6.5%
1183
3
0.9%
168
3
1.8%
209
4
2.1%
288
2
0.7%
661
1
11.1%
11
1
9.1%
17
1
33.3%
3
0
6
0
9
2
22.2%
5
48
3.1%
925
37
4.0%
2081

Trinity CASS
Rollovers
Frequency
94
7.9%
1
0.5%
18
2.7%
1
5.9%
0
0
114
5.5%

Table 13. Crash Result per System in States with Complete Data Sets by Predominant Road Condition
Low-Tension 3-Cable
Crashes Penetrations Frequency
437
53
12.1%
214
28
13.1%
135
14
10.4%
9
0
795
95
11.9%

Brifen WRSF
Nucor NU-CABLE
Trinity CASS
Crashes Penetrations Frequency Crashes Penetrations Frequency Crashes Penetrations Frequency
37
3
8.1%
278
34
12.2%
879
93
10.6%
36
2
5.6%
212
15
7.1%
313
37
11.8%
46
3
6.5%
199
18
9.0%
793
43
5.4%
0
0
3
0
17
0
119
8
6.7%
692
67
9.7%
2002
173
8.6%

Road Conditions
at Time of Crash
No Adverse Effects
Wet or Pooling Water
Snow, Slush, or Ice
Unknown or Other
Total

Low-Tension 3-Cable
Crashes
Rollovers
Frequency
437
45
10.3%
214
9
4.2%
135
10
7.4%
9
1
795
65
8.2%

Crashes
1269
80
193
2
1544

Brifen WRSF
Nucor NU-CABLE
Rollovers
Frequency Crashes
Rollovers
Frequency Crashes
45
3.5%
374
30
8.0%
951
1
1.3%
262
4
1.5%
313
2
1.0%
284
3
1.1%
800
0
5
0
17
48
3.1%
925
37
4.0%
2081

Trinity CASS
Rollovers
Frequency
76
8.0%
7
2.2%
31
3.9%
0
114
5.5%
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Road Conditions
at Time of Crash
No Adverse Effects
Wet or Pooling Water
Snow, Slush, or Ice
Unknown or Other
Total
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5.2.3 Weather and Time of Year
The number of crashes into cable barriers was plotted with severity against week number
of each crash to determine if there was any additional adverse effect from the time of year, and
by extension specific weather patterns, on crash severity and frequency. The result is shown in
Figure 2. A significant spike in crashes was noted between December (beginning in week 47)
and February (ending week 9), which was likely related to an increase in low-severity crashes
during snowy or icy conditions. Crash frequency was also largely related to cultural patterns as
well. For example, the spike in crashes during week 12 corresponds to the approximate time
frame for collegiate spring breaks. Between weeks 13 and 47 during the year, crash rates were
relatively constant and crash frequency distributions were random. However, no distinct pattern
of fatalities could be discerned except for a rise during the middle of the year, which may be due
to an increased number of vehicle miles traveled.
Crash Frequency and Outcome by Week Number
6%

6.0%

Crash Frequency

5.0%

A+K Crash Frequency

4%

4.0%

3%

3.0%

2%

2.0%

1%

1.0%

0%

Severe CMB Crash Rate

Percentage of All CMB Crashes

5%

0.0%
1

3

5

7

9

11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51
Annualized Week Number

Figure 2. Crash Frequency and Severity by Week Number
For a different perspective, crash severity was also plotted by month, as shown in Figure
3. The number of crashes was significantly higher in the winter months, especially in December,
when the first snows of each winter season usually fell. Monthly averages of fatalities rose
slightly between January and April, with large increases in fatalities during June, July, and
September. This is likely the result of summer vacations and travel which is more common in the
summer. The analogous drop in fatalities and crashes in August is likely due to the end of
summer travel and vacations and correspond to the impending start of the school year.
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Crash Frequency and Outcome by Month
20%

10.0%
CMB Crash
Frequency

9.0%

16%

8.0%

14%

7.0%

12%

6.0%

10%

5.0%

8%

4.0%

6%

3.0%

4%

2.0%

2%

1.0%

0%

0.0%

Percentage of CMB Crashes Are Severe

Percentage of All CMB Crashes

18%

Month

Figure 3. Crash Frequency and Severity by Month
5.2.4 Slope Characteristics
A frequently-cited parameter for the likely cause of barrier containment failures was
related to median slopes and barrier placement within medians. Median slopes were investigated
in several different states to determine the relative contribution to the crash result. Whenever it
was possible, median geometries were obtained exactly using site details collected by DOT
personnel or using geotechnical surveying equipment. Ohio DOT was able to provide geodetic
survey information for all roadways with cable median barrier installed. In other states, selected
site tours and investigation using barrier geometries, photogrammetry, and reference
configurations were applied to photographs of cable barriers at crash sites observable using the
Google Maps street view application.
The 857 cable median barrier crash records between 2007 and 2010 from Ohio were
tabulated to determine the relative frequency of penetration and rollover crash events by median
geometry. Crash results were tabulated by median geometries at the crash sites and are shown in
Tables 14 through 16. Higher slope rates tended to increase penetration propensity, but there was
a large number of penetrations which occurred on flat slopes or near roadway shoulders. Crashes
into cable median barriers located on the back-side median ditch resulted in fewer penetrations
than when the barrier was installed in either the ditch center or on the approach slope of the
median. However, independent of barrier placement in the median, barriers placed in medians
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with flat approach slopes always had an equal or higher rate of penetration than barriers located
on an approach slopes with slope rates between 6:1 and 8:1. Since FHWA currently permits
barriers to be placed on 6:1 or shallower approach slopes, these findings suggest that sloped
median crashes occurring in medians wider than 40 ft (12 m) may not be as critical as was first
estimated.
Very few rollovers occurred on moderately steep slopes between 6:1 and 8:1. Rollovers
were more frequent on the shallower slopes. More than 71% of the rollovers occurred on
approach slopes of 8:1 or flatter. Alternatively, 13% of rollovers occurred on medians with
approach slopes steeper than 6:1. However, 56.7% of all crashes on Ohio roadways occurred on
roads with slopes of 8:1 or flatter, and steep median crashes constituted 13.9% of all crashes.
Table 14. Crash Results for Flat or V-Ditch Medians with Barriers on Traffic-Side Slopes
Barrier on Traffic-Side Shoulder or Slope
Approach Slope
Steeper than 6:1
6:1-8:1
8:1-10:1
Flatter than 10:1
All Crashes

Crashes Penetrations % Penetrations
74
11
14.9%
128
8
6.3%
118
6
5.1%
174
18
10.3%
494
43
8.7%

Rollovers
4
2
7
9
22

% Rollovers
5.4%
1.6%
5.9%
5.2%
4.5%

Table 15. Crash Results with Barriers Located Less than 4 ft (1.2 m) from Bottom of V-Ditch
Barrier within 4 ft (1.2 m) of Ditch Bottom
Approach Slope

Steeper than 6:1

Backside Slope
Steeper than 6:1
6:1-8:1

8:1-10:1
Flatter than 10:1
Total
Steeper than 6:1
6:1-8:1
6:1-8:1
8:1-10:1
Flatter than 10:1
Total
Steeper than 6:1
6:1-8:1
8:1-10:1
8:1-10:1
Flatter than 10:1
Total
Steeper than 6:1
Flatter than 10:1 6:1-8:1
8:1-10:1
Total
All Crashes

Crashes
1

Penetrations
1

Penetrations
100.0%

Rollovers
0

Rollovers
-

5

0

-

0

-

6
3
15
7
20
11
7
45
6
14
10
10
40
2
2
19
23
123

2
0
3
1
1
1
2
5
0
1
2
3
6
0
0
3
3
17

33.3%
20.0%
14.3%
5.0%
9.1%
28.6%
11.1%
7.1%
20.0%
30.0%
15.0%
15.8%
13.0%
13.8%

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
3
3

15.8%
13.0%
2.4%
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Table 16. Crash Results for V-Ditch Medians with Barriers Installed on Back Slope
Barrier on Opposite Slope of V-Ditch
Approach Slope

Backside Slope
Steeper than 6:1
6:1-8:1
Steeper than 6:1
8:1-10:1
Flatter than 10:1
Total
Steeper than 6:1
6:1-8:1
6:1-8:1
8:1-10:1
Flatter than 10:1
Total
Steeper than 6:1
6:1-8:1
8:1-10:1
8:1-10:1
Flatter than 10:1
Total
Steeper than 6:1
Flatter than 10:1 6:1-8:1
8:1-10:1
Total
All Crashes

Crashes
12
9
4
5
30
7
31
14
14
66
11
19
24
15
69
3
14
58
75
240

Penetrations
0
1
2
2
5
0
1
2
2
5
0
2
4
1
7
0
0
7
7
24

Penetrations
11.1%
50.0%
40.0%
16.7%
3.2%
14.3%
14.3%
7.6%
10.5%
16.7%
6.7%
10.1%
12.1%
9.3%
10.0%

Rollovers
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
4
1
5
0
1
2
3
10

Rollovers
20.0%
3.3%
7.1%
1.5%
16.7%
6.7%
7.2%
7.1%
3.4%
4.0%
4.2%

For moderately steep slopes of 6:1 to 8:1, the vehicle tended to travel toward the center of
the ditch (i.e. to the lowest point), since that is an energetically favorable position due to
minimization of gravitational potential energy. Barriers installed on these slopes applied
redirective forces which were largely parallel with the slope because of the orientation of the
vehicle at impact. Whereas the initial applied load on the vehicle due to cable barrier systems
was large, if the vehicle’s orientation angle was not excessive, the slope tended to counteract the
roll moment applied by the barrier on the vehicle. This was historically evident in most full-scale
crash tests conducted on level and sloped terrain. Following redirection, vehicles departing cable
barrier systems tended to redirect at very low angles [17-19]. Low-angle redirection on a 6:1
slope caused a subsequent continued engagement between the vehicle and the barrier, and the
reactive force from the cable barrier largely balanced the overturning moment from the slope,
improving vehicle stability. The competing roll influences are explained in greater detail in
Chapter 11.
Occasionally, based on orientation angle, the vehicle yawed counterclockwise toward
higher orientation angles (i.e., yawing with the left-front and right-rear corners leading) near a
post location. When the yaw occurred on a slope, the vehicle pitched forward to allow the rear
wheels to rise consistent with the slope, which increased local front tire-ground friction. On
shallower slopes, the resistance was decreased, and on steeper slopes, resistance increased
significantly. For moderate slopes such as 6:1 to 8:1 slopes, the increase in resistance due to yaw
motion on the slope was not trivial but frequently did not contribute to rollover; instead, these
slope rates tended to resist yaw rotations to 90 degree orientation angles, then increased yaw
27

June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13

tendency thereafter. If the vehicle did not trip as the vehicle orientation approached 90 degrees to
the barrier, the vehicle stabilized and the trailing end of the vehicle rotated into the barrier and
became the leading end. On flat or nearly flat slopes, there was no re-stabilizing slope which
could shift the vehicle toward tracking in either frontal or rear directions. Instead, the increase in
trailing-end tire friction due to tire slip tended to arrest the yaw motion of the vehicle near an
orientation angle of 90 or 270 degrees and initiate rollover.
A statistical analysis was conducted on the slope data to determine how crash outcome
depended on median approach slope rate. A chi-squared test on crashes in Ohio indicated that
occupants of vehicles involved in penetration or rollover crashes were 5 times more likely to be
seriously injured or killed than occupants involved in non-penetration or non-rollover crashes.
Further segregation of the crash data and additional statistical tests indicated that penetration
crashes were 3-times more likely to produce serious injury or fatality, and rollover crashes were
10-times more likely to involve A+K injuries, than non-penetration or non-rollover crashes.
Other chi-squared tests for independence were performed on the penetration and rollover
frequency as a function of slope steepness. The chi-squared test for independence indicated that
penetration frequency was not independent of slope steepness at the 10% confidence level, and
rollover frequency was not independent of slope steepness at the 4% confidence level. An
analogous but equally true statement would be that the risk of penetration would be correlated to
slope steepness in no less than 90% of the cable median barrier crashes, and the risk of rollover
would be correlated to slope steepness in no less than 96% of the crashes. However, the
functional nature of the correlation was not a factor in this test.
Further investigation of the correlation demonstrated two trends which were supported by
crash data in all of the participating states. In general, the highest risk of barrier penetration and
rollover risk either occurred on slopes steeper than 6:1 or slopes flatter than 10:1. When the
relative risk of rollover in each category was plotted against slope steepness, an asymptotic-like
relationship was obtained in both system failure types. The penetration and rollover risk plots
and interpolated risk curves obtained from this effort are shown in Figures 4 through 6. The
lowest risk for both penetration and rollover combined occurred on median slopes between 7:1
and 6:1, and the risk increased for both steeper and flatter slopes. Rollovers were more frequent
on level ground than on steep slopes in this study, although there were a limited number of very
steep slopes in this database. Penetrations were much more frequent on steeper slope rates; this
was expected and was consistent with the current state-of-knowledge of cable barrier design with
respect to vehicle motion on slopes. Median slope crash data is summarized in Tables 17 and 18.
However, divided medians in Ohio were frequently wider than 50 ft (15 m). As a result,
the bouncing and underride tendencies aggravated in narrow medians less than 40 ft (12 m) wide
were not present in this database. Caution should be used when applying these results to narrow
median applications.
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Rollover and Penetration Risk by Median Approach Slope
16%
14%

Penetration Risk

Statistical Risk of Result

Rollover Risk
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%

2%
0%
Shallower than 10:1

8:1 to 10:1
6:1 to 8:1
Median Approach Slope

Steeper than 6:1

Figure 4. Statistical Analysis of Penetration and Rollover Risk by Median Slope
Approximate Median Approach Slope Risk Curves
20%
Approximate Penetration Risk Curve

18%
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Figure 5. Estimated Ohio Median Approach Slope Risk Curves by Approach Slope Grade
(Relative to Nucor Systems)
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Approximate Median Approach Slope Risk Curves
20%
Approximate Penetration Risk Curve

18%
Approximate Rollover Risk Curve

Statistical Risk of Result
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Figure 6. Estimated Ohio Median Approach Slope Risk Curves by Approach Slope Steepness
(Relative to Nucor Systems)
Table 17. Crash Result and Median Slope Summary
Summary of Median Slope Results
Barrier Position

Approach Slope
Steeper than 6:1
6:1-8:1
Traffic-Side
8:1-10:1
Approach Slope
Flatter than 10:1
TOTAL
Steeper than 6:1
6:1-8:1
< 4 ft from Ditch
8:1-10:1
Bottom
Flatter than 10:1
TOTAL
Steeper than 6:1
6:1-8:1
Opposite-Side
8:1-10:1
Back Slope
Flatter than 10:1
TOTAL

All Crashes

Crashes Penetrations % Penetrations Rollovers % Rollovers
74
11
14.9%
4
5.4%
128
8
6.3%
2
1.6%
118
6
5.1%
7
5.9%
174
18
10.3%
9
5.2%
494
43
8.7%
22
4.5%
15
3
20.0%
0
45
5
11.1%
0
40
6
15.0%
0
23
3
13.0%
3
13.0%
123
17
13.8%
3
2.4%
30
5
16.7%
1
3.3%
66
5
7.6%
1
1.5%
69
7
10.1%
5
7.2%
75
7
9.3%
3
4.0%
240
24
10.0%
10
4.2%

857

84

30

9.8%

35

4.1%
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Table 18. Summary of Crash Result and Severity by Barrier Location and Median Slope

Barrier Location

Crashes

Penetrations

Rollovers

A+K Injuries

Shoulders (Either Side)
Traffic-Side Slope
Within 4 ft of Ditch Bottom
Opposite-Side Slope
All Traffic-Side Crashes
All Opposite-Side Crashes
All Crashes Not in Ditch Center

20
485
123
229
494
240
734

20.0%
8.5%
13.8%
8.3%
8.7%
8.8%
8.7%

5.0%
4.3%
2.4%
4.4%
4.5%
4.2%
4.4%

15.0%
4.5%
0.8%
3.5%
4.9%
3.8%
4.5%

All Crashes

857

9.5%

4.1%

4.0%

Approximately 80% of the crashes in the Ohio database occurred on Nucor NU-CABLE
barrier systems. Precise slope data were not available at the time of this study from most of the
other states and barrier systems involved in this research effort. Nonetheless, a concerted effort
was made to tabulate approximate median conditions in other states with different barrier
systems.
A database of Missouri median conditions available at all sites was beyond the scope of
this study, but median geometries for serious crashes involving penetrations or rollovers were
tabulated. The Missouri DOT had approximately 950 miles of low-tension, 3-cable median
barrier installed on interstate roadways. Even though the vast majority of Missouri’s interstate
system has V-ditches with slopes as steep as 4:1, many severe penetration and rollover crashes
occurred on shallower slopes. Missouri’s severe crash data is shown in Tables 19 and 20. Unlike
Ohio, many Missouri medians were relatively narrow, with widths of 40 ft (12 m) or less.
Table 19. Missouri’s Severe Penetration Crash Median Slope Summary

Approach Slope
4:1-6:1
6:1-8:1
8:1-10:1
Flatter than 10:1
All Severe
Penetrations

Severe Penetration Crashes
Barrier Installed On
Shoulders (Both)
1
1
0
1
3
7%

Approach Slope
4
5
2
2
13
31%

Center
5
9
6
2
22
52%

31

Opposite Slope
1
1
1
1
4
10%

All Severe
Penetrations
11
16
9
6

26%
38%
21%
14%
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Table 20. Missouri’s Severe Rollover Crash Median Slope Summary

Approach Slope
4:1-6:1
6:1-8:1
8:1-10:1
Flatter than 10:1
All Severe
Rollovers

Severe Rollover Crashes
Barrier Installed On
Shoulders (Both)
1
2
0
0
3
11%

Approach Slope
0
1
3
2
6
21%

Center
3
6
3
3
15
54%

Opposite Slope
0
0
4
0
4
14%

All Severe
Rollovers
4
9
10
5

14%
32%
36%
18%

Despite the limited data set, some tendencies were clear. Barriers installed on approach
slopes relative to traffic flow of encroaching vehicles in Missouri were more frequently involved
in penetration crashes, and the most common location for penetration was when the median
barrier was located near the center of the slope. This is not surprising, and the same effect was
observed in the Ohio median slopes database. Barriers installed on approach slopes, back slopes,
and the center of the V-ditch were subject to the greatest variation in front-end height and impact
orientation angles of the impacting vehicle [20]. Since a large number of low-tension, 3-cable
median barrier installations in Missouri were located near the center of relatively steep, narrow
V-ditches, it was not surprising that center impacts were most common in both the severe
penetration and severe rollover crashes. However, a proportionate distribution of crashes on each
slope type was not available, so estimates of the rates of penetrations or rollovers based on slope
steepness were not applicable.
Approximately 46% of all severe rollover crashes and 64% of all severe penetration
crashes occurred on slope steeper than 8:1; this indicates that rollovers were less frequent on the
steeper slopes than penetrations were. The slopes flatter than 8:1 were relatively infrequent in
Missouri where cable median barriers were installed, but still accounted for 54% of all severe
rollover crashes. General observations about median slope performance were not applicable in
Missouri, since the database did not incorporate non-severe crashes. However, variations in the
results of the Ohio and Missouri databases were likely due to four reasons: (1) Missouri used a
standard low-tension, 3-cable median barrier with S3x5.7 (S76x8.5) steel posts, which are
stronger in weak-axis and strong-axis bending than most proprietary system posts; (2) the
Missouri database was limited to only severe crashes; (3) slopes flatter than 6:1 were infrequent;
and (4) medians were typically narrower in Missouri than in Ohio.
5.2.5 Impact Conditions
Vehicular impact conditions were investigated by performing crash reconstructions with
available scene diagrams and photographic evidence, when available. A total of 110 severe
crashes with enough information to reconstruct the crash were analyzed in the State of Missouri.
Vehicle CG trajectory, orientation, and sideslip angles were calculated. Unfortunately, roadway
curvature data were not available, which would allow for comparison of expected and actual CG
trajectory angles; however, most roadways were straight in this study.
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The CG trajectory angle was defined as the angle formed between the vehicle CG path
and a tangent line to the barrier at the point of impact (POI). Vehicle orientation angle was
defined as the angle formed by a driver’s line of sight (LOS) and a tangent line to the barrier at
the POI or equivalently, the angle between the vehicle’s centerline and the barrier tangent. The
sideslip angle represented the degree to which a vehicle was “tracking,” a condition in which the
rear tires follow the tracks of the front tires. Sideslip angles were measured between the CG
trajectory angle and the orientation angle of the vehicle at the POI. For both trajectory and
orientation angles, vehicle heading toward the median was positive ranging between 0 and 180
degrees; heading angles directed away from the median ranged between 180 and 360 degrees.
Trajectory angles were plotted by orientation angle and sideslip angle, and are shown in
Figures 7 and 8. Although sideslip angles between the path of the vehicle and heading can
exceed 90 deg, high sideslip angles were generated by non-zero yaw rates; this is assumed to be
an effectively non-tracking impact condition. Moreover, if the driver was conscious and aware to
steer the vehicle in avoidance maneuvers, a large number of drivers will also instinctively apply
the brakes and attempt to stop an errant vehicle, which further contributes to non-tracking
behavior. The threshold between when a vehicle was considered tracking and non-tracking was
determined to be approximately 20 degrees based on analysis of non-tracking behavior on crash
results [21].
The trajectory angle distribution was very high relative to other studies conducted on
severe crash results. The severe CMB crash results were compared to the distribution of severe
crash results in the 2010 NCHRP Report No. 665 database [22]. The 50th, 75th, 85th, and 95th
percentiles of the severe CMB crash distributions corresponded to 18, 30, 38, and 53 degrees,
respectively. By contrast, the 50th, 75th, 85th, and 95th percentile departure angles measured from
the database of severe crashes in NCHRP Report No. 665, which was used to determine the test
speed and angles for full-scale test criteria for assessing safety hardware, corresponded to 15, 22,
26, and 36 degrees, respectively.
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Figure 7. CG Trajectory and Orientation Angles in Severe Cable Median Barrier Crashes
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Figure 8. CG Trajectory and Sideslip Angles in Severe Cable Median Barrier Crashes
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Historically, the roadside safety community collectively agreed that the 85th percentile
impact condition for both speeds and angles could be regarded as a practical worst-case impact
scenario to evaluate roadside hardware. As has been discussed in depth, selection of practical
impact conditions should not be subjective and should evaluate a system’s capacity to capture,
contain, or redirect the majority of impacting vehicles [23]. Although the 25 degree impact angle
previously used for crash tests using 4,400-lb (2,000-kg) pickup trucks was approximately 0.6
degrees lower than the 85th percentile roadside departure condition identified in NCHRP Report
No. 665, the small difference between testing and actual impact conditions suggested that the
historical impact angle was sufficiently accurate for continued evaluation of roadside features.
The departure angle was selected in lieu of the impact angle when determining appropriate
testing conditions. This angle was selected for many reasons, including:
(1) Initial impact location was affected by proximity of the struck object to the sides of
the road. Impacts far from the road permit the vehicle to slow down to low speeds,
reducing the crash severity that would normally occur with a barrier or roadside
feature at much closer proximity. Because there are currently no required crash tests
to evaluate vehicular braking in advance of a barrier system, impact conditions
currently do not accommodate driver inputs prior to impact.
(2) In many multiple-impact events, selection would have to be applied to determine
which event was most significant, which introduces both subjectivity and error. Crush
energy contributions were frequently very difficult to partition to individual impacts.
(3) Barrier crashes were undersampled in the NCHRP Report No. 665 database. The
small barrier crash data set prohibited meaningful statistical analysis out of barrier
crash results. Furthermore, the majority of the barrier impact events were at much
higher speeds than occurred in non-barrier crashes.
(4) Some roadside departures resulting in disabling vehicle damage, such as rollovers,
did not have a clearly defined orientation angle prior to impact. Interpretations of the
effective location of impact varied widely, and vehicle orientation during these types
of crashes was frequently difficult to determine. Orientation and departure angles
were not only easier to measure at departure, they were often more meaningful, since
crash testing has historically been conducted with fully-tracking vehicles.
CG trajectory and orientation angles measured at the first recorded location of impact
obtained from the NCHRP 665 database were much closer to the corresponding angles at impact
measured in the severe cable median barrier crashes in Missouri. If current MASH [24] crash
tests were conducted at the same speed but the angle was increased from 25 degrees to 39
degrees, the impact severity (IS) of the crash would increase by 120%. Few barriers have ever
been subject to this level of scrutiny.
The CG trajectory and orientation angle plot was segregated by crash result into
“Penetration”, “Rollover”, or “Other” categories. The segregated database is shown in Figure 10,
and a detail view for vehicle orientation angles greater than -10 degrees is shown in Figure 11.
Of all the severe cable median barrier crashes, 43% occurred with sideslip angles in
excess of 20 degrees. Approximately 40% of penetration crashes were non-tracking at impact
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with the barrier. Severe penetrations occurred more commonly at higher CG trajectory angles
than severe rollovers. The median CG trajectory angle in severe penetration crashes in Missouri
was 24 degrees, and the 85th percentile angle was 46 degrees.
In Missouri, 63% of the severe rollover crashes that were caused by the cable median
barrier occurred with CG trajectory angles less than 20 degrees. The median CG trajectory angle
for the severe rollover crashes was 16 degrees, and the 85th percentile CG trajectory angle was 35
degrees.
Very few crashes occurred with “overcorrecting” and non-tracking impact conditions in
which the driver of the vehicle was attempting to steer the vehicle away from the barrier. This
type of orientation tended to promote a more “broadside” impact condition, where the side of the
vehicle makes first contact with the barrier instead of the front end. This was likely a product of
the generally steep terrain found in Missouri’s medians, and relatively narrow medians typically
measuring 40 ft (12.2 m) wide. Drivers who steered into the median would then find it very
difficult to steer away from the barrier and back up the approach slope, which could have
contributed to fewer “overcorrecting” impacts.
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Figure 11. Detail View of Severe Crash CG Trajectory and Orientation Angles in Missouri
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Alternatively, “oversteering” impacts, in which the orientation angle of the vehicle was
larger than the CG trajectory angle, were very common. Approximately 51% of severe
penetration crashes, 53% of severe rollover crashes, and 49% of all severe crashes had
“oversteering” conditions. Comparatively, 83% of severe penetrations, 85% of severe rollovers,
and 82% of severe non-penetration, non- rollover crashes with non-tracking impact conditions
were “oversteering” crashes. The high number of oversteering crashes in the median was a
reflection of median geometry and roadway conditions. Vehicles which strike a cable median
barrier located near the center of a V-ditch have a minimum lateral offset that must be traversed
before impact, which tends to bias crash results toward higher CG trajectory angles. This crash
condition was reflected in real-world crash results, but suggests that future testing of cable
median barriers should be conducted for both tracking and non-tracking impact conditions.
The crash set was further evaluated by considering the relationship between CG
trajectory angle and containment rate for severe crashes. A cumulative distribution plot of CG
trajectory angle for severe penetration and rollover crashes as well as severe non-penetration,
non-rollover crashes is shown in Figure 12. A statistical analysis was conducted on the CG
trajectory angle distributions, and a probability curve for likelihood of penetration or rollover
crash results in severe cable median barrier crashes is shown in Figure 13.
In all severe crashes, there was a minimum of a 49% risk of penetration or rollover at
very small CG trajectory angles to a high risk of penetration or rollover at large CG trajectory
angles. As the CG trajectory angle approached 90 degrees, the risk of penetration or rollover
crash results in severe cable median barrier crashes approached 100%, indicating that with a 90
degree CG trajectory angle and a severe crash result, every crash would be expected to be either
a penetration or rollover.
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Figure 12. Cumulative Distribution of CG Trajectory Angles by Severe Crash Result
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Figure 13. Probability Distribution of Containment Failure in Severe Crashes
5.2.6 Comparison of Missouri and North Carolina
Additionally, a subset of crashes in North Carolina was analyzed, consisting of entirely
penetration-related crashes. The penetration crashes were not randomly selected, but typically
were investigated in greater detail either when DOT staff saw crash results on newscasts or when
crashes were spotted by a field observation team. The investigative teams typically measured
median profiles, center-of-cable heights, which side of the low-tension 3-cable median barrier
was struck (i.e., side with one or with two cables), tire trajectory marks, and the number of posts
damaged. Researchers were then able to determine departure and impact CG trajectory and
orientation angles, and observed a higher number of “backside” penetration crashes, in which the
barrier was penetrated more often when struck on the side of the barrier with one supported
cable. Photographs were taken of both the vehicle and barrier system involved in the crash.
The subset of crashes investigated, totaling 22 in all, were plotted in a distribution and
compared with the severe crashes in Missouri, as shown in Figure 14. The North Carolina
sample also tended toward higher angles than the NCHRP 665 crashes, but the sample size was
too small to make judgments about the distribution. Preliminary attempts to determine
correlations using chi-squared tests were not statistically significant (i.e., p values between 0.4 to
0.7), but it is likely that the distributions would be similar if additional data were obtained.
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5.2.7 Crash Severity
The relative severity of crashes on each barrier type is shown in Tables 21 through 23.
Penetration Severe Crash Contributions (PSCC) and Rollover Severe Crash Contribution
(RSCC), along with Penetration Severity Increase Factors (PSIF) and Rollover Severity Increase
Factors (RSIF) metrics, were created to evaluate the relative severity risk of each type of crash
outcome based on the barrier system. PSIF, PSCC, RSIF, and RSCC metrics are explained on
page 43.
The severe crash contribution factors represent the total contribution of penetration and
rollover crashes to all severe crash outcomes. Both PSCC and RSCC were summed to analyze
relative severities. If the sum of PSCC and RSCC approach 100%, it would correspond to a
situation in which every severe crash outcome was determined solely by penetration or rollover
crash occurrence. If the sum of PSCC and RSCC was low, it would indicate little correlation
between crash outcome and crash severity, instead suggesting other factors were more significant
to severe crash outcome.
The PSIF was calculated from the ratio of the frequency of severe penetration crashes to
the frequency of severe non-penetration crashes. Likewise, the RSIF was calculated from the
ratio of the frequency of severe rollover crashes to the frequency of severe non-rollover crashes.
In this way, the ratio of the severities of penetration and rollover crashes were determined. As a
result, a PSIF of 1.0 corresponded to a case in which the penetration crash had an equivalent risk
of severe injury or fatality as a non-penetration crash. The highest average PSIF was 13.2 for
low-tension, 3-cable median barrier, and the highest RSIF was 12.0 for the Brifen Wire Rope
Safety Fence (WRSF). In general, higher PSIF and RSIF corresponded to lower average severity
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non-penetration and non-rollover crashes. The aggregate A+K crash severities for each system
were reported, even when PSCC, RSCC, PSIF, and RSIF were not available.
When data were not available for either rollover or penetration data sets, data subsets
were created for each group and the results were compared to the composite totals. For every
barrier except the low-tension cable median barrier, the subset distributions were nearly identical
to the aggregate. Subsets of the low-tension cable median barrier crash results are compared in
Tables 21 through 23.
Although Gibraltar barrier systems were represented in the database, less than 100 total
crashes and less than 15 total penetration crashes were available for analysis on the Gibraltar
data. The Safence database was at the level of statistical significance (295 crashes); however, the
number of penetrations was unknown and the tolerance on the number of A+K crashes in the
rollover database was significant; the variation in a single crash at the A+K level would produce
0.4% difference in net A+K rate. Therefore, PSCC, RSCC, PSIF, and RSIF were not calculated
for these systems. Additionally, very few Brifen crashes were available for examination with
respect to penetration frequencies, which rendered the PSCC and PSIF less useful.
The “effective” A+K rate was a obtained by averaging the A+K ratios in the datasets, if
average state-level data were available; otherwise it was equal to the sum of severe crashes
divided by the total number of crashes. Since Missouri’s A+K ratio was known, it was included
when calculating the effective A+K ratio, even though all cable median barrier crashes were not
included in the data set.
Based on the metrics created to analyze the crash results, several important but surprising
conclusions were made. First, the barrier system with the lowest average severity was the lowtension, 3-cable median barrier system. The maximum state-reported frequency of severe crashes
on the low-tension, 3-cable median barrier was 2.0%. Even this maximum number was lower
than every other barrier type analyzed in every other state.
Second, rollover severity was higher on high-tension systems than on the low-tension, 3cable median barrier, on average. This was unexpected since the low-tension, 3-cable median
barriers have the highest rates of rollover of all barrier systems. Although the proportionate
number of rollovers was high, these crashes included “tip-overs” in which vehicles made less
than 3 quarter-turns. When rollover crashes involved less than 3 quarter-turns, the rollovers were
generally low-speed, and as such had a significantly lower risk of severe injury than higherspeed rollovers. The rollover mechanism most commonly associated with low-speed rollovers
was contact with post members. Since the low-tension cable median barrier uses the stiffest post
in weak-axis bending, it is not surprising that rollovers occurred more frequently, but with lower
average severity, than high-tension systems. A more complete discussion of rollover crashes is
provided in Chapter 11.
Third, severe penetration and rollover crashes had the highest representation of all severe
crashes on low-tension cable median barriers. This indicated that the number of non-rollover,
non-penetration severe crashes on low-tension cable median barrier was the lowest of all barrier
types evaluated. Alternatively, this statistic indicated that uncontrolled or unknown types of
serious injury mechanisms, such as occupant contact with system components or high-exit angle
redirection crashes, were minimal.
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Table 21. Crash Severities by System Type and Penetration Crash Outcome
Low-Tension 3-Cable Set 1

Injury Severity

Low-Tension 3-Cable Set 2

Brifen WRSF TL-3

Nucor NU-CABLE TL-3

Trinity CASS 3-Cable

Crashes

Freq

Penetrations

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Penetrations

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Penetrations

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Penetrations

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Penetrations

Freq

Killed (K)

3

0.4%

3

100.0%

19

0.6%

10

52.6%

6

0.4%

-

-

3

0.4%

0

-

19

1.0%

7

36.8%

Disabling Injury (A)

13

1.6%

7

53.8%

25

0.7%

9

36.0%

34

2.2%

-

-

26

3.7%

7

26.9%

33

1.7%

5

15.2%

Moderate Injury (B)

59

7.4%

12

20.3%

164

4.9%

33

20.1%

109

7.0%

-

-

81

11.4%

10

12.3%

125

6.4%

13

10.4%

Slight Injury (C)

76

9.6%

12

15.8%

462

13.8%

37

8.0%

139

9.0%

-

-

58

8.2%

5

8.6%

173

8.9%

19

11.0%

Property Damage Only (O)

644

81.0%

63

9.8%

2688

80.0%

110

4.1%

1263

81.4%

-

-

543

76.4%

43

7.9%

1593

82.0%

129

8.1%

Severe Crashes (A+K)

16

2.0%

10

10.3%

44

1.3%

19

9.5%

40

2.6%

-

-

29

4.1%

7

10.8%

52

2.7%

12

6.9%

Total Applicable Crashes

795

-

97

12.2%

3358

-

199

5.9%

1551

-

-

711

-

65

9.1%

1943

-

173

8.9%

CONTRIBUTION

62.5% PSCC

43.2% PSCC

-

24.1% PSCC

23.1% PSCC

PENETRATION FACTOR

13.7 PSIF

12.8 PSIF

-

3.5 PSIF

2.6 PSIF

Table 22. Crash Severities by System Type and Rollover Crash Outcome
Low-Tension 3-Cable Set 1

Injury Severity

Low-Tension 3-Cable Set 2

Brifen WRSF TL-3

Nucor NU-CABLE TL-3

Trinity CASS 3-Cable

43

Crashes

Freq

Rollovers

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Rollovers

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Rollovers

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Rollovers

Freq

Crashes

Freq

Rollovers

Freq

Killed (K)

3

0.4%

0

-

19

0.6%

-

-

6

0.4%

1

16.7%

3

0.3%

1

33.3%

20

1.0%

6

30.0%

Disabling Injury (A)

13

1.6%

3

23.1%

25

0.7%

-

-

34

2.2%

10

29.4%

35

3.7%

7

20.0%

35

1.7%

9

25.7%

Moderate Injury (B)

59

7.4%

22

37.3%

164

4.9%

-

-

109

7.0%

13

11.9%

93

9.9%

12

12.9%

130

6.4%

26

20.0%

Slight Injury (C)

76

9.6%

10

13.2%

462

13.8%

-

-

139

9.0%

7

5.0%

64

6.8%

7

10.9%

176

8.7%

13

7.4%

Property Damage Only (O)

644

81.0%

27

4.2%

2688

80.0%

-

-

1263

81.4%

18

1.4%

749

79.3%

7

0.9%

1661

82.1%

44

2.6%

Severe Crashes (A+K)

16

2.0%

3

4.8%

44

1.3%

-

-

40

2.6%

11

22.4%

38

4.0%

8

23.5%

55

2.7%

15

15.3%

Total Applicable Crashes

795

-

62

7.8%

3358

-

-

-

1551

49

3.2%

944

-

34

3.6%

2022

-

98

4.8%

CONTRIBUTION

18.8% RSCC

-

27.5% RSCC

21.1% RSCC

27.3% RSCC

ROLLOVER FACTOR

3.0 RSIF

-

12.0 RSIF

7.4 RSIF

7.7 RSIF
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PSCC = Penetration Severe Crash Contribution; ratio of number of severe penetration crashes to number of all severe crashes
PSIF = Penetration Severity Increase Factor; ratio of percent risk of A+K crash in penetration crashes to non-penetration crashes
RSCC = Rollover Severe Crash Contribution; ratio of number of severe rollover crashes to number of all severe crashes
RSIF = Rollover Severity Increase Factor; ratio of percent risk of A+K in rollover crashes to non-rollover crashes
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Table 23. Risk Factor Summary for Barrier Systems
Low-Tension
3-Cable

Brifen
WRSF

PSCC
RSCC
TOTAL
PSIF
RSIF
AVERAGE

48.1%
22.8%
70.8%
13.2
3.0
8.1

27.5%
12.0
-

24.1%
21.1%
45.2%
3.5
7.4
5.4

EFFECTIVE A+K

1.8%

2.6%

4.1%

Nucor
Trinity CASS
NU-CABLE

Gibraltar

Safence
(4-Cable)

23.1%
27.3%
50.3%
2.6
7.7
5.2

-

-

2.7%

2.9%

2.2%

A closer examination of the non-penetration and non-rollover severe crashes with cable
median barriers frequently incorporated occupant contact with posts supporting cables, unbelted
occupant ejection, occupant compartment intrusion not caused by penetration or rollover events,
and high lateral or longitudinal accelerations due to cable tension. All of these factors were more
pronounced in the high-tension cable barrier system crashes than in low-tension system crashes,
indicating that increased cable tension may have led to an increase in A+K crashes.
Consideration of barrier placement may explain some of the differences in barrier
performance. An analysis on the severity of crashes based on barrier location was conducted in
Ohio. Crashes were tabulated based on barrier location in the median as Traffic Side, Center, or
Opposite Side positions. Crashes with barriers included in the Center category were within 4 ft
(1.2 m) of the center of the median. All installations further than 4 ft (1.2 m) from the median
were either classified as Traffic Side or Opposite Side installations, depending on the vehicle’s
direction of travel. A summary of the performance evaluation of crashes in Ohio is shown in
Table 24.
Table 24. Crash Severity by Barrier Location

Barrier Location

Crashes

Penetrations

Rollovers

A+K Injuries

Traffic-Side
Center
Opposite-Side
Traffic- and Opposite-Sides

235
128
494
729

8.7%
14.1%
7.7%
8.4%

4.5%
3.1%
3.8%
4.3%

4.9%
1.6%
3.4%
4.4%

It was determined that the highest crash severity occurred with traffic-side installations,
with an effective A+K rate of 4.9%. Barriers installed in the median center had an effective A+K
rate of 1.6%, whereas barriers installed on the opposite side had an effective A+K rate of 3.4%.
Chi-squared tests conducted comparing the Traffic and Opposite Side crashes to Center crashes
were on the bounds of significance. The p-value of the severe crash comparison was 0.118,
which was significant at the 12% confidence level. Comparison of the distribution of penetration
and rollover crashes was much more significant, with a p-value of 0.002; this is very statistically
significant. Likewise, if the injury distributions were shifted, and A, B, and K injuries were
compared, the distributions were statistically different with p-value 0.020, and was statistically
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significant at the 2% level. Therefore, it can be conclusively determined that the distributions of
crashes are not similar, and it is very likely that barriers placed in the center of medians are
associated with fewer severe crashes than installations on the traffic- or opposite sides of the
roadway. Although it was beyond the level of statistical significance, the analysis also suggested
a higher rate of severe crash outcomes with installations placed near either shoulder.
5.3 Discussion
Results from this study were groundbreaking in several facets. To date, few studies were
available which have applied a broad cross-section evaluation of any barrier type to determine
weaknesses, barrier containment failures, and potential improvements which could be made on
the barrier systems. As such, there was little precedent on which to build in this crash study, and
many recommendations made previously were determined to be less advantageous than
originally believed.
With the lack of precedent, surveyed state DOTs could not supply all of the information
desired by researchers. No single state could supply a comprehensive data set with crash reports
filed by responding emergency personnel and DOT staff, photos of crash scenes, measurements
from crash sites, vehicle information, and slope geometries. Most states dedicated effort to assist
with individual portions of the data requested even at cost to the state DOTs. The information
presented in this report represents the best-effort and broad cooperation of state DOTs pooling
information together to solve problems and improve cable barrier safety performance. As a
result, some interpolation and extrapolation was necessary, which introduced uncertainty in the
analysis.
One element of cable barrier serious crash risk included risk due to motorcyclist travel.
Motorcyclist impacts with cable median barriers have historically caused concern. A study
completed in 2011 determined that although motorcyclist traffic accounted for approximately 2%
of all cable median barrier crashes, over 40% of those crashes were severe [25]. Out of states
with complete data sets in this study, 13 motorcyclists were involved in crashes with cable
median barriers, and 10 of those crashes were severe, with 4 fatalities. In Missouri, out of 127
severe crashes, motorcyclists accounted for 3 crashes, or 2.4% of all serious and fatal crash
events. Motorcyclist safety will continue to be a concern for roadside safety engineers.
Lastly, it should be noted that high-severity crashes which occurred with barrier systems
installed on roadway shoulders were not caused by problems with construction. No cable median
barrier installation observed was found to be deficient with respect to manufacturer’s installation
recommendations. However, site-specific analysis was limited to detailed narrative, site drawing,
photographic, and scene diagram evidence. Future improvements to cable median barrier designs
must be accomplished to realize the maximum safety improvement potential.
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6 CASE STUDY
One distinctive discrepancy in the data set in particular was centered around the Trinity
Cable Safety System (CASS) performance in Utah versus Washington. Both states had a
significant number of miles of CASS system installed yet the rates of penetration on this system
were markedly different between the states. In fact, the average rate of penetration due to the
combined effects of vehicle underride, override, and rollover on CASS systems in Utah was only
6.1% on a per-crash basis. However, in Washington, the rate of penetration was much higher,
with a possible net frequency of 14.5%. Cross-median events in which the vehicle entered
opposing lanes totaled 4.6% of all cable median barrier crashes in Washington, and CMCs
resulting from cable median barrier penetrations occurred in 2.0% of all CMB crashes. Yet,
based on images of barrier installations along Washington and Utah roadways using Google
Street View, there were no apparent differences between the states with respect to barrier
construction using the C-channel post, and both states rigorously maintained recommended
barrier placement guidelines provided by FHWA and research reports. An analysis of the
differences between Utah and Washington results is provided below.
6.1 Weather Conditions
Along the I-15 corridor in Utah, annual snowfall totals can exceed 200 in. (5,080 mm)
per year, more than 10 times greater than the state average. The precipitation totals along I-15 are
much higher than the remainder of the state, as shown in Figure 1. More than 50% of all crashes
reported in Utah involved snowfall. This was more than twice as large as the snow representation
in Washington. Although some locations in Washington received high snow totals, particularly at
higher-elevation locations near the mountains, the majority of the crashes into cable median
barrier occurred in coastal regions where snowfall was infrequent. Snowfall tended to decrease
both penetration and rollover propensity, whereas frequent rain near cable barrier locations could
contribute to weak post-soil interaction in Washington, increasing penetration propensity.
6.2 Traffic Volumes
Typical ADT counts in Washington on roadways with cable median barriers varied
between 20,000 vehicles per day to over 100,000 vehicles per day throughout the state. In Utah,
traffic volumes ranged from less than 10,000 vehicles per day to over 100,000 vehicles per day
on similar roadways with cable median barrier. More crashes in Utah occurred on roadways with
lower traffic volumes than in Washington. The average difference in traffic volumes between
crashes in Utah and Washington was over 20%. Furthermore, a larger percentage of heavy trucks
were present in Washington relative to Utah. Thus, cross-median and penetration crash events
which were not within the design limits of the barrier occurred. Although these crashes were not
part of the failure analysis study since these barriers were not designed to withstand impact from
larger trucks, these crashes nonetheless contributed to some severe injuries.
6.3 Avoidance Maneuvers
In Utah, most cable barrier crashes were caused by vehicles losing control due to wet,
snow-covered, or icy road conditions. Crashes in which the vehicle striking the cable median
barrier encountered dry roads and clear weather conditions in addition to being involved in
avoidance maneuvers, were relatively sparse. For example, the frequency of avoidance-related
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crashes in Utah was approximately 9.0%, and at least one additional vehicle contributed to the
crash sequence in 19.8% of the cable barrier crashes. Although avoidance maneuver statistics
could not be obtained for Washington crashes, approximately 37.2% of crashes involved more
than one vehicle, which was nearly twice the rate of Utah. This suggests that due to large traffic
volumes, avoidance maneuvers occurred more frequently in Washington than in Utah, and fewer
severe crashes occurred in Utah as a result.
Avoidance maneuvers generally resulted in higher CG trajectory and orientation angles
because of highly-dynamic, large steering angle motions. These motions can alter a vehicle’s
travel path and cause a non-tracking skid engagement. As was observed in the Missouri cable
median barrier impact angle analysis, high CG trajectory and orientation angles frequently led to
severe penetration crash events. The lower number of avoidance-related crashes in Utah
indicated that many cable barrier crashes were likely low-angle events caused by loss of control,
not avoidance from an adjacent or encroaching vehicle.
6.4 Median Geometries
Medians on Washington roadways frequently ranged between 35 and 50 ft (10 and 15 m)
wide. Over 63% of the crashes in Washington occurred with maximum median widths less than
45 ft (13.7 m). In Utah, however, average median widths exceeded 50 ft (15 m) in many sample
sites measured from satellite images with map scaling using CAD programs. Some median
widths on roadways with cable median barrier installed approached 80 ft (24.3 m).
Cross-median crashes occurred on roads with median widths exceeding 70 ft (21 m), as
recorded in the California, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Missouri studies mentioned previously
[2,6,8,12]. By placing a barrier in the median, the barrier impact absorbs some energy from a
crash even if a penetration occurs. By decreasing vehicle energy and providing some lateral
resistance during impact, the tendency for cross-median crashes to occur on roads with wide
medians drops significantly. With this reduction in CMCs, severe crash risks are also reduced.
In Utah, with larger medians and relatively flat slopes (most slopes were between 6:1 and
10:1), a higher proportion of impacts occurred on the median slopes with lowest risk of
penetration than in Washington, based on the median slope results shown in Figure 6. Sitespecific estimates in Washington indicated that the roads with the highest rates of penetration
were sites with either fairly flat (i.e., flatter than 8:1) or steep (i.e., greater than 6:1) median
slopes. The two roads with the lowest rates of penetration had estimated slope rates of between
6:1 and 8:1 over much of the protected length, and much of that roadway was at 8:1.
6.5 Barrier Placement
Cable median barriers were also frequently placed near the edge of median shoulders in
Washington, adjacent to the travel lanes. In Utah, many cable median barrier installations were
located in the median, either 1 ft (0.3 m) or 8 ft (2.4 m) from the ditch centerline, or up to 16 ft
(4.9 m) from the road. Barrier installations near the ditch center can reduce the number of
nuisance hits by allowing an opportunity for vehicles to correct from errant maneuvers. When
vehicles are engaged in avoidance maneuvers, CG trajectory angles tend to increase relative to
the barrier proportionately with the distance between the travel lanes and the barrier installation.
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During loss of control, however, vehicle speeds at impact were typically lower when barriers
were far from the roadway due to heavy braking and skidding.
Swerving, avoidance, or over-correcting maneuvers in Washington caused more vehicles
to strike the barrier at higher orientation angles and CG trajectory angles. Barriers located on the
shoulder permitted the vehicle striking the barrier from adjacent travel lanes to pry under or
override the cables, and vehicles impacting from the opposite direction to pry underneath or
launch over the barrier. Crash outcomes depended on the impact angles, impact speeds, slope
rates, and vehicle profiles.
6.6 Conclusions
As a result, it was reasonable to assume that average impact CG trajectory angles and
speeds during cable barrier impacts in Washington were higher than the average impact CG
trajectory angles and speeds in Utah. This determination was based on the frequencies in snowrelated crashes, as well as differences in median widths, traffic volumes, and the number of lanes
on each roadway where crashes occurred. Similar arguments can also be provided for many of
the states participating in this study.
However, Washington provided a tabulated list of only whether or not a rollover
occurred, as well as the maximum injury level sustained in a crash, in lieu of which vehicle
rolled and which vehicle had the highest severity. Rollovers occurred in 12% of all crashes
involving more than one vehicle in Washington, and data from other states suggested that in at
least 15% of multi-vehicle crashes involving cable median barrier, and possibly up to 30%, the
vehicle which does not strike the cable median barrier was involved in the rollover. This could
reduce the actual rate of rollover on Washington systems by 1.8% to 3.6%. Similarly, multiple
vehicles were involved in most of the severe crashes in Washington. Approximately 1.5% of all
Washington crashes were A+K crashes not involving head-on collisions with vehicles in
opposing travel lanes. Approximately 20% of the non-cross-median serious crashes in which
multiple vehicles were involved should not have been classified as serious crashes due to higher
injury severity to an occupant in the vehicle which did not strike the barrier than in the vehicle
which did. Accounting for this adjustment, the average rate of severe crashes caused by the cable
median barrier would be reduced to 2.1% in Washington, which compares favorably with all
other states in this study. Unfortunately, these adjustments cannot be made on the individual case
level, which could affect one installed system to a greater degree than another.
However, none of the aforementioned factors should increase liability to any state
participating in this study. As stated, this study was both groundbreaking and unique, and the
recommendations provided in this research establish a precedent for future research and
consideration. Barrier installations already constructed or in construction prior to the publication
of this report cannot be treated with the same scrutiny as future barrier installations. Benefit-tocost analyses are required to provide improved guidance in the future changes to policy and
construction. Furthermore, all states participating in this study indicated that the findings would
be helpful to guide future policy and construction, as part of a very active attempt to improve
roadside safety. For this reason, states participating in this study should be lauded for their
enduring commitments to safety.
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For example, expanding median widths and regrading medians of established roadways
can be often impossible due to constraints on the right-of-way, drainage, and prohibitively large
construction costs in these locations. The benefit-to-cost ratios of many of these efforts are often
much less than 1. Future construction projects may not have a sufficient budget to address these
needs as well. Furthermore, no median slope was “immune” to either penetration or rollover
crashes; only a minimization was observed. Instead, it is generally desirable that modifications
can be made to existing cable median barrier systems to improve performance regardless of
placement or median slope rate, since this generally has a lower net cost to the state and a higher
propensity for better overall barrier performance. However, such developments require extensive
crash-testing, design and validation work, marketing, and production, and it will require time for
manufacturers to develop products to address these newly-identified needs.
In every state, significant effort was expended to adhere to the current state of knowledge
of cable median barrier construction and recommendations at the time of barrier installation [2628]. It has been frequently re-iterated in roadside safety conversations that barrier installations at
or near the shoulder should decrease impact severity; the opposite effect was observed. Most
cable median barrier placement guidelines have been developed based on case studies and
simulations of cable median barrier impacts, and have led to some important and meaningful
conclusions about improper placement and practices. However, in nearly every design simulation
utilized by roadside safety research organizations, modeled cable properties were not reflective
of actual cable material and physical properties [29]. However, since replacing systems installed
on the shoulder could also be cost-prohibitive compared to the safety benefit realized; a better
solution would be to improve barrier design for systems installed on shoulders.
Every cable median barrier system evaluated in this study has passed NCHRP Report No.
350 crash test standards at the TL-3 impact conditions. Currently, there are no standards or
requirements for agencies or states to test barriers to non-standard impact conditions, and
systems are currently in testing according to MASH standards. However, impact conditions
which led to an increased propensity for penetration through the barrier or rollover were not
consistent with NCHRP Report 350 or MASH crash-testing standards. Oversteering crashes
dominated the database, occurring more frequently than even low-sideslip crashes. Since no
cable median barrier has been tested with these impact conditions to date, and these impact
conditions are not required for a barrier system to be installed in the median of a roadway in the
National Highway System (NHS), there is no meaningful argument that states or barrier
manufacturers have acted negligently with respect to any existing barrier installation or barriers
currently under construction.
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7 VEHICLE ANALYSIS
7.1 Introduction
Vehicle profiles have often been cited as critical factors in the performance of cable
median barrier systems. Unfortunately, a comprehensive cross-sectional analysis of cable median
barrier crashes and vehicle profiles has not been available. It was frequently cited in publications
and re-iterated in conversations with DOT representatives that cable median barriers are less
capable of safely containing larger, taller vehicles such as trucks, as well as to low-profile,
narrow-front-end vehicles such as roadster or sport car vehicles. Furthermore, many experts
believed some vehicles were uniquely susceptible to penetration or rollover compared to other
vehicles, due to inertial, suspension, and front profile differences [e.g. 10, 20, 27]. As a result, it
was uncertain whether the roadside safety community was conducting crash tests with
representative practical worst-case vehicles, or if more critical vehicles should be used.
Based on vehicle makes, models, and years involved in cable median barrier crashes, a
database was constructed relating vehicle dimensions and properties to crash results. Data from
states not providing vehicle year, make, and model were excluded from the analysis.
Two different reference databases of vehicle dimensions were consulted to identify
critical features of vehicles involved in roadside safety crashes. The first reference was the
National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) crash testing vehicle data
spreadsheet, which tabulated vehicle dimensions and weights of vehicles used in various crash
testing programs including the New Car Assessment Program (NCAP) [30]. The second resource
consulted included dimensions of various vehicles tabulated by make, model, and year. The data
were assembled by expert crash reconstructionists into the program Expert AutoStats, produced
by 4N6XPRT Systems.
Vehicle dimensions and inertial properties of both databases were compared. In general,
less information was available from the NHTSA dataset, since data tabulation in the NHTSA set
supported frontal crash testing programs. Discrepancies between the databases were typically
minimal, with the exception of weights. The differences are believed to be the result of the
inclusion of dummies in NCAP testing.
7.2 Vehicle Types
Vehicle types were classified using a simple heuristic combination of Highway Loss Data
Institute (HLDI) classifications of passenger cars, and segregation of utility vehicles into van,
SUV, and light truck profiles. HLDI classifications segregated passenger cars by wheelbase and
overall length. Small cars were defined to be cars with total lengths less than 180 in. (4,572 mm)
and wheelbases less than 105 in. (2,667 mm). Mid-size cars were defined as vehicles with
wheelbases between 105 and 110 in. (2,667 and 2,794 mm) and overall lengths between 180 and
195 in. (4,572 and 4,953 mm), and large cars were taken to be the remainder of the passenger
cars. Tractor-trailer, large truck, and commercial or mass transit vehicles were categorized as
“Large Vehicles,” but due to the relatively low frequency of impacts at only 1.9% of all crashes,
a detailed analysis of tractor-trailer and large vehicle crashes was not conducted.
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The impact distribution by vehicle type is shown in Figure 15. Each distribution was
plotted as a percentage with the type of crash noted. Small cars were involved in the highest
number of crashes and penetrations, but were involved in fewer rollovers than SUVs. Likewise,
mid-size cars were involved in the second highest number of crashes and penetrations, but were
involved in fewer rollovers than small cars, SUVs, and pickups, in terms of total crashes.
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Percent of All Crash Type
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All Crashes
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Penetrations
Rollovers
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15%
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Vehicle Type
Large Vehicle category refers to tractor trailers, single-unit trucks, buses, and other large-chassis vehicles.

Figure 15. Vehicle Types Involved in Cable Barrier Crashes
By comparison, rates of vehicle penetration and rollover on a per-crash basis are shown
in Figure 16. Large cars were involved in the highest frequency of penetration crashes, followed
by vans, mid-size cars, and small cars. Surprisingly, pickups had the lowest rates of penetration
of any vehicle type. Although some pickup models were identified which had a higher
susceptibility to penetration crashes, as discussed later, generally pickups were not prone to
penetrating through cable median barriers. Rollovers were infrequent with all passenger car
types, but were common for larger vehicles, averaging more than 10% of all pickup, SUV, and
van crashes combined.
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Figure 16. Frequency of Barrier Failure by Vehicle Type
Serious injury and fatal crashes were distributed between all vehicle classes, as shown in
Figures 17 and 18. Large car and SUV crashes were more severe in general than small car, midsize car, or pickups. Vans had the highest rate of severe crashes. A high number of severe
crashes occurred involving vans. Tractor-trailer crashes involved a high number of cross-median
crashes and rollovers which contributed to the increased average crash severity.
SUVs and large cars were involved in a disproportionately high number of severe
crashes. The high rate of severe crashes with these vehicle classes correlated with the high
rollover and penetration rates. Likewise, despite a high rate of rollovers, pickup trucks were
involved in a significantly lower number of penetration crashes than other vehicle types, which
contributed to a comparable rate of severe crashes as small and mid-size cars.
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Figure 17. Risk of A+K Crash by Vehicle Type
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Figure 18. Frequency of Severe Injury by Crash Result and Vehicle Type
An analysis of severe crashes based on barrier containment rates indicated that the
majority of severe crashes were associated with barrier containment failures, as shown in Figure
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19. The highest frequencies of severe crashes based on containment failures occurred with large
cars, SUVs, and pickups. Not surprisingly, vans had the lowest rate of severe injuries related to
barrier containment failures, since the penetration and rollover rates for vans were not extremely
high while the severe crash rate was conversely very high. Also, mid-size cars were involved in
more crashes in which the vehicle became entrapped in the cables and cables crushed the hood,
roof, or windshield, or penetrated into the occupant compartment of convertibles. As a result,
more non-containment failure related crashes were severe involving mid-size cars than other
vehicle types.
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Figure 19. Percentage of Severe Crashes Related to Containment Failures
7.3 Vehicle Factor Analysis
In order to evaluate the statistical relationships between vehicle parameters and CMB
containment failures, chi-squared tests were performed to evaluate the similarity between vehicle
parameters and the global distribution related to that parameter. The statistical weighting scale
used to evaluate statistical significance is shown in Table 25.
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Table 25. Scales Used to Evaluate Statistical Significance of Chi-Squared Tests
Lower Limit Upper Limit
p-value
p-value

Interpretation

0

0.15

0.15

0.25

Likely Independent

0.25
0.4
0.6
0.75
0.85

0.4
0.6
0.75
0.85
1

Possibly Independent
No Conclusion
Possibly Similar
Likely Similar
Statistically Similar

Statistically Independent

7.3.1 Summary of Important Findings
A summary of critical results pertaining to penetration and rollover crashes is shown in
Table 26. It was obvious that the distribution of vehicles involved in rollover events varied
considerably from the composite distribution. The composite distribution was defined as the
database of all crashes.
Containment failure causes were not known for many of the penetration and rollover
crashes in which vehicle year, make, and model were known. As a result, penetration and
rollover rates could not be segregated for every vehicle. If crashes without containment failure
causes were excluded, the dataset was too small to make critical analysis of the features which
contributed to penetration or rollover. Thus, all containment failures were included and analyzed
in this dataset. In addition, containment failure data from Missouri and North Carolina, which
oversampled severe and penetration crashes, respectively, were included. Overall penetration,
rollover, and severe crash rates were used to scale the resultant frequencies of penetration and
rollover to the calculated national average.
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Table 26. Chi-Squared Tests for Independence of Tested Vehicle Factors
Distributions Evaluated for
Independence using
Chi-Squared Tests
Weight

Penetration Subset Rollover Subset
p-value
p-value

Comparison of Subset to Global Set
Penetration

Rollover

0.7972

0.0000

Likely Similar

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.0758
0.1415

0.2870
0.1914

Statistically Independent
Statistically Independent

Possibly Independent
Likely Independent

Wheelbase

0.4496

0.0005

No Conclusion

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.0582
0.2674

0.6882
0.8409

Statistically Independent
Possibly Independent

Possibly Similar
Likely Similar

Track Width

0.5099

0.0187

No Conclusion

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.0320
0.3922

0.6503
0.3348

Statistically Independent
Possibly Independent

Possibly Similar
Possibly Independent

Bumper Height

0.5732

0.0000

No Conclusion

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.8591
0.5924

0.4536
0.2010

Statistically Similar
No Conclusion

No Conclusion
Likely Independent

Center of Headlight Height

0.2634

0.0000

Possibly Independent

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.5394
0.5454

0.7157
0.4408

No Conclusion
No Conclusion

Possibly Similar
No Conclusion

Front Hood Height

0.6267

0.0000

Possibly Similar

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.0320
0.3922

0.6503
0.3348

Statistically Independent
Possibly Independent

Possibly Similar
Possibly Independent

Rear Bumper Height

0.0615

0.0853

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.2890
0.3338

0.8065
0.3627

Possibly Independent
Possibly Independent

Likely Similar
Possibly Independent

Top of Trunk Height

0.4531

0.0000

No Conclusion

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.5263
0.7745

0.6545
0.9159

No Conclusion
Likely Similar

Possibly Similar
Statistically Similar

CG Height

0.1691

0.0000

Likely Independent

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.2053
0.2089

0.1585
0.5335

Likely Independent
Likely Independent

Likely Independent
No Conclusion

CG from Front Axle

0.6634

0.0000

Possibly Similar

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.9015
0.4500

0.1211
0.9136

Statistically Similar
No Conclusion

Statistically Independent
Statistically Similar

Turning Circle Diameter

0.1363

0.0340

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.1950
0.7420

0.8586
0.8660

Likely Independent
Possibly Similar

Statistically Similar
Statistically Similar

Max Turning Angle

0.3267

0.4031

Possibly Independent

No Conclusion

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.3354
0.7855

0.7174
0.5520

Possibly Independent
Likely Similar

Possibly Similar
No Conclusion

Roll Moment-of-Inertia

0.9626

0.0000

Statistically Similar

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.0497
0.4665

0.1406
0.2802

Statistically Independent
No Conclusion

Statistically Independent
Possibly Independent

Yaw Moment-of-Inertia

0.4904

0.0008

No Conclusion

Statistically Independent

Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
SUVs, Pickups, and Vans

0.6047
0.1170

0.1987
0.9384

Possibly Similar
Statistically Independent

Likely Independent
Statistically Similar
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As shown in Figure 16, SUVs were involved in rollovers in approximately 13% of all
crashes. Likewise, rollovers occurred in 9.4% and 9.3% of all pickup and van crashes,
respectively. With such a significant frequency of rollovers occurring with larger vehicles, the
combined distribution of vehicle dimensions, weights, and inertial properties varied at an
overwhelmingly statistically significant level from the distribution of all crashes, which was
much more balanced in terms of vehicle representation.
By contrast the penetration subset was largely inconclusive with respect to the composite
dataset. While penetration crash frequency was the highest with large cars, penetrations varied
between 9% and 11% of all crashes for four of the vehicle body types. Thus, penetration crashes
did not vary widely from the global composite distribution. The large similarity between the
penetration rates suggests that other factors than the vehicle type, including impact conditions,
median barrier placement, and median slopes have a stronger correlation with penetration
propensity than the vehicle type. Certain features on impacting vehicles, such as sharp front nose
profiles, rear bumper heights, turning circle diameters, and CG heights, serve to accentuate the
risk of penetration.
Vehicle dimensions tabulated from both the NHTSA database and 4N6XPRT Expert
AutoStats program were plotted and compared. Some discrepancies were observed in the
distributions of vehicle wheelbase, weight, and CG heights using both methods, but most of the
variations were within 5% difference. The only statistically significant difference occurred with
large vehicle wheelbases and weights. For example, the Chi-squared error, calculated using the
formula
𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 =

(𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑠−𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑠)2
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑢𝑚 𝐶𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑠

was 52.5 for wheelbases between 115 and 120 in. (2,921 and 3,048 mm), heavily oversampling
larger vehicles in the NHTSA database. As a result, overall p-values of the distributions were
less than 0.001.
7.3.2 Vehicle Curb Properties
Weight distributions varied widely between the NHTSA and AutoStats databases, and are
shown in Figure 20. The discrepancies in weights were likely the result of added weight which
could be attributable of dummies, ballast, and instrumentation used in NCAP testing.
Additionally, the Expert AutoStats program tabulated the vehicle curb weights, whereas the
NHTSA database tabulated gross weight prior to testing. The resultant difference in weights was
approximately 500 lb (227 kg) for the composite distributions.
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Figure 20. Distribution of Vehicle Weight in Severe CMB Impacts by Crash Result
Differences in the database were also related to the information constraints available in
the NHTSA database. When certain years or models of vehicle were not available, the database
was cross-referenced using knowledge of the structural frames used in each model year. For
example, the Ford Taurus and the Mercury Sable were geometrically similar and built on the
same frames through 2006. When one vehicle type was involved in a crash and information on
that year or model could not be found, a search was made for an analogous vehicle platform and
shape from the same year. Also, vehicles from the same production generation years were
examined and occasionally data from older or newer vehicles of the same model were used. As a
result, dimensions and properties obtained from the NHTSA database were extrapolated to the
available vehicles, and were therefore an approximation. This approximation was excellent for
small, mid-size, and full-size cars and SUVs, but was poor for pickups and vans.
Comparisons of the curb weights and exterior dimensions of vehicles in the Expert
AutoStats programs matched manufacturer-provided data in discrete tests. In light of the
differences between the databases, unrealistically high weights, the need for approximations to
associate dimensions in the NHSTA database, and the greater volume of data available using the
Autostats database, the Expert AutoStats data results were concluded to be more accurate and
thus are exclusively shown from this point forward.
The distribution of vehicle weights plotted by crash result and vehicle body type is shown
in Figure 21. The global vehicle weights were poor estimates for the independent effects
observed in the databases. In particular, the global rollover distribution suggests that heavier
vehicles, as a whole, are more likely to be involved in rollover crashes than lighter vehicles.
However, a comparison by vehicle types indicate the opposite effect is likely true – lighter cars
are more commonly involved in rollovers than heavier cars, and there does not appear to be a
causal relationship between SUV, pickup, and van rollovers and vehicle weights. Passenger car
rollover relationships were not statistically significant because there were few passenger car
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rollovers, but it is believed that the relationship would be significant with additional data. By
contrast, heavier passenger cars were statistically significantly more likely to be involved in
penetrations than lighter vehicles. Heavier SUV, van, and pickup vehicles also were involved in
more penetrations than lighter vehicles. Individual plots of the relationships between vehicle
weights and penetration and rollover propensities are shown in Figures 22 and 23.
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Figure 22. Crash Result by Vehicle Weight, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
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Figure 23. Crash Result by Vehicle Weight, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans
Cable barrier failure propensity based on wheelbase is shown in Figure 24. The
distribution of vehicles was plotted with the frequency of penetration or rollover in each
category. Rollovers were more frequent with increasing wheelbase. Recall that small car classes
according to HLDI classifications had wheelbases less than 105 in. (2,667 mm) and total lengths
less than 185 in. (4,699 mm), and mid-size cars had wheelbases between 105 and 110 in. (2,667
and 2,794 mm) and overall lengths between 180 and 195 in. (4,572 and 4,953 mm). Because
mid-size cars had such a low rate of rollovers, the rollover curve reached a minimum in the midsize car wheelbase range of 4.7% of crashes.
Approximately 57% of all crashes into cable median barrier involved vehicles with
wheelbases ranging between 100 and 110 in. (8 ft-4 in. and 9 ft-2 in., or 2,540 and 2,794 mm).
Of all vehicles with wheelbases exceeding 130 in. (3,302 mm), 106 vehicles were pickup trucks,
6 were SUVs, and 16 were vans. The high contribution of pickups in this large wheelbase
category likely contributed to the increase in rollover frequency.
The wheelbase distribution was further segregated by vehicle type. Small car, mid-size
car, and full-size car classes were segregated into one group, and SUVs, vans, and pickups were
segregated into a second group. Plots of the two groupings are shown in Figures 25 and 26.
Rollover rates were relatively flat when segregated by vehicle type, which indicated that
wheelbase alone was not a causative factor in rollover crashes. Vehicle type was a controlling
factor. Alternatively, mid-length SUVs, pickups, and vans had high penetration rates, whereas
mid-length cars had the lowest penetration rates.

60

35%

14%

30%

12%

25%

10%

20%

8%

15%

6%

10%

4%

5%

2%

0%

0%

Percent CMB Failure

Pecent of All Crashes

June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13

All Crashes
Penetrations
Rollovers

> 120 in.

115-120 in.

110-115 in.

105-110 in.

100-105 in.

< 100 in.

Wheelbase

Figure 24. Crash Result Based on Wheelbase
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Figure 25. Crash Result Based on Wheelbase, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
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Figure 26. Crash Result Based on Wheelbase, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans
The distribution of wheelbase lengths is shown in Figure 27. The distribution was
stepped, because wheelbase numbers were tabulated by whole inches in the AutoStats program.
An attempt was made to smooth the distributions by capturing the median percentile for each
wheelbase increment. The smoothed plot of the distribution is shown in Figure 28.
100%
90%

Percent Greater Than

80%
70%

60%
All Crashes

50%

Penetrations
40%

Rollovers

30%
20%
10%

0%
90

100

110

120
Wheelbase (in.)

130

140

150

Figure 27. Distribution of Vehicle Wheelbase in Cable Median Barrier Crashes
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Figure 28. Smoothed Distribution of Vehicle Wheelbase in Cable Median Barrier Crashes
The distribution of wheelbase by crash result for all vehicles suggested that large
wheelbase vehicles were involved in more rollovers than small-wheelbase vehicles. This was
confirmed in Figure 24. There were no obvious differences between the penetration and
composite distributions.
Distributions based on vehicle segregation into passenger car vs. SUV, van, and pickup
classes are shown in Figure 29. Unlike in the composite distributions, this sub-divided
distribution indicated a typically slightly larger wheelbase involved in passenger car and SUV,
pickup, or van penetrations. Alternatively, the rollover distribution was virtually
indistinguishable from the composite distributions for both vehicle classes.
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Figure 29. Smoothed Distribution of Vehicle Wheelbase by Vehicle Type and Crash Result
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Track widths were also plotted to identify potential relationships, as shown in Figure 30.
Generally, rollovers were more prevalent with larger track widths. This was expected, because
SUVs, pickups, and vans, which are involved in more rollovers than cars, also typically have
larger track widths.
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Figure 30. Crash Result Based on Track Width
Track widths were segregated by vehicle type as shown in Figures 31 and 32. The
distributions were compared by crash outcome. Segregation by vehicle type indicated a strong
relationship between track width and penetration rates for passenger cars, whereas statistically
significant differences in penetration rate were not observed for SUVs, pickups, and vans.
Penetrations were infrequent with small track with utility vehicles, but remained relatively
constant for vehicles with track widths greater than 60 in. (1,524 mm). Rollover rates were not
strongly related to track width in either vehicle grouping. Further analysis of track width with
respect to CG height is discussed in Section 7.3.4.
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Figure 31. Crash Result Based on Track Width, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
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Figure 32. Crash Result Based on Track Width, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans
A smoothed distribution of crash result by track width is shown in Figure 33. The
penetration distribution was dominated by larger-track width passenger cars. The 85th percentile
track width in all car crashes was 63.3 in. (1,608 mm), whereas the 85th percentile track width for
cars involved in penetration crashes was 63.8 in. (1,621 mm). By contrast, rollovers frequently
occurred with greater frequency at smaller track widths, which would contradict the conclusions
made by solely evaluating the results shown in Figure 30.
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Figure 33. Smoothed Distribution of Track Width by Vehicle Type and Crash Result
7.3.3 Vehicle Profile Dimensions
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Figure 34. Crash Result Based on Top of Front Bumper Height
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Crash results based on front bumper height were plotted and are shown in Figure 34.
There was an unmistakable increasing trend toward higher rollover rates with increasing bumper
height. Surprisingly, this correlation appeared nearly linear with bumper height. A similar
relationship could not be determined for penetration crashes. The overall distribution of vehicles
involved in the crashes had no discernible trend in penetration rates.
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As with wheelbase and track widths, the crash results were segregated by vehicle type
and plotted separately. The plots are shown in Figures 35 and 36. Although rollover rates were
very strongly related to front bumper heights when all vehicles were compared together,
comparisons by classes revealed mixed results. Passenger cars had no strong correlation between
rollover rates and front bumper heights. A strong correlation was observed between SUV,
pickup, and van rollover rates and front bumper heights.
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The penetration distributions were not independent from the composite distributions of
each vehicle type when compared by bumper height; in fact, the passenger car penetration
distribution was statistically similar to the distribution of all passenger car crashes. This result
was surprising, since it is widely known that lower bumper heights can contribute to higher
penetration rates for low-profile cars. This likely indicates that median terrain and impact
conditions have a far stronger effect on penetration than top-of-bumper height.
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Figure 35. Crash Results by Front Bumper Height, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
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Figure 36. Crash Result by Front Bumper Height, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans
A smoothed distribution of bumper heights by vehicle class and crash result is shown in
Figure 37. The distributions of bumper heights indicated significant differences between car and
utility vehicle bumper heights. Differences in bumper heights between car penetrations and
rollovers compared to the composite were negligible. The distribution of passenger car bumper
heights strongly supports the presumption that the differences in suspension characteristics, such
as stiffness and travel, were more significant than differences in bumper heights for these cars,
since 85% of all passenger car bumper heights were between 19 and 23 in. (483 and 584 mm).
This also further supported the conclusion that impact conditions may be more important than
bumper heights for passenger car impacts in relationship to penetration frequency.
In addition to the top of the front bumper, crash results were analyzed by center-ofheadlight heights, as shown in Figure 38. As before, a strong relationship between the center-ofheadlight height and rollover frequency was observed. Higher center-of-headlight heights were
associated with higher rates of rollover. However, this was expected because higher rollover
rates were associated with pickups, vans, and SUVs, all of which had higher average center-ofheadlight heights than passenger cars.

68

June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13
100%
90%
80%

% Greater Than

70%
60%

All Cars

Cars - Penetrations

50%

Cars - Rollovers
All Utility Vehicles

40%

Utility Vehicles - Penetrations
30%

Utility Vehicles - Rollovers

20%
10%
0%
15

17

19

21

23
25
27
Front Bumper Height (in.)

29

31

33

35

40%

16%

35%

14%

30%

12%

25%

10%

20%

8%

15%

6%

10%

4%

5%

2%

0%

0%

Percent CMB Failure

Pecent of All Crashes

Figure 37. Smoothed Distribution of Bumper Height by Crash Result and Vehicle Type
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Figure 38. Crash Result by Center-of-Headlight Height
When compared by vehicle types, rates of penetration and rollover due to variations in
center-of-headlight height were less significant, as shown in Figures 39 and 40. However, a
generally decreasing trend in penetration rates for increasing center-of-headlight heights was
observed for passenger cars, as shown in Figure 39. This was intuitive; very low front bumper
height vehicles were involved in more penetration crashes than other passenger cars due to an
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increased propensity to underride. No significant correlations were observed with respect to
SUVs, pickups, and vans.
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Figure 39. Crash Result by Center-of-Headlight Height, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
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Figure 40. Crash Result by Center-of-Headlight Height, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans
The distributions of center-of-headlight heights were plotted and are shown in Figure 41.
The deviation of the rollover dataset of SUVs, pickups, and vans was clearly visible. The
correlation between larger center-of-headlight height and rollover frequency was clearly visible
for SUVs, pickups, and vans.
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Figure 41. Smoothed Distribution of Center-of-Headlight Heights by Crash Result and Vehicle
Type
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Figure 42. Crash Result by Leading Edge of Hood Height
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The front-of-hood height was also plotted, and is shown in Figure 42. As with the bumper
and center-of-headlight heights, the rollover distribution was statistically significantly different
from the composite dataset. The increase in rollover rates occurred at front hood heights
exceeding 33 in. (838 mm). This is significant since the top cable heights on most TL-3 hightension and low-tension cable median barrier systems is 35 in. (889 mm) or less. The penetration
rates did not appear to be strongly influenced by front-of-hood height.
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When compared by vehicle types, results were mixed. Comparisons of crash results by
vehicle type and hood heights are shown in Figures 43 and 44.The passenger car distribution of
front hood heights involved in penetrations was statistically independent of the composite.
Likewise, the distribution of front hood heights for SUVs, pickups, and rollovers approached
statistical independence. However, the relationships were opposite. In general, cars had lower
rollover rates with increasing hood heights, except for hood heights in excess of 31 in. (787 mm).
By contrast, SUVs, pickups, and vans were involved in more rollovers with increasing hood
height, with the exception of vehicles with hood heights greater than 44 in. (1,118 mm).
In both classes, the median front hood heights had the lowest rates of penetration. Higher
rates were observed at both lower and higher hood heights. Also, the highest front hood heights
for both cars and utility vehicles had the highest rates of rollover.
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The smoothed distribution of front hood heights of all vehicles is shown in Figure 45.
The difference between the composite and rollover datasets is clearly visible, particularly with
hood heights between 30 and 40 in. (762 and 1,016 mm). A surprising trend was observed that
very few rollover crashes involved vehicles with front hood heights between 30 and 35 in. (762
and 889 mm). Over 65% of all cable median barrier crashes occurred involving vehicles with
front hood heights less than 32 in. (813 mm), whereas 55% of all rollovers involved vehicles
with front hood heights greater than 35 in. (889 mm). The distribution of front hood height by
crash result and vehicle group were virtually indistinguishable for both vehicle groups, and was
not shown.
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Figure 43. Crash Result by Front Hood Height, Small, Mid-Size, and Large Cars
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Figure 44. Crash Result by Front Hood Height, SUVs, Pickups, and Vans
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Figure 45. Distribution of Front Hood Heights in CMB Crashes
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The top of bumper to front of hood height separation distances were plotted against crash
result, but results were not statistically significant when plotted by vehicle grouping. Although
statistical significance was observed with respect to the rollover database when all vehicle types
were plotted together, the differences were strongly related to the types of vehicle involved in
rollover crashes, and were not caused by the bumper-to-hood separation distance. Furthermore,
statistical tests evaluating bumper-to-hood separation distances of passenger cars indicated a
very strong statistical similarity between bumper-to-hood separation distances in rollovers and
all crashes; stated differently, the two distributions were virtually indistinguishable. If there is a
relationship between bumper-to-hood separation distance and penetration rates for passenger cars
or utility vehicles, it was not obvious in the available database of 3,804 crashes with known
vehicle types and crash outcomes, as shown in Figure 46.
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Figure 46. Smoothed Distribution of Separation Between Leading Edge of Hood and Top of
Bumper by Crash Result and Vehicle Type
Rear bumper heights were compared to the composite and plotted, as shown in Figure 47.
The penetration frequencies peaked between 24 and 28 in. (610 and 711 mm), and was reduced
at both lower and higher rear bumper heights. Rollovers reached a minimum between 22 and 24
in. (559 and 610 mm) rear bumper height. Both distributions were statistically independent of the
composite distribution.
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Figure 47. Crash Results by Rear Bumper Height
Rear bumper heights were plotted by crash result and vehicle class, and are shown in
Figures 48 and 49. Although results were not statistically independent for either rollover or
penetration crashes for either dataset, the penetration dataset for passenger cars approached
statistical independence from the composite distribution. The penetration rates varied
significantly between bumper heights of 25 and 27 in. (635 and 686 mm). However, penetration
rates for rear-leading impacts, which were not distinguished in this data analysis, were higher for
both lower and higher bumper heights. Although evidence of this claim is currently limited to
anecdotal observations, further evidence is being explored.
Top-of-trunk heights were related to both penetration and rollover rates. The top-of-trunk
height plots for all vehicles are shown in Figure 50. Penetration rates generally declined with
increasing rear trunk heights. This was intuitive: higher rear trunk heights were associated with
greater vertical capture area and higher energetic requirements to underride the barrier,
particularly in rear-leading impacts. As the trunk or hatch height increased, underride
penetrations were virtually eliminated, which decreased the overall penetration rate. However, a
competing effect due to increased CG and bumper heights tended to increase the rate of override
for higher trunk or hatch heights as well, though this effect was less pronounced.
In addition, rollover rates increased with increasing trunk or hatch height, but this was
expected based on vehicle dimensions of the typical vehicles involved in rollover crashes. Trunk
or hatch heights were determined to not be causatively linked to rollover frequency.
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Figure 49. Crash Result by Rear Bumper Height, SUVs, Vans, and Pickups
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Figure 50. Crash Result by Top of Trunk/Rear Hatch Height
A smoothed distribution of trunk and hatch heights based on crash results and vehicle
groups is shown in Figure 51. The distributions were each virtually identical to the composite for
each respective vehicle group.
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Figure 51. Smoothed Distribution of Top of Trunk/Rear Hatch Heights

77

June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13

7.3.4 Center-of-Gravity Location
The position of the CG was a critical factor in the selection of crash testing vehicles for
standardized testing according to NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH [31, 24]. A comparison of
CG heights by crash results was plotted and is shown in Figure 52. The rollover rate was
intuitively related to CG height. Higher CG heights were generally associated with higher
rollover rates. One unexpected relationship was that penetrations generally decreased with
increasing CG height, through 28 in. (711 mm), then increased thereafter for passenger cars and
utility vehicles.
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Figure 52. Crash Result by CG Heights
CG height distributions based on crash result and vehicle type indicated strong
correlations between penetration and rollover rates based on vehicle CG. Plots of CG heights for
passenger cars and SUVs, pickups, and vans are shown in Figures 53 and 54.
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CG heights were not strongly correlated with rollover rates for SUVs, pickups, and vans.
This result suggested that these types of vehicles were susceptible to rollover independent of the
CG heights. However, penetration rates were strongly correlated with CG heights, as penetration
rates increased with increasing CG height.
Passenger cars had a mixed rate of penetrations with CG height, with a maximum
between 22.25 and 22.5 in. (565 and 572 mm). The minimum occurred between 21.75 and 22.25
in. (552 and 565 mm). Rollover rates demonstrated a much more linear relationship, generally
declining with increasing CG height through 23 in. (584 mm). Results of all these factors were
on the bounds of statistical significance, but the small differences between the passenger car CG
height distribution would be erased if a vehicle entered a sloped median and struck the cable
median barrier at any height other than nominal level. Thus, although CG height had an effect,
particularly on stability, overall CG height did not have a causative relationship in cable median
barrier containment performance within the indicated vehicle groupings.
Surprisingly, no passenger cars and only two SUVs in the entire database of 3,806
vehicles had recorded CG heights between 22.5 in. (572 mm) and 22.75 in. (578 mm). Between
22.25 in. (565 mm) and 22.5 in. (572 mm) a total of 282 vehicle crashes were recorded, and
between 22.75 in. (578 mm) and 23.0 in. (584 mm), a total of 201 crashes were recorded. There
were no obvious explanations for the apparent gap in vehicles with CG heights between 22.5 and
22.75 in. (572 and 578 mm).
The smoothed distribution of CG heights in cable barrier crashes is shown in Figure 55.
Over 60% of all crashes occurred with CG heights less than 23 in. (584 mm), but approximately
9% of crashes and penetrations occurred with CG heights between 23 and 26 in. (584 and 660
mm). The 85th percentile CG heights for the composite, penetration, and rollover data sets were
21.6, 20.7, and 25.8 in. (548, 525, and 654 mm), respectively.
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Figure 55. Smoothed Distribution of CG Heights in Cable Barrier Crashes
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A comparison of the longitudinal CG location relative to the front axle was plotted and is
shown in Figure 56. Penetration rates were relatively independent of the longitudinal distance
between the CG and the front axle, but rollover rates tended to increase as the CG distance from
the front axle increased. Historical tests with cable median barriers has indicated a higher
proportion of large yaw displacements using rear engine mount cars with CGs located far from
the front axle [32, 33]. The yaw displacement following redirection may contribute to vehicle
instability.
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The distribution of longitudinal CG locations is shown in Figure 57. The distribution of
longitudinal CG location suggested that both penetration and rollover crashes tended to occur
more frequently with vehicles with CGs located further from the front axle, but closely
mimicked the distribution of all crashes for longitudinal distances less than 40 in. (1,016 mm).
The 85th percentile longitudinal CG locations for the composite, penetration, and rollover
databases were 51.7 in., 52.5 in., and 54.5 in. (1,313 mm, 1,333 mm, and 1,384 mm),
respectively.
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Figure 57. Distribution of Longitudinal CG Location Relative to Front Axle
The static stability factor (SSF) [34], which is calculated using the formula
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑊𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ

𝑆𝑆𝐹 = 2(𝐶𝐺 𝐻𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡)

(1)

was used to segregate crash outcomes. Results are plotted in Figure 58. The SSF is a statistical
measure of the likelihood of rollover, based on the slope angle that would cause a static vehicle
to tip over. SSF star ratings and the probability function ranges of estimated rollover rates is
shown in Table 27.
Table 27. NHTSA SSF Star Ratings and Probability Function Values [34]
NHTSA Star Rating






SSF Range
< 1.04
1.04-1.12
1.12-1.24
1.24-1.45
> 1.45

Rollover Probability Function
Value Range
> 0.40
0.30-0.40
0.20-0.30
0.10-0.20
< 0.10

Although end effects were present at the 1- and 5-star ratings since less than 100 crashes
involved either 1-star or 5-star rated vehicles, generally rollovers decreased with higher SSF
ranking. These results are not surprising, but reinforce what is known about rollover stability
with relation to CG position and track width.
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Figure 58. Crash Result Based on Track Width and CG Height (SSF)
Whereas a very strong relationship between rollover and SSF was observed with respect
to all vehicles, when the data was segregated into subsets by vehicle types, variations were not as
distinctive. However, it is worth noting that very few SUVs, pickups, or vans were rated with
four-star SSF rating, whereas very few passenger cars had a three-star SSF rating or less.
Distributions were statistically independent at the 5% confidence level but functionally
distributions were not unique. Penetrations and rollovers were both more common with lower
SSF values for SUVs, pickups, and vans, but were more common at higher SSF values for much
of the passenger car distribution.
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7.3.5 Vehicle Cornering and Inertia
Crash results by minimum turning circle diameters were also plotted and evaluated. The
plot is shown in Figure 51. The minimum turning circle is a measure of the maximum steering
angle and reaction of the wheels and suspension to driver steering input. As a result, it was
expected that smaller turning circles, corresponding to higher cornering rates and larger
maximum steering angles, would be associated with more rollovers and penetrations due to a
more rapid increase in CG trajectory angle.
In general, larger turning circles corresponded to higher rates of rollover. This was
because SUVs, pickups, and vans had larger turning circle diameters than cars, on average.
When distributions were plotted by vehicle type and crash results, the penetration and rollover
rates were not clearly related to turning circle diameter, as shown in Figure 61. A large portion of
car penetrations occurred with turning circle diameters between 38 and 45 in. (96 and 1,143
mm). This class of passenger car corresponded to sports-type cars, such as the Chevrolet
Camaro, Dodge Charger, Pontiac Firebird/Trans Am, and Dodge Viper, in addition to imported
sports cars.
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Figure 61. Smoothed Distribution of Turning Circle Diameter by Crash Result and Vehicle Type
The distribution of roll moments of inertia of vehicles involved in cable median barrier
crashes is shown in Figure 62. For both passenger car and utility vehicles, penetrations occurred
at larger roll moments of inertia than the composite distribution. However, rollover rates were
mixed. For utility vehicles, higher roll moments corresponded to higher rollover rates for roll
moments of inertia less than 600 lb-ft-s2 (248 kg-m2), but for larger roll moments of inertia the
rollover distribution matched the composite. Alternatively, for the passenger car rollover
distribution, rollovers generally occurred with lower roll moments of inertia. The passenger car
distribution matched the intuitive expectation that lower roll moments of inertia were associated
with higher rates of rollover. Penetrations were more common at higher roll moments of inertia
for both vehicle types.
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Roll moments of inertia were non-dimensionalized by dividing by the mass and CG
height squared. Results are plotted in Figure 63. By non-dimensionalizing the rollover
distribution of SUVs, pickups, and vans, the rollover distribution was altered from approaching
statistical independence to bordering statistical similarity, with a p-value of 0.83. None of the
other distributions had statistically significant differences to the composite.
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Figure 63. Distribution of Non-Dimensionalized Roll Moments of Inertia by Crash Result and
Vehicle Type
Likewise, the distribution of the yaw moments of inertia of vehicles involved in cable
barrier crashes is shown in Figure 64. As with roll moments of inertia, higher yaw moments of
inertia were associated with higher rates of penetration. Higher yaw moments of inertia were
correlated with higher rollover frequency for SUVs, pickups, and vans through 2,500 lb-ft-s2
(1,033 kg-m2), but converged to the composite distribution at higher yaw moments of inertia,
similarly to the roll moments-of-inertia distribution. Additionally, lower yaw moments of inertia
were associated with higher rollover rates for passenger cars.
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Figure 64. Distribution of Yaw Moments of Inertia by Crash Result and Vehicle Type
7.3.6 Conclusions
The vehicle dimension and performance analysis suggested that there is no “silver bullet”
vehicle profile or set of dimensions which can functionally explain all of the penetration or
rollover occurrences. Vehicles such as SUVs are involved in a disproportionately large number
of rollover crashes resulting from vehicle instability. However, the high rate of rollovers was not
indicative of a high rate of penetrations. Furthermore, pickup trucks had the lowest overall rate of
penetrations, which may be related to years of cable median barrier full-scale testing with pickup
trucks. Vehicles not commonly used in cable median barrier testing, including large cars, SUVs,
and vans were involved in more penetrations than pickup trucks. Furthermore, vans were also
involved in more rollovers and severe crashes than pickup trucks in general.
It may be necessary to adjust the vehicles used in crash testing to be more reflective of
the actual fleet involved in penetration or rollover crashes. The historical perspective on vehicle
selection can be improved using these results, because vehicle types and selection can be catered
directly to those vehicles which were involved in containment failures or severe crashes.
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7.4 Vehicle Make and Model Analysis

A summary of the vehicles most commonly involved in penetration and rollover crashes with
cable median barriers is shown in Tables 28 and 29. Recall that both penetration and rollover
rates for all vehicle types were scaled down to reflect calculated national overall penetration and
rollover rates. Vehicles included in Tables 28 and 29 were in a minimum of 10% penetration or
rollover crashes, respectively, and were typically involved in at least 15 crashes. Vehicles with
the highest rates of penetration were the 1996-2007 Ford Taurus, which spanned two generations
of the Taurus model, as well as the Subaru Impreza, Ford F250 and F350, and Chrysler PT
Cruiser.
Vehicles involved in penetrations were largely either high-CG, stiff-body panel vehicles
or large cars with narrow, sharp front profiles. Likewise, rollovers were most frequent with highCG SUVs, pickups, and vans. However, in addition to notably high crash rates it is also
constructive to consider vehicles which were involved in relatively few rollover or penetration
crashes. A tabulated list of vehicles with relatively low risk of penetration or rollover are shown
in Tables 30 and 31.
There has been a trend in recent years away from sharply-contoured front end profiles.
Many of the vehicles involved in high penetration crash frequencies are no longer in production.
This is an unfortunate consequence of having datasets which extend more than 10 years from the
present. However, Subaru Imprezas and Chrysler PT Cruisers, for example, are relatively
common, have models readily available, and had penetration rates above 20%.
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Table 28. Vehicles Involved in Penetration Crashes at High Frequencies
PENETRATIONS
Vehicle

Crashes

Penetrations

Rollovers

Honda Civic
Honda Accord
Ford Explorer
Ford Taurus (1996-2007)
Saturn SL/SL1/SL2
Nissan Sentra
Chevrolet Blazer
Pontiac Grand Am
Ford Escort
Volkswagen Jetta
Pontiac Grand Prix
Chevrolet Trailblazer
Toyota 4 Runner
Ford F250
Acura Integra
Chevrolet Impala
Chrysler Sebring
Dodge Durango
Jeep Liberty
Dodge Intrepid
Toyota Tundra
Chevrolet Cobalt
Chevrolet Lumina
Ford F350
Chevrolet Astro
Chevrolet Camaro
Chevrolet S10
Ford Crown Victoria
Buick Regal
Chrysler PT Cruiser
Oldsmobile Alero
Subaru Impreza
Ford Escape
Toyota Celica
Chrysler Concorde
Lincoln Town Car
Mercury Tracer
Mitsubishi Mirage
Chrysler Cirrus
Toyota Matrix
Ford Aerostar
Mercury Grand Marquis
Oldsmobile 88
Volkswagen Golf

130
118
81
48
41
40
37
37
33
33
33
28
25
24
24
23
23
21
21
19
19
19
18
17
16
15
15
14
14
12
12
11
11
10
7
7
6
6
6
6
5
4
4
4

18
15
11
10
5
8
7
5
5
5
4
4
5
6
6
5
4
4
3
4
3
3
4
4
3
3
3
4
3
4
3
6
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

5
4
20
6
3
2
9
2
2
0
1
3
6
5
0
1
0
2
3
3
3
1
0
2
2
1
0
0
1
3
0
0
0
2
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Scaled
Penetration
Rate
12%
11%
12%
18%
11%
17%
16%
12%
13%
13%
11%
12%
17%
22%
22%
19%
15%
17%
12%
18%
14%
14%
19%
20%
16%
17%
17%
25%
19%
29%
22%
47%
24%
26%
37%
37%
43%
29%
29%
29%
35%
43%
43%
43%

Scaled
Rollover
Rate
3%
3%
21%
10%
6%
4%
20%
5%
5%
0%
3%
9%
20%
17%
0%
4%
0%
8%
12%
13%
13%
4%
0%
10%
10%
6%
0%
0%
6%
21%
0%
0%
0%
17%
24%
0%
0%
14%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
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Table 29. Vehicles Involved in Rollover Crashes at High Frequencies
ROLLOVERS
Vehicle

Crashes

Penetrations

Rollovers

81
72
37
32
30
27
25
24
21
19
19
12
11
11
11
7
6
5

11
4
14
7
2
3
3
5
6
3
4
3
4
2
2
1
3
0

20
13
8
9
8
4
6
6
5
3
3
3
3
4
3
3
2
2

Ford Explorer
Ford Ranger
Chevrolet Blazer
Chevrolet C1500/2500/3500
Jeep Cherokee
Dodge Ram 1500
Toyota 4 Runner
Ford F250
Jeep Liberty
Dodge Intrepid
Toyota Tundra
Chrysler PT Cruiser
Isuzu Rodeo
Dodge Grand Caravan
Ford Econoline
Chrysler Concorde
Mazda Tribute
Mazda 323

Scaled
Penetration
Rate
12%
5%
16%
5%
9%
10%
17%
22%
12%
18%
14%
29%
16%
16%
8%
37%
0%
17%

Scaled
Rollover
Rate
21%
15%
20%
21%
11%
19%
20%
17%
12%
13%
13%
21%
31%
23%
23%
24%
28%
34%

Table 30. Vehicles Involved in Penetration Crashes at Low Frequencies
PENETRATIONS
Vehicle
Ford Ranger
Ford Focus
Chevrolet Malibu
Dodge Dakota
Toyota Tacoma
Dodge Caravan
Hyundai Accent
Mitsubishi Eclipse
Dodge Stratus
Jeep Grand Cherokee
Honda CRV
Ford Expedition
Nissan Pathfinder
Geo Metro/Prizm
Chevrolet Suburban
Pontiac Sunfire
Nissan Maxima
Chevrolet K2500
Jeep Wrangler
Mazda Protégé
Ford Contour

Crashes

Penetrations

Rollovers

72
61
32
33
24
23
22
21
21
20
19
19
18
17
16
16
15
15
14
14
13

4
4
2
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
0
1
0

13
5
1
0
1
2
0
2
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
0
0
2
2
1
0

90

Scaled
Penetration
Rate
5%
6%
5%
3%
0%
0%
4%
4%
4%
4%
0%
5%
0%
5%
5%
5%
0%
6%
0%
6%
0%

Scaled
Rollover
Rate
15%
7%
3%
0%
3%
7%
0%
8%
4%
8%
9%
9%
9%
5%
5%
0%
0%
11%
12%
6%
0%
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Table 31. Vehicles Involved in Rollover Crashes at Low Frequencies
ROLLOVERS
Vehicle

Crashes

Penetrations

Rollovers

Ford Mustang
Chevrolet Malibu
Chevrolet Silverado
Pontiac Grand Prix
Dodge Dakota
Volkswagen Jetta
Chevrolet Malibu (2004-2008)
Toyota Camry (2001-Present)
Toyota Tacoma
Acura Integra
Chevrolet Impala
Buick Lesabre
Chrysler Sebring
Hyundai Accent
Dodge Stratus
Hyundai Elantra
Subaru Legacy
Chevrolet Cobalt
Mercury Sable
Chevrolet Tahoe
Mitsubishi Galant
Chevrolet Lumina
Pontiac Sunfire
Chevrolet Camaro
Buick Century
Chevrolet S10
Mazda 3
Nissan Maxima

52
32
34
33
33
33
34
26
24
24
23
23
23
22
21
21
21
19
19
18
18
18
16
15
15
15
15
15

6
2
4
4
1
5
3
2
0
6
5
2
4
1
1
2
2
3
2
2
2
4
1
3
2
3
2
0

0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
0
0

Scaled
Penetration
Rate
10%
5%
10%
11%
3%
13%
8%
7%
0%
22%
19%
8%
15%
4%
4%
8%
8%
14%
9%
10%
10%
19%
5%
17%
12%
17%
12%
0%

Scaled
Rollover
Rate
0%
3%
2%
3%
0%
0%
0%
3%
3%
0%
4%
0%
0%
0%
4%
4%
0%
4%
0%
5%
5%
0%
0%
6%
0%
0%
0%
0%

Current- and previously-used small cars were not well-represented in terms of penetration
crash frequency. The combined number of crashes involving Geo Metro/Geo Prizm,
Volkswagon Golf, Suzuki Swift, and Hyundai Accent was 47 crashes, but only 4 penetrations
and 1 rollover were recorded on these small cars. These cars were frequently used in NCHRP
Report 350 crash testing. This is not surprising, since full-scale crash testing with these small
cars under NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH has only showed critical behavior when tested in
a V-ditch [35]. Few crashes were tabulated with vehicles frequently used in MASH testing.
Vehicles demonstrating more frequent barrier failures should be considered in future
crash testing efforts. Testing with vehicles which are susceptible to penetrations or rollovers
should be conducted in order to maximize the resultant safety of all impacting vehicles. Results
shown suggest that crash testing with new MASH trucks may not be sufficient to capture the
extent of the penetration and rollover crash types observed in this study. Further analysis of the
causes of penetration crashes is explored in Chapter 8.
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8 CAUSES OF CABLE MEDIAN BARRIER PENETRATIONS
Cable median barrier penetrations were heavily dependent on which type of system was
struck. Penetration mechanisms were heavily dependent on the mechanics of barrier deformation
and cable release. In order to describe the mechanisms of penetration, system details for the
Nucor NU-CABLE TL-3 3-Cable System, C-Shaped post and S-Shaped post Trinity Cable
Safety System (CASS) TL-3 Systems, Brifen Wire Rope Safety Fence (WRSF) TL-3 4-Cable
System, and the TL-3, low-tension, 3-cable median barrier system are described below.
8.1 System Design Details
8.1.1 Nucor NU-CABLE TL-3 3-Cable System
Nucor system details are shown in Figures 65 through 68. The cable-to-post attachment
used by Nucor was very strong compared to all other barrier systems, and is shown in Figures 68
and 68. This cable-to-post attachment is also used in the Trinity CASS barrier near end
anchorages and terminations. The details which follow were reflective of the systems available
for analysis in the existing database; an alternative construction with the Nucor system utilizes
cable hangars on the top of the post instead of the strong cable attachment shown in this report.
The clips were fastened to the post by inserting the bent upper leg into the appropriate
hole on the flanged U-channel, and then were locked in place with a nut threaded onto the
bottom clip threads. Holes in the flanges were spaced approximately 1 in. (25 mm) on center
vertically through the centerline of the flange. Many posts were 4 lb/ft (6 kg/m) flanged Uchannel with Rib-Bak construction, though some installations utilized the 5 lb/ft (7 kg/m) posts.
The median barrier configuration for this post utilized two short clips, shown in Figure 68, for
the top and bottom cables, and one long clip, shown in Figure 67, to support the middle cable.
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Figure 65. Nucor Cable Barrier Design Details [36]
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Figure 66. Nucor Cable Barrier Design Details [36]
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Figure 67. Nucor Cable Barrier Long Clip Design Details [37]
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Figure 68. Nucor Cable Barrier Short Clip Design Details [37]
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Since the attachment had a 60 ksi (414 MPa) minimum ultimate strength requirement, the
resulting minimum tensile load required to cause rupture of the shank was 4.6 kip (20.5 kN)
through a single leg. The clip appeared to be designed to dissipate energy through the bending
deformation of the upper leg of the clip. During vertical pullout loading conditions, the curved
clip construction contributed to friction wedge locking of the bent leg in the bottom hole. Due to
vertical forces, the couple at the bottom of the clip tended to aggravate the locking tendency as
the bottom leg interacted with the web. A schematic of the vertical release problems identified is
shown in Figure 69. The friction lock resisted the lower leg bending and releasing from the post,
frequently resulting in large applied tensile loads carried by both legs of the clip until the clip
fractured, the post was pulled vertically out of the ground or post socket, or the post fractured.
The vertical loading resulted in post pullout in most crashes.

Figure 69. Vertical Pullout Moment Couple on Nucor Cable-To-Post Attachment
Although the clip would perform adequately in horizontal pullout with posts that are
sufficiently stiff, the flange-channel U-post does not have the rigidity necessary to resist bending
and buckling or fracture to permit the top cable to release. During horizontal pullout loading, the
post deflected with the cable, and the horizontal load applied experienced a rotation to a mixed
horizontal and vertical loading. As the loading transitioned to vertical pullout, the posts were
pulled upward and out of the ground or fractured in many crashes. Relatively few crashes were
observed in which the cable-to-post attachments released as intended.
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8.1.2 Trinity Cable Safety System (CASS) 3-Cable Barrier
Like the Nucor TL-3 3-cable barrier on flange-channel posts, the Trinity CASS 3-cable
barrier installed on C-shaped posts had a large installed base in the United States. CASS
installations were present in such states as Iowa, Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, and Washington, as
well as many others. Details of the C-channel and S-post versions of the TL-3 CASS system are
shown in Figures 70 through 73.
Most of the Trinity CASS system installed in the participating states utilized the TL-3 Cshape post sections. Installations of both the TL-4 and TL-3 structural S-type post section barrier
designs were identified. However, relatively few crashes with the TL-4 design were available for
analysis.
The direction of the channel in the C-shaped posts was alternated, per construction
design. As a result, the radius of gyration to the weak axis was different when the posts were
struck on the channel or continuous sides. Alternatively, the S-shape posts were comprised of
S4x7.7 (S102x11.5) shape sections, with two 11/16-in. (17-mm) holes in each flange. Researchers
estimated that weakening holes decreased the strong-axis section modulus from 3.03 in.3 to 2.54
in.3 (49,652 mm3 to 41,623 mm3), and decreased the weak-axis section modulus from 0.562 in.3
to 0.368 in.3 (9,210 mm3 to 6,030 mm3). By comparison, a standard S3x5.7 post has a strong-axis
bending modulus of 1.67 in.3 (27,366 mm3), and a weak-axis bending modulus of 0.383 in.3
(6,276 mm3).
All of the cables in the Trinity CASS systems were located in a slot in the top of the post.
Cable spacers and retainers were used to prevent the cables from slipping out of the posts in
nuisance impacts. A sleeve tie was also used to retain the lower cable with a higher vertical
release load and to stiffen the flanges where the web was cut. Driven and socketed options were
available. The S-post TL-3 system had cables mounted at 29½, 253/16, and 20⅞ in. (749, 640, and
530 mm) and are shown in Figure 72. Cables in the TL-3 C-shape post system were 1/16 in. (2
mm) lower than in the S-post system. The TL-4 system had cables mounted at 38⅛, 29½, and
20⅞ in. (968, 749, and 530 mm).
A common cause of penetration in the CASS database occurred when the vehicle struck a
post before striking the cable barrier system. The posts then transmitted the impact load to the
posts through the internal slot. Because the vehicle had little, if any, interaction with the cables
prior to striking the post, lateral loads applied to the cables tended to engage the cables more
deeply in the slot, preventing the cables from disengaging from the post to capture the vehicle.
The slot engagement contributed to many override containment failures of vehicles, including
passenger cars which are typically not prone to override. This type of cable entrapment can occur
whenever cables are located within a post slot.
Because this mechanism of penetration was determined to occur frequently, this form of
cable entrapment was referred to as a “ramp formation” override penetration. The Trinity CASS
system may be intrinsically susceptible to cable entrapment and ramp formation override
penetrations unless barrier modifications to prevent cable entrapment can be made. A schematic
of the cable entrapment mechanism is shown in Figure 74.
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Figure 70. Trinity CASS C-Shape Post System Details [38]
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Figure 71. Trinity CASS C-Shaped Post System Details [38]
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Figure 72. Trinity CASS TL-3 S-Post System Details [39]
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Figure 73. Trinity CASS TL-3 S-Post System Details [39]
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Figure 74. Entrapment Forces Acting on Cables in Center Post Slot
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8.1.3 Brifen TL-3 Wire Rope Safety Fence (WRSF)
The TL-3 Brifen WRSF is typically comprises proprietary Z-posts with rollers supporting
the cables vertically, as shown in Figures 75 through 77. Virtually all Brifen systems utilize
ground sockets for easy post replacement, though a post with soil plate option was also available.
Four cables are used in the system, with one cable woven around the posts and mounted at 19 ½
in. (495 mm), two cables cross-woven and mounted at 26 in. (660 mm), and an additional cable
in a slot cut in the top of the post, mounted at 28 ⅜ in. (720 mm).
Typically, plastic retainer caps were used to retain the top cable in the Brifen WRSF.
Other cables were constrained by the interaction with adjacent posts. For each of the middle and
lower cables, vertical rise was only resisted by friction, whereas the lower roller supported the
cable from being pushed down by the impacting vehicle. Because of the cable weave, the Brifen
cables often sagged after a moderate-speed crash into the system in which more than two posts
were disengaged from the cables. The weave significantly reduced average dynamic deflections
and provided a smooth ridedown deceleration, but the system was susceptible to underride
penetrations. Rollovers were sometimes associated with wheel entrapment by the lower woven
cable. Underride penetrations were frequently caused by vehicles prying the bottom cable
upward. This was because the bottom cable had low resistance to vertical uplift. These factors
will be discussed in greater depth in Chapters 9 and 11.
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Figure 75. Typical TL-3 Brifen WRSF Design Details [40]
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Figure 76. Typical TL-3 Brifen WRSF Design Details [40]

107
June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13

Figure 77. Typical TL-3 Brifen WRSF Surface-Mounted Post Design Details [40]
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8.1.4 Low-Tension, 3-Cable Median Barrier
Several low-tension, 3-cable median barrier designs have been tested and were originally
approved by FHWA according to TL-3 crash conditions in NCHRP Report 350. One lowtension, non-proprietary 3-cable median barrier was developed through testing and evaluation by
several state DOTs, including New York and Washington [e.g. 41-42]. Several other states have
installed many miles of low-tension cable median barrier, and in North Carolina and Missouri,
the combined length of barrier exceeded 1,400 miles (2,253 km). It was estimated that the lowtension, non-proprietary 3-cable median barrier currently accounts for more than 40% of the
cable median barrier mileage installed in the United States, though the exact percentage is
unknown.
The low-tension, 3-cable median barriers installed in Missouri, Washington, and North
Carolina were very similar. Examples of the North Carolina’s low-tension, 3-cable median
barrier standard plans implemented in 2002 are shown in Figures 78 through 83. In each of the
low-tension, non-proprietary designs, tension spring compensators were used to retain tension in
the cables during very warm weather and to prevent excessive tension increases during very cold
weather. The cables were tensioned to between 900 and 950 lb (4.0 to 4.2 kN) at approximately
70º F (21º C), and frequently used wedge splitter cable splice connections, as shown in Figure
81. End anchors for these designs frequently used the end terminal developed by New York,
which was approved under the guidelines presented in NCHRP Report 350 [43]. North Carolina
later modified the standard cable median barrier plans in 2006 to address penetration concerns
after conducting some performance improvement studies [44].
8.2 Overview of Crash Data
Based on the statistical analysis presented, the crash data were analyzed individually and
crashes were categorized by system type. The types of containment failures in each cable median
barrier crash were determined using scene diagrams, narratives, vehicle damage indications, and
photographs when available. When the cause of the penetration crash could not be identified, the
case was identified as Unknown.
A total of 213 crashes with determinable causes of penetration were identified. Seven
primary causes of vehicular penetrations were identified and tabulated, and are shown in Table
32. One of the categories, “Large Vehicle”, included all medium to heavy truck crashes,
including single-unit trucks, buses, tractor-trailers, construction vehicles, and other vehicles
which are not typically used in a cable barrier full-scale crash testing program for TL-3 impact
conditions. However, because this type of failure was linked primarily to vehicle type,
penetrations involving large vehicles were easily linked and virtually no large vehicle crashes
were included in the “Unknown” category. As a result, these types of crashes were
disproportionately identifiable relative to the other crash types.
The failure causes shown in Table 32 were not intended to demonstrate relative
frequencies of penetration crash types between systems. Many of the penetration crashes did not
have determinable causes. The purpose was to demonstrate the types of failures which were
discernible per each system type to observe general trends in the data. Unfortunately, systems
such as Gibraltar and Brifen had very few discernible causes of penetrations due to the lack of
available scene diagrams and data about penetrations.
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Figure 78. Low-Tension 3-Cable Median Barrier Standard Plans, North Carolina DOT, 2002
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Figure 79. Low-Tension 3-Cable Median Barrier Standard Plans, North Carolina DOT, 2002
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Figure 80. Low-Tension 3-Cable Median Barrier Standard Plans, North Carolina DOT, 2002
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Figure 81. Low-Tension 3-Cable Median Barrier Standard Plans, North Carolina DOT, 2002
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Figure 82. Low-Tension 3-Cable Median Barrier Standard Plans, North Carolina DOT, 2002

114
June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13

Figure 83. Low-Tension 3-Cable Median Barrier Standard Plans, North Carolina DOT, 2002
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Table 32. Causes of Penetrations
Penetration
Contributor
Diving

Prying

Override

Description

Nucor

Front end of vehicle protrudes beneath cables and lifts
cables up and over the hood. This condition is most
common with passenger cars.
Vehicle protrudes between or below cables and pries the
cables away from the system due to the slope of the vehicle
body, resulting in either underride or through-cable
penetration.
Wheels of vehicle pass over the top of the cables, forcing
them below the undercarriage. This category includes
launching but excludes rebound off of slopes which causes
override.

Number of Penetrations Recorded
CASS Brifen Gibraltar Generic

Total

10

2

1

1

22

36

20

26

5

1

30

82

27

26

1

-

8

62

Bounce-Over

Specific to rebounding off of slopes; vehicle strikes ditch
and rebounds up and over the barrier due to suspension
compression and unloading.

-

2

-

1

1

4

System Failure

Penetration caused by a breakdown of system components,
design, or installation, either releasing tension in the cables
or eliminating post contributions.

-

-

-

-

2

2

Large Vehicle

Tractor-trailers, buses, large trucks, camper vehicles, and
construction vehicles. No cable barrier is currently designed
for these types of impacts; however, these impacts are
frequently severe.

5

7

-

1

8

21

62

63

7

4

71

207

Total

Furthermore, many states had a significant number of miles of one particular barrier type
installed. This contributed to some additional uncertainty due to roadside design practices
utilized in each state. For example, median widths in Ohio routinely exceeded 50 ft (15.2 m), and
barriers on relatively shallow slopes were typically installed either at or near the center of the
ditch or near the shoulder slope break point. As a result, very few crashes would result in a
“bounce-over” type of failure, since “bounce-over” crashes involve vehicles rebounding
vertically after bouncing on changes in the median slope.
Similar constraints affected the Brifen system overall. The only crashes applicable in this
study involved barriers located in wide medians or adjacent to shallow slopes, effectively
eliminating any opportunity for a “bounce-over” impact to occur. Although no “bounce-over”
impacts were observed on the Brifen, Gibraltar, or Safence systems, there is currently no
proprietary or non-proprietary design which is not susceptible to “bounce-over” failures.
Most of the impacts in the database occurred with 3-cable barrier variations of each
system type, with standard hardware and cable spacing. A total of 18 crashes occurred in the
state of Ohio with a 4-cable Nucor barrier, which was the only TL-4 system involved in crashes
which had available scene diagrams and supporting photographic evidence to determine the
causes of failure. Two penetrations and two rollovers occurred in two crashes on this system. In
one crash, barrier penetration contributed to a rollover. In a separate crash, the rollover caused
the vehicle to override the barrier.
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Although the causes of barrier containment failures were mutually exclusive, contributing
factors to the failures were not. Contributing factors included: system-dependent factors,
installation-dependent factors, and vehicle-dependent factors. Of these domains, the systemdependent and installation-dependent failures will be discussed in detail in Chapter 9. A brief
summary of typical conditions associated with each type of penetration factor is provided below.
8.3 Types of Penetrations
8.3.1 Diving Penetrations
Diving-type penetrations were defined as crashes in which the median geometry caused
suspension compression, causing the leading edge of the vehicle bumper to dive below the
bottom cable and lift all of the cables above the bumper and onto the hood. Diving penetrations
were characterized by mechanical levers: once the impacting corner of the vehicle protruded
under the cables, prying action through the longitudinal axis of the vehicle lifted the cables up in
the same manner as a small force on a rod at a sufficient distance can lift or displace a boulder.
Diving failures were not restricted to particular vehicle classes. Examples of vehicle
makes involved in diving crashes included a Saturn Aura, Mitsubishi Galant, Ford Fusion, and
Ford Mustang. These vehicles did not conform to any identifiable front-end patterns except that
the height of the leading edge of the hood was not “large,” or was below approximately 27 in.
(686 mm) in each case when the vehicle was at rest. Other underride penetration types were
heavily dependent on the geometry of the impacting vehicle.
8.3.2 Prying Underride Failures
In prying-type underride penetrations, cables were pried up above the hood, thus allowing
the vehicle to pass under the cables. The prying differentiation was used to separate crashes
which did not heavily depend on median terrain; any underride containment failure occurring on
a flat shoulder adjacent to the travel lane was therefore a prying-type penetration. Prying
underride penetrations had a strong correlation with the orientation angle and vehicle shape.
Prying penetrations were analogous to mechanical wedges, which can split logs when
struck with enough force. Analogously, for low-angle prying events, the prying action is similar
to a “seesaw,” in which a small child located far from the fulcrum can lift an adult. Similarly, the
motion of the rear of the vehicle can cause prying on the front corner to lift the cables, or viceversa. Both diving and prying penetrations shared similar failure mechanisms. However, median
geometries and vehicle types varied widely between the two containment failure datasets,
prompting researchers to treat each type independently.
Non-tracking skid crashes, in which the entire side of the vehicle was engaged with the
cable barrier, frequently resulted in adequate vehicle capture and low risk of rollover.
Conversely, engagement along the front or rear planar surfaces of the vehicle frequently resulted
in penetrations.
During high-orientation angle impact conditions, the vehicle engaged the barrier in a
condition which may promote cable separation, lifting, or compression. The increased risk to
impacting vehicles was due to a combination of the following factors: (1) higher front-end and
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rear-end stiffness prevented the cables from creating “furrows” or grooved contact patches on the
vehicle, which tended to retain the cables throughout impact; (2) the “approximate equivalent”
vehicle profile which came into direct contact with the barrier system changed; and (3) vertical
motions of the front or back of the vehicle were exaggerated relative to cable motion at
orientation angles approaching 90 or -90 degrees.
8.3.3 Bounce-Over Penetrations
A bounce-over penetration was a specialized crash event in which the impacting vehicle
rebounded off of a median slope and passed over the top of the barrier system. This type of crash
is more common with smaller passenger vehicles since large vehicles more frequently “dig in” to
the medians and either roll over or are captured by the barrier.
Bounce-over crashes occur most commonly on medians steeper than 8:1; most bounceover crashes occurred on medians between 6:1 and 4:1. Medians which are in this steepness
range are often used to facilitate large rain runoff from the road; as a result, many medians have
moist or wet soil through much of the year, even in dry climates. The softer median terrain does
not facilitate bounce-over for larger vehicles since a large amount of soil is typically displaced
after a heavy vehicle engages the slope. Soil displacement dissipates much of the energy which
contributes to “bouncing.” Smaller vehicles, which frequently have much lower pitch and yaw
inertias and overall masses, bounce due to median impact without displacing much soil. This is
why frequently only small to mid-size cars were engaged in bounce-over impacts in this crash
database.
8.3.4 Override Penetrations
Override penetrations corresponded to a vehicle passing over the top of all of the cables
before passing to the non-impact side of the cable median barrier. Note that “bounce-over”
crashes, in which the impacting vehicle rebounded off of the median slope and passed over the
barrier, were segregated from override penetrations due to median slope contributions.
Override crashes occurred due a combination of factors including vehicle profile shape,
vehicle orientation angle at impact, cable entrapment at a post, ramp formation, or excessive
cable sag. Of these possibilities, cable entrapment, ramp formation, and vehicle orientation at
impact were the most common causes. Virtually every large ½-ton or ¾-ton pickup truck class
has a rear end bumper height which is approximately 3 to 5 in. (76 to 127 mm) higher than in the
front. Since many cable median barrier systems have a top cable mounting height less than 35 in.
(889 mm), many rear-leading pickup and large SUV crashes resulted in penetration that likely
would have been adequately captured if cable barrier systems were taller or if the vehicle had
struck with the front end. MASH crash testing with the 2270P vehicle could demonstrate this
type of behavior.
8.3.5 Low CG Trajectory Angle Penetrations
A broad class of penetrations that spanned multiple penetration mechanisms consisted of
low-CG trajectory angle crashes which resulted in penetration. Low-angle impacts leading to
barrier penetration occurred on every barrier make. According to the results of NCHRP Report
No. 665 [22], approximately 55% of all run-off-road crashes occurred with CG trajectory angles
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less than or equal to 15 degrees. Due to the difficulty in determining when a penetration crash
occurred, it is likely that the number of low-angle penetrations is underrepresented in the
penetration crash database.
Low-CG trajectory angle penetration crashes frequently occurred concomitantly with
contributions cable entrapment on posts, front-end profiles and bumper heights which increased
susceptibility to penetration, and low energy associated with the lateral component of velocity
(IS value energy) available for stable crush to occur. Barrier-specific interactions also
contributed to penetration propensity. Both override and prying underride penetrations occurred
at low CG trajectory angles.
The risk of severe crash result associated with this containment failure was dependent on
multiple factors. If the low-CG trajectory angle crash resulted in penetration when the barrier
was installed on the traffic-side shoulder or approach slope, the vehicle entered the median.
Then, the vehicle could enter the opposing lanes, come to rest in the median, or redirect toward
the initial travel lanes. Crashes in which the vehicle came to rest were not severe in general,
whereas moderately low-angle cross-median trajectories were frequently severe but relatively
uncommon. When the barrier was installed near the center of the V-ditch, vehicles involved in
low-angle penetration crashes nearly always came to rest in the median.
Roof crush was a major contributor to severe low-CG trajectory angle penetration
crashes. Vehicles which became entrapped beneath the cables were frequently at a higher crash
severity risk than vehicles which either completely penetrated beneath the system or were
redirected. Low-CG trajectory angle penetrations did not occur on systems located on the back
side of median slopes, but did occur when the barrier was installed on the opposite-side shoulder.
8.4 Approximate Equivalent Vehicle Profile
Penetration crashes into high-tension cable median barriers shared many common
characeristics. Narrow-profile vehicles or vehicles with smooth front ends alter the expected
interaction between the vehicle’s front end and the cable barrier during high-orientation angle
crashes. As the orientation angle approached either 90 or 270 degrees to the barrier system,
differences arose as the vehicle engaged the cable barrier system with the entire front or back
surface instead of a concentrated impact at a corner. Impacts occurring along vehicle corners
could be analyzed as a wireframe object with corresponding mass as well as roll, pitch, and yaw
moments of inertia impacting the cable barrier. Front- or rear-leading impacts instead engaged
the cable barrier with an entire surface, which engaged the barrier with a contour corresponding
to a cross-section of the vehicle at a given time. This concept is illustrated in Figure 84.
The observation of the differences between impact orientations gave rise to the concept
of an approximate equivalent vehicle concept, which consisted of a block striking a string in a
two-dimensional plane. If the block strikes the strings with an orientation angle other than 0, 90,
180, or 270 degrees, contact will be made along a leading edge, and the tensioned string will
remain engaged with leading edge until the block redirects and contact is made with the trailing
edge. Prying underride penetrations occurred when the leading edge contact caused cable
separation or lifting. If the vehicle orientation at impact was 0, 90, 180, or 270 degrees, an entire
surface contacted the cable. Rounded or smooth vehicle front-end surfaces caused separation or
lift when impact occurred near the midspan. This susceptibility was amplified when crashes
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involved vehicles with aerodynamic, sharply-contoured front ends. Large vehicles were also
sometimes able to push the cables down and override the barrier if bending waves propagating
through the cables caused the cables to disengage from the front bumper.

Figure 84. Approximate Equivalent Vehicle Profile Concept
The major difference associated with the performance in high orientation angle crashes
near 90 or 270 degrees was that contact was distributed. With non-localized contact along the
entire front or rear of the vehicle, contact pressure was distributed and local contact forces were
low. Cable barrier systems are tension systems which have a lateral force-deflection curve only
dependent on the total force acting over a given span. Thus, for the same lateral deflection of the
cable, the reduced contact force resulting from distributed pressure did not surpass the elastic
limit of the front-end components on the vehicle. Elastic deformations were negligible in
comparison with cable barrier deflections. Thus, vehicle reacted similarly to a rigid body, and
lifted cables above the bumper and hood, separated the cables and allow the vehicle to penetrate
through, under, or over the cables, depending on the shape of the vehicle’s front end.
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8.5 Cable Tension and Dynamic Deflection
As discussed in Chapter 5, there was an increased risk to occupants of errant vehicles in
any high-tension cable median barrier crash that appeared to be associated with the higher
tension in the cables. Although higher cable tensions do tend to reduce dynamic deflections, the
effect was not as pronounced as many engineers have assumed previously. Dynamic deflections
in tests conducted on cable barrier systems, including roadside systems, were plotted by against
impact severity. Impact severities were derived from crash test results submitted to FHWA for
eligibility status for use on the NHS, as well as testing agency reports. Results were included
through 2010 and are shown in Figure 85.
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Figure 85. Dynamic Deflection Comparison, Low- and High-Tension Cable Barriers
As shown in Figure 85, at IS-values below 40 kip-ft (54 kJ), high-tension barriers exhibit
up to a 33% reduction in dynamic deflection compared to low-tension cable barriers. However,
the difference in dynamic deflection between low- and high-tension cable barrier systems was
approximately 15% with an IS value of 102 kip-ft (138 kJ). This IS value is typical of the
standard impact condition for TL-3 impacts using a 2000P test vehicle according to NCHRP
Report 350. Reported rates of dynamic deflections were always higher than the 15% average
determined from full-scale crash testing. It should be noted that the high-IS value crashes with
high-tension cable median barriers very closely corresponded to, and occasionally intersected,
the approximate deflection curve from low-tension crashes; the primary “benefit” of high-tension
dynamic deflection reduction occurs at low IS-value crashes. This low-IS value benefit is likely
the result of decreased post spacing and total cable system lengths less than 300 ft (91 m) in
many of the high-tension cable median barrier systems. However, the low-tension systems
120

June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13

exhibited much lower average crash severity than high-tension systems, which may be correlated
with the lower cable tension.
Reasons that higher cable tensions do not produce a substantially lower dynamic
deflection at high IS values include the following: (1) most high-tension cable barrier systems
used weak, proprietary posts which were not as strong in strong-axis bending as S3x5.7
(S76x8.5) posts used in low-tension cable barrier systems; (2) higher tension on the cables
produced a lateral redirective force with an approximate correlation to the sine of the angle
formed between the deflected cable and adjacent supports, meaning weaker adjacent posts
cannot sustain as much load as stronger posts used in low-tension 3-cable median barrier systems
could and the cable deflection angle between adjacent posts was frequently less than in lowtension systems; and (3) higher-tension systems frequently redirected vehicles with fewer
numbers of cables since the higher restorative forces in the cables tended to allow vehicles to
override lower cables or slip under higher cables. While there was a tangible benefit to using
higher-tension systems, the associated detriments must also be weighed in accordance with that
decision.
8.6 Energetic Capture Concept
The increased risk of penetration due to high orientation angle had roots in classical
physics and mechanics. The cable capture phenomenon was strongly related to energetic
constraints during redirection. When vehicles engaged cable barrier systems with standard crash
testing conditions, with both CG trajectory and orientation angles of 25 degrees, the front
bumper corner absorbed the initial impact through headlight fracture and crushing of the front
fender panels. As the fenders were crushed by the cables, local energetic minima were generated
which tended to cause the cables to interlock with the vehicle. Cables which were engaged in
those energetically-favorable crush locations would have to undergo additional stretch to climb
out of the energetic minima around the crush. This same concept is utilized to maintain cables or
wire ropes in sheaves and pulleys, which have flanges which require the cables to stretch in order
to release. By the natural tendency to minimize potential energy, including strain energy, cables
which engaged vehicle sheet metal and interlocked most commonly remained engaged until the
vehicle was captured or redirected.
When vehicles impacted cable barrier systems with orientation angles approaching 90 or
270 degrees with respect to the barrier system, energetic constraints were altered. Localized
crushing was typically reduced, preventing the energetic minima from being generated. As a
result, the cables did not have a stable engagement with the vehicle and were only constrained by
frictional interaction with the components, rather than a sheave-like groove. Unless intermittent
locations of energetic minima were created (i.e., the grill cracking, headlights fracturing, hood
lifting or prying, or the windshield or crown of the hood catching the cable), the cables
frequently slipped up and over the vehicle. The large stiffness of the most vehicle front and back
planes often prevented localized contact stresses from exceeding the elastic limit of the
impacting components and prevent the initial capture engagement in some crashes.
Higher cable tensions further decreased cable response times and increased sensitivity to
transverse wave motions. High-tension cables closely follow classical wave propagation
equations for tensioned strings since the bending contributions become negligible compared to
low-tension cables. As a result, wave speeds were functionally dependent on cable tension.
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Bending waves caused cables to disengage from the impacting vehicle in some crashes. Higher
CG trajectory angle crashes were also susceptible to these types of prying underride or cable-slip
override phenomena.
8.7 Overall Discussion and Recommendations
As stated previously, low-tension, 3-cable median barriers had the lowest average rate of
severe crashes and severe outcomes of all of the barrier types. Researchers postulated that this
result was actually the culmination of multiple effects.
First, low-tension cable median barriers are frequently historical systems. Most lowtension cable median barrier currently installed in the United States were installed before hightension cable median barrier systems became prevalent. Working knowledge of the barrier and
the difficulties associated with mowing and ditch erosion around posts were also expressed in
research reports and DOT experience as the prominence of high-tension cable median barriers
increased. As a result, many state DOTs began to place high-tension cable median barrier
adjacent to the travel lanes on the shoulders in the hope that the problems experienced by
roadside maintenance crews could be mitigated. Additionally, barrier placement on shoulders
frequently improved ease of repair by maintenance crews since the workers were able to park
vehicles in the median and repair the system at a safe distance from adjacent traffic.
However, crash severity is strongly correlated with the associated IS value at impact.
Although systems in median centers experienced a higher frequency of crashes with high CG
trajectory angles, the speeds of the crashes were almost always lower than when barrier systems
were located on the shoulders adjacent to the roadways. This fact was particularly evident when
comparing crash results of states with widely-varying median configurations. In Utah, median
barriers were commonly installed at 1 ft (0.3 m) or not less than 8 ft (2.4 m) from the center of
the V-ditch but as far from the travel lanes as possible, per Utah installation standards. Utah’s
large separation distance between the cable barrier and the travel way contributed to the lowest
rates of A+K crashes compared to other aggregate severities of high-tension cable barrier
installations in other states. However, frequent wet or snowy weather in the Interstate 15 corridor
also contributed to lower-speed and lower-angle crashes, which also reduced crash severities.
Conversely, in both Wisconsin and Washington, similar systems were frequently installed on
barrier shoulders since medians were steeper and narrower to accommodate increased drainage
and narrower right-of-ways. In both of these states, the crash severity on the same barrier type
was considerably higher than in Utah. These effects had never been previously documented, and
all three states were acting in compliance with the state-of-the-art in cable barrier installation
practices and recommendations made by transportation safety agencies. Furthermore, many
miles of the system with the same shape of posts, same types of connections, and similar speed
roadways adjacent to the system minimized individual discrepancies which could occur.
An analysis of the median data in Ohio indicated that, although penetration propensity
increased to more than 17% when barriers were located within 4 ft (1.2 m) of the center of the Vditch, crash severities were lowest when barriers were placed near the center of the ditch verses
on traffic-side shoulder, opposite-side shoulder, approach slope, or back slope. In fact,
penetration propensity was nearly twice as large when barriers were installed near the center of
the ditch compared to anywhere else in the median. One exception was the traffic-side shoulder,
which had a penetration rate nearly equal to the penetration rate of the barriers installed near the
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center of the median. Yet the percentage of serious injury and fatality crashes for barriers in
median centers was less than half as large as when the barrier was installed anywhere else in the
ditch.
In addition, nearly all severe crashes near the center of the median were caused by
penetrations, occasionally resulting in cross-median crashes or rollovers. If penetration crashes
can be prevented when cable median barriers are placed in ditch centers, the potential to reduce
severe crash risk is very high. The results of the Ohio evaluation are shown in Table 33.
A chi-squared test was conducted on the severe crash, penetration, and rollover data, and
the results were significant at the 10% confidence level; given the size of the data set at 857
crashes, the result should be interpreted as very significant since the data set is small with respect
to A+K crashes.
Table 33. Ohio Cable Median Barrier Location Severity and Crash Result

Barrier Location

Crashes

Penetrations

Rollovers

A+K Injuries

Shoulders (Either Side)
Traffic-Side Slope
Within 4 ft of Ditch Bottom
Opposite-Side Slope
All Traffic-Side Crashes
All Opposite-Side Crashes
All Crashes Not in Ditch Center

20
485
123
229
494
240
734

20.0%
8.5%
13.8%
8.3%
8.7%
8.8%
8.7%

5.0%
4.3%
2.4%
4.4%
4.5%
4.2%
4.4%

15.0%
4.5%
0.8%
3.5%
4.9%
3.8%
4.5%

All Crashes

857

9.5%

4.1%

4.0%

Penetration and rollover crashes increased risk to occupants of errant vehicles compared
to low-tension systems. However, penetration and rollover crashes typically constituted less than
55% of all severe cable median barrier crashes. Based on this finding, if penetration and rollover
crash risks could be completely mitigated, many other severe crashes would still occur.
Ultimately, cable median barrier penetrations were caused by varied factors and were
heavily dependent on barrier design. Therefore, changes in barrier design can lead to immediate
reductions in the risk of penetration, as well as the rates of severe injury or fatality crashes.
Based on the results of this study and the types of containment failures identified, improved
barrier designs may be drafted, tested, and implemented. This could lead to the reduction of
hundreds or thousands of severe injuries and fatalities.
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9 PENETRATION CRASH ANALYSIS
9.1 Nucor TL-3 System on Flange Channel Posts
The Nucor NU-CABLE system was installed in many of the surveyed states, although the
greatest quantity was in the state of Ohio. The most predominant causes of penetrations on the
Nucor system were override events and prying crashes in which the vehicle pried cables upward
and lifted them over the hood and bumper. Several crashes in which the strong cable-to-post
attachments contributed to penetration containment failure occurred at CG trajectory angles
much lower than are designated for full-scale crash testing in NCHRP Report 350 or MASH.
9.1.1 Override Penetrations
A total of 22 override penetrations were identified on the database of Nucor penetration
crashes. Of these override crashes, 16 were linked to the strong cable-to-post attachment, 4 were
due to vehicle launching over the barrier due to installation on a slope, and 2 penetrations were
due specifically to the weak post-to-ground interaction. Photographs of the crashes were used to
document failure types when available.
An example of a crash in which the strong cable-to-post attachments contributed to
vehicular penetration through the barrier is shown in Figures 86 and 87. In this crash, an
impacting pickup truck lost control due to slick roadway conditions and departed the roadway
into the median. The CG trajectory angle was approximately 24 degrees, and the orientation
angle of the vehicle at impact was approximately 110 deg. The vehicle impacted the cables and
began to redirect. The first few impacted posts were pulled out of the ground as the pickup was
redirecting, and the strength of the cable-to-post attachments retained the posts on the cables.
Due to the high orientation angle at impact, the cables did not locally crush the fender at the front
of the vehicle. Fender crush promotes good cable-vehicle interaction and was commonly
associated with vehicular capture or redirection. Posts downstream from impact bent backward
as the pickup truck progressed into the system. Because the cables remained attached to the posts
as the posts fractured and bent at the ground line, cable heights were lowered relative to the
vehicle. Eventually, the vehicle overrode the cables and struck the round wood posts on the back
side of a W-beam guardrail system. Due to the high orientation angle of the truck, the posts acted
as a tripping mechanism and the pickup rolled five quarter-turns.
Although the weak post strength and high vehicle orientation contributed to the
penetration, the primary cause of the failure was due to the cable-to-post attachments which
failed to release the cables. By preventing cable release, the posts were pulled out of the ground
or fractured, which deposited the posts on the ground and lowered the cable heights in front of
the bumper. This type of override penetration was therefore referred to as a “ramp formation”
failure. If the cables had been released from the posts, cables would have remained engaged with
the front of the vehicle.
The incident slope at the POI was 10.4:1, which was generally considered “flat” median
terrain. Construction of the system was within recommended tolerance, and the vehicle bore a
strong resemblance to the Dodge Ram pickup trucks used in many full-scale crash tests
evaluating roadside hardware to MASH criteria. Other additional crashes occurred in which the
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Figure 86. Penetration Crash Caused by Strong Cable-to-Post Attachment
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Figure 87. Crash Result Due to Strong Cable-to-Post Connection

126

June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13

strong cable-to-post attachments caused override, but photographic evidence from those crashes
was sparse.
A second example of the strong cable-to-post connection consisted of a combination of
several component failures which culminated in the override penetration. Vehicle no. 1
hydroplaned on the roadway and struck an adjacent vehicle. The second vehicle swerved to
avoid Vehicle no. 1 but was unsuccessful. After colliding with Vehicle no. 1, Vehicle no. 2
skidded into the median and struck a cable barrier, coming to rest on the opposite side of the
system. Impact CG trajectory and orientation angles of Vehicle no. 2 were in the range of 10 to
15 degrees and 20 to 30 degrees, respectively. Unfortunately, a lack of vehicle trajectory
photographs prevented more accurate photogrammetric techniques from being used to calculate
the encroachment angles. Final vehicle orientation was approximately 205 degrees, relative to
the vehicle’s original travel direction. Crash photographs are shown in Figures 88 and 89.
The penetration event occurred due to a combination of the following three factors: (1)
the posts were manufactured from high-strength, low-ductility steel, resulting in post fracture
rather than bending at the ground line; (2) the cable-to-post attachments remained firmly
attached to the cables, resulting in the accumulation of fractured posts in front of the vehicle; and
(3) the top cable engaged the vehicle above the top of the bumper, but the large vertical
resistance to cable disengagement from the post tore the bumper cover off of the vehicle. Based
on the photographic evidence, it would appear that the bumper cover removal occurred early in
the crash event, because no posts accumulated in front of the vehicle before the bumper cover
was removed. Further, it is likely that the top cable engaged an opening between the bumper
cover and the fender due to bumper cover deformation shortly after impact, snagging the bumper
cover and retaining it in front of the vehicle for the remainder of the impact event.
The bumper cover disengagement from the vehicle is related to vehicle stiffness in the
capture zone (CZ). The CZ refers to the front area of the vehicle between the upper bumper
surface and the lower edge of the hood which is the predominant location intended for cable
engagement with an impacting vehicle. The capture zone is generally composed of blunt surfaces
concealing the radiator, the engine, and cavities in the body made for headlights and the wheel
well. The CZ concept has frequently been invoked when discussing cable barrier placement in
V-ditches and explaining both failures and successes of certain cable barrier systems.
Bumper cover disengagement resulting in vehicular penetration is a relatively rare event.
However, the accumulation of fractured posts may be indicative of a systemic problem, because
the post fractures during both redirection and penetration events, and post accumulation, were
both widely observed.
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Figure 88. Override Penetration Crash Caused by Strong Cable-to-Post Attachment
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Figure 89. Override Penetration Crash Vehicle Final Position and Removed Bumper Cover
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9.1.2 Prying Underride Penetrations
Through-cable penetrations were never identified for crashes involving the TL-3 Nucor
NU-CABLE, flanged U-channel post cable median barrier system. All prying penetrations were
caused by vehicle underride. Every Nucor prying underride penetration occurred with one of the
following impact conditions: (1) a high orientation angle (typically a large oversteering angle)
contributed to underride penetration because the bumper slid beneath the bottom cable; (2) small
CG trajectory and orientation angles, combined with a downward slope in advance of the barrier,
contributed to poor initial engagement of the impacting bumper corner; or (3) after redirection,
the vehicle re-engaged the barrier at a low CG and orientation angle which then pried cables up
before penetrating through the barrier. Vehicles involved in prying failures were either narrowprofile, sharp-nosed vehicles, such as the early 2000s-model Ford Taurus, or vehicles which had
stiff, rounded back ends such as the Pontiac Grand Am and Grand Prix models.
Several examples of prying failures are discussed here in greater detail. In one pryingtype crash, a 1999 Ford Taurus struck the Nucor 3-cable median barrier with CG trajectory and
orientation angles of less than 10 degrees when the barrier was located at the edge of the
shoulder. The vehicle remained in contact with the barrier for approximately 60 ft (18.3 m)
before prying the cables above the hood and coming to rest in the median. No photographs were
available for this crash.
In a second prying case, a 1994 Chevrolet Camaro impacted the Nucor system with a
sideslip angle of approximately 90 degrees. Photos of the impact are shown in Figures 90 and 91.
In this crash, the vehicle oversteered into the median to avoid contact with another vehicle on the
road, and struck a TL-3 3-cable Nucor barrier system with 20 ft (6.1 m) post spacing. The CG
trajectory angle at impact was approximately 32 degrees, and the heading angle was
approximately 118 degrees. The vehicle yawed and redirected away from the opposing travel
lanes, coming to rest with an orientation angle of approximately 245 degrees. The vehicle
engaged one post along the right side, and pushed the post downstream. The post did not
disengage from the cables as the vehicle underrode the system.
The vehicle did not adequately engage the cables due to the geometry of the vehicle and
the impact orientation angle. Unlike many other vehicles, the Camaro had stiff body paneling
and a sloped front hood above the headlight, which changed the capture zone on the front of the
vehicle to the area below the bumper level. In this crash, the adequate capture zone varied
between a front-leading impact and a corner-leading impact. The front end of the vehicle would
promote the tendency of the bottom cable to slide up over the leading edge of the bumper and
above the hood. Conversely, orientation angles between 10 and 50 degrees, or 130 and 170
degrees, would likely promote cable engagement because the headlight cavities at the right-front
and left-front corners of the vehicle extended upward to the leading edge of the hood. The
variation in the capture zone based on orientation angle increases the difficulty of a “panacea”
solution to cable mounting heights.
As the cables slid up from the top of the bumper over the hood, front windshield, roof,
and rear windshield, the cables pried the hood upward and crushed both the front and rear
windshields. The vehicle’s hood may have struck the front windshield, causing both left- and
right-side windows to subsequently fracture. Other penetration and redirection crashes did not
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always result in windshield or window fracture; this result was strongly related to the high cable
tensions of the Nucor system.
Partial penetration crashes were crashes in which the final position of the vehicle with
respect to the barrier suggested penetration was imminent. Partial penetration crashes consisted
of crashes in which the vehicle overrode the cables and came to rest with at least one wheel on
the back side of the system and at least one wheel on the impact side of the system, or crashes in
which the vehicle came to rest with cables resting on the roof with no cables on the impacting
side of the system capable of redirecting the vehicle. If at least one cable remained engaged with
the impacting side of the vehicle, the crash was not considered a partial penetration.
One such potential penetration crash occurred with a 2003 Pontiac Grand Am, which
struck a cable barrier with a low but unknown CG trajectory angle and an orientation angle
greater than 100 degrees. Photographs of the crash are shown in Figure 92. Vehicle engagement
was initially acceptable as the lower cables crushed the right-front fender panel inward and
fractured the headlight housing. However, due to the slope of the leading right-front corner of the
vehicle and the strength of the cable-to-post attachments, the upper cable was forced up the
vehicle’s A-pillar, lifting the lower cables and tearing the hood supports. The hood was removed
from the vehicle and came to rest at an unknown location in the median. The force applied to the
vehicle to remove the hood initiated a clockwise yaw by arresting the front of the vehicle. The
second and third posts downstream from impact were struck by the rear of the vehicle and lifted
out of the ground due to the prying action of the cables above the vehicle, but remained attached
to the cables due to the strong cable-to-post attachments. The posts became wedged in the rear
windshield, shattering the rear glass and crushing the roof inward.
Although the vehicle was brought to a stop in the median, the strong cable-to-post
attachment could have seriously injured or killed an occupant in the back seat of the vehicle in
this crash because of the retention of the post. Fortunately, no occupants were present in highrisk seat locations, and this crash resulted in only property damage.
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Figure 90. Prying Penetration Crash on Nucor NU-CABLE Barrier
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Figure 91. Prying Penetration Failure on Nucor NU-CABLE Barrier
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Figure 92. Potential Penetration Crash on Nucor NU-CABLE Barrier
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9.1.3 Diving Underride Penetrations
A total of 11 diving penetration crashes were identified in the Nucor penetration crash
database. Of the 11 documentable diving penetration crashes on the Nucor barrier, 8 crashes
occurred in medians with approach slopes steeper than 7:1 and when the barrier was installed
close to the ditch center. In each crash, the CG trajectory angle was sufficient to cause
suspension compression on the impacting corner, and the vehicle orientation angle was between
10 and 80 degrees to the barrier. No rear-leading or over-correcting diving crashes were
documented, leading researchers to conclude that failures due to vehicular diving were sensitive
to the impacting orientation angle.
One such diving crash that resulted in a penetration involved a 2009 Ford Fusion.
Photographs of the crash are shown in Figure 93. A collision occurred with a second vehicle in
adjacent travel lanes, causing the Fusion to veer off of the roadway into the median. The vehicle
entered the median with an oversteering vehicle orientation, but the vehicle’s front suspension
compressed as it interacted with the 5.2:1 approach slope, and the vehicle dove beneath the lower
cables. Suspension rebound lifted the cables up, crushing and folding the hood and crushing the
windshield. Many posts upstream and downstream from impact were pulled out of the ground
due to the underride collision, rendering the system inoperable for subsequent impacts.
A second example of a diving collision involved a 2003 Ford Taurus. Photographs from
the impact are shown in Figure 94. The vehicle had lost control on the icy roadway and entered
the median with an orientation angle greater than 60 degrees and a moderately-high CG
trajectory angle of approximately 21 degrees. After impact, the cables slid up the bumper and
grill and onto the hood without crushing or becoming “seated” in the vehicle’s body. Cables
adjacent to impact lifted posts out of the ground, and the posts pierced the windshield before the
vehicle came to a stop. Both the windshield and roof were crushed downward by the cables.
It was determined that in addition to the smooth contour of the front end of the vehicle,
suspension compression also contributed to this penetration crash. With the large orientation
angle and moderately large CG trajectory angle, suspension compression and subsequent
rebound had the effect of “bouncing” the cables upward and onto the hood and windshield.
Significant occupant compartment deformation occurred, and the vehicle demonstrated a clear
propensity for penetration since no cables were in optimum position to capture the vehicle after
the vehicle came to rest; thus this crash was classified as a potential penetration and included
with other penetrations in the analysis.
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Figure 93. Diving Underride Penetration Crash on Nucor NU-CABLE Barrier
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Figure 94. Diving Potential Underride Penetration Crash on Nucor NU-CABLE Barrier
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9.1.4 Nucor NU-CABLE Penetrations Discussion
The Nucor NU-CABLE barrier had the largest volume of photographs available. It also
had the highest average severity for all of the high-tension barrier types. The penetration severity
increase factor (PSIF) of the barrier was low relative to other barrier types, as shown in Table 23.
Based on the overall A+K rate near 4%, this indicates that non-penetration crashes tend to be
more severe on average than occurred with other systems.
Strong cable-to-post attachments were disadvantageous in two ways: (1) the strong
attachments tended to promote system override by forcing the cables to deflect downward with
the posts on impact and (2) to the inherently weak post-soil interaction and analogous low
embedment of the post in socketed foundations increased susceptibility to post pullout from the
ground or sockets. Although both conditions increased risk to impacting occupants by enabling
penetration crash conditions to occur, the weak post-soil or post-socket interaction increased
occupant risk more than override conditions because displaced posts which remain attached to
the cables became spearing risks to small cars.
9.2 Trinity CASS Cable Barrier
Most of the Trinity CASS crashes in the available crash database occurred with the
Trinity CASS system with C-section posts. As a result, analysis efforts were focused on this
system. However, penetration frequencies for all systems were virtually identical, and the same
mechanisms contributed to vehicle penetration for each of the designs. Despite a large
uncertainty associated with a relatively small dataset, the highest penetration crash frequency
occurred with the TL-4 CASS system.
9.2.1 Ramp Formation Override Penetrations
Override penetrations were the most common type of penetration failure of the CASS
system. Of the 26 penetration override events with distinguishable causes on the CASS barriers,
23 of the penetration crashes were caused by the vehicle striking a post before contacting the
cables. All of the CASS system variations utilize a center slot which seats the cables in the post,
which is designed to release the cables when the post bends over. When impacts occurred at a
post location and the post failed to release the cables from the slot, a ramp was formed permitting
the vehicle to climb up and override the barrier system. Furthermore, evidence of this type of
impact can be provided simply by examining the vehicles involved in override penetrations.
Small and mid-size cars comprised 31% of all override penetration failures on the CASS system.
By contrast, excluding “bounce-over” impact conditions in which the impacting vehicle
rebounded off of the median slope and penetrated over the top of the barrier, small to mid-size
cars were typically involved in less than 15% of override penetrations on any other cable barrier
system.
Because impacts at post locations contributed to cable entrapment within the slot in the
web, this type of failure was referred to as a “ramp formation” failure. Oversteering impacts
involving vehicles with large orientation angles at impact were the most common impact
condition associated with ramp formation failures. Overcorrecting and fully tracking crashes
only constituted 3 ramp formation override crashes. Unfortunately, crashes with photographic
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evidence of the ramp formation failure could not be shown to prevent violation of non-disclosure
agreements.
An additional override crash involved a vehicle towing a trailer. Most of the crashes
involving a vehicle towing a trailer resulted in unfavorable cable barrier performance, by causing
trailer “tip-over.” trailer penetration, vehicle rollover, or vehicle penetration. Frequently, these
crashes were caused by oversteering gradients in the median. Trailers with high CG locations,
higher bumper heights, flatter, stiffer body panels, and high rigidity, failed to engage cable
barriers and increased penetration propensity. However, crashes involving passenger vehicles
towing trailers were also infrequent. Thus, these crashes were not considered to be “failures” of
the barrier, nor the fault of the DOT, construction or maintenance crews, or barrier designers.
9.2.2 Prying Underride Penetrations
Twenty-six prying underride crashes were identified in the CASS penetration crash
database. Of the 26 identified vehicular prying penetrations, high orientation angle crashes
accounted for 17 penetrations and low CG trajectory angle, low orientation angle crashes
accounted for 9 penetrations.
One high-orientation angle, prying underride crash with a CASS cable barrier involved a
2002 Dodge Stratus. This crash was particularly notable because, of the 21 cable median barrier
crashes involving similar Stratus vehicles, only one crash resulted in a penetration. The scene
diagram from the penetration crash involving the 2002 Dodge Stratus is shown in Figure 95.
Photographs of a 2002 Dodge Stratus, which was similar to the vehicle involved in the impact,
are shown in Figure 96.
The vehicle departed the roadway due to slick road conditions, impacting the system with
a CG trajectory angle less than 10 degrees, but with an orientation angle exceeding 60 degrees.
Because of the large orientation angle, the cables did not become “seated” in either the grill
cutout, headlights or quarter panels. The vehicle slipped beneath the lower cables and entered the
median, coming to rest between parallel installations of cable guardrails.

Figure 95. Scene Diagram of High-Orientation Angle Crash
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Figure 96. 2002 Dodge Stratus Similar to Vehicle Involved in High-Orientation Angle
Penetration Crash [45]
The Dodge Stratus was not typically involved in penetration crashes due to some unique
features. The front of the vehicle was both broad and blunt, and the sides of the vehicle were
relatively flat. There were multiple locations on the vehicle which promoted interlock with the
vehicle, such as cutouts around headlights, a recessed grill area, and a concave trunk area which
resisted cable slippage. Typical sill heights of the windows exceed 35 in. (890 mm), whereas the
ground clearance averages approximately 16 in. (406 mm). Total vehicle height averages were
approximately 55 in. (1,397 mm). This height provided a large surface over which vehicle
capture was possible, which also required cables to rise substantially to pass over the top of the
vehicle. Thus, this vehicle was uniquely positioned to resist cable median barrier penetrations.
Other high-orientation angle penetration crashes involving vehicles which were not
traditionally susceptible to penetration were also observed in the database. These crashes
supported the conclusion that high orientation angles increased propensity for penetration by
altering the initial contact engagement sequence.
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Other low-angle crashes also contributed to unexpected cable median barrier penetration
crashes. The CASS system was susceptible to low-angle penetration crashes because continued
engagement of the cable barrier system resulted in multiple posts deflecting downstream and
releasing from the cables, allowing for even minor prying forces on the cables to lift cables out
of center post slots after a sufficient number of posts were deformed. The low angle of
engagement also typically corresponded to lower levels of cable damage on the vehicle, which
reduced cable interlock. The cables were not entrapped on the vehicle body and were free to
oscillate or shift along the body panels, and particularly, to rise above the hood and roof.
This problem was aggravated when crashes involved narrow-profile vehicles or vehicles
with smooth front ends. When a vehicle’s bumper protruded beneath the cables, the vehicle was
able to pry upper cables out of the slot and away from the post. Higher cable tensions resisted
this uplift prying force, but also resulted in more hood, roof, and windshield crush than cables
with lower tensions.
9.2.3 Diving Underride Penetrations
Only two diving underride penetrations were observed in the CASS database. Both
occurred on the Trinity CASS system with C-channel posts and occurred in V-ditches with
slopes between 4:1 and 6:1. Not all crashes in which the vehicles interacted with slopes to
compress the suspension prior to impact resulted in penetrations or partial penetrations. Diving
crashes typically resulted in higher severity on CASS systems than other cable median barrier
systems due to the potential for roof crush by the bottom or middle cables. If the bottom cable
remained adequately engaged with the vehicle but did not adequately disengage from the posts,
the cables occasionally caused occupant compartment crush.
The cable release load of the bottom cable in the CASS system was not available in
published research studies. However, a brief mechanical analysis indicated that the weight of the
cable, the cable tension, and friction with the retainer clip likely could develop a net vertical
release load per post of approximately 900 lb (4.0 kN). However, due to the vertical resistance of
the upper two cables, the vertical release of the lower cable could rise by a factor of as much as
2.5, to approximately 2200 lb (9.8 kN). For posts deflecting during impact, the vertical release
load can be even larger. During a diving or prying underride crash, the propensity for the lower
cable to crush the hood or windshield could be very large if the low vertical release load of the
bottom cable was increased.
Scene diagrams were not available for several non-rollover, non-cross-median, severe
CASS crashes with passenger cars. It was believed that partial or complete underride was likely
responsible for the severe outcomes. However, this estimate could not be proven with the
currently available dataset. Care should be taken to determine the cause of any serious crash
involving the Trinity CASS barrier to ensure that the lower cables did not crush the occupant
compartments of impacting vehicles.
9.2.4 Trinity CASS Penetrations Discussion
In general, placement of the cables in the post slot resulted in less desirable cable
interaction with the vehicle. Although many crashes resulted in adequate containment with
relatively low damage to impacting vehicles, and dynamic deflections were relatively low in
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most crashes because good cable engagement occurred, many crashes resulted in undesirable
outcomes. By placing the cables within the center slot and constraining them, the cables are
subject to the reaction of the posts and may not release properly, which increases penetration risk
due to override and increased occupant risk due to underride. Barrier design improvements must
be made to prevent these types of high-risk containment failures from occurring.
9.3 Brifen Wire Rope Safety Fence (WRSF)
The total number of Brifen cable barrier crashes exceeded 1,500, and cross-median crash
rates of the Brifen system in Oklahoma were comparable with other systems used in the state.
However, documentable cable barrier crashes, in which scene diagrams, photographs, and
narratives were available, numbered approximately 120. Of this set, only 7 documentable cable
barrier crashes resulted in penetrations. Thus, the penetrations were examined in great detail, but
the relative frequency of each type of penetration event could not be determined.
9.3.1 Prying Underride Penetrations
Of the 7 penetration crashes available for further analysis, 5 were prying underride
crashes in which the impacting vehicle struck and penetrated below the Brifen WRSF barrier.
Slope contributions were not considered with this data set. The surprisingly high rate of prying
penetrations, given the small data set, further illustrates the risk associated with low vertical
release loads for the bottom cable. Vehicles diving under the barrier, or those which engaged the
barrier such that the cables slipped over the bumper and were pried upward, experienced
significantly increased risk of penetration, since the bottom cable could not resist vertical uplift
prying forces.
An example of a Brifen crash which resulted in a prying penetration is shown in Figure
97. With sufficient details to complete a full crash reconstruction, it was determined that the
2000 Toyota Avalon impacted the barrier at approximately 50.7 mph (81.6 km/h) with a 16
degree CG trajectory angle and a 152 degree orientation angle, with respect to the barrier. The
vehicle contacted the wire rope with the right-front corner leading.
Immediately after impact, the force of the redirection caused the vehicle to yaw with the
right-rear corner turning into the barrier. These forces were eccentric to the vehicle’s CG and
induced a counter-clockwise yaw, but the force required to initiate yaw were relatively low. As a
result, the forces never exceeded the breaking strength of the front headlight glass casing and the
cables did not crease into and engage the vehicle. As the vehicle’s back end rotated into the
barrier, the cables slipped over the front bumper and hood corner due to the prying force and the
vehicle penetrated under the barrier. The sunroof was shattered due to contact with the cables.
The vehicle struck and bent four posts. One impact occurred at the front bumper, two
occurred with the right-side body panels, and one occurred at the right-rear wheel, as shown in
Figure 97. The vehicle occupants were not injured in this crash. The approach slope in front of
the barrier was 9:1, and soil foundation tubes supporting the posts were in excellent condition.
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Figure 97. Prying Underride Failure on Brifen WRSF
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Other prying penetration crashes were typical of this crash event. Vehicles impacted the
barrier with large orientation angles, frequently with the right-side of the vehicle leading, and
slipped under the wire ropes. These types of failures were predominantly due to the
configuration of this barrier type. The lower cables on the TL-3 Brifen barrier were located at a
height of 19½ in. (495 mm), but no vertical constraints were used to retain the bottom cable.
Vertical release of the cables is largely resisted by gravity and friction with the post, but
consequently the dynamic release loads tend to be very low.
9.3.2 Other Penetration Types
One override penetration and one diving penetration were recorded. The diving
penetration crash occurred in an approved 6:1 V-ditch, in which the Brifen barrier was installed
on the traffic-side approach slope. The vehicle exited the roadway at a relatively low angle,
projected over the slope break point, then contacted the slope and began to rebound. During
rebound, the vehicle partially redirected and yawed into and beneath the barrier.
The override penetration observed in the database was somewhat anomalous. In this
crash, a heavy snowfall occurred prior to and during the crash. Control of the vehicle was lost,
and the vehicle entered the median and struck the Brifen WRSF. However, the snow depth was
so high that the barrier deflection was restricted, and the snow in front of the barrier contributed
to ramping over the barrier. Such a penetration event is not expected in most impact conditions.
Moreover, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to prevent such a penetration from occurring
on other barrier systems; due to the snow and low travel speeds, this crash has low likelihood of
cross-median crash result.
9.3.3 Brifen WRSF Penetration Discussion
The Brifen penetration database was limited, but some clear tendencies were observed.
First, due to the low vertical resistance of the bottom cable, the Brifen TL-3 WRSF was
susceptible to underride from prying and diving failure types. Prying failures were the most
common type of failure and the most common type of impact condition in general, especially
when barriers were located at or near the shoulder. Thus, special care should be taken to increase
the vertical release resistance of the lower cable. One such improvement could consist of the
addition of a cable retainer at the bottom of the post which has a sufficient vertical release load to
resist or prevent prying-type penetration crashes from occurring. However, the optimum lowercable release load threshold has not been determined.
9.4 Low-Tension Non-Proprietary 3-Cable Median Barrier
Approximately 128 severe cable median barrier crashes in Missouri between 2007 and
2009, 795 crashes in Washington between 1999 and 2008, and 22 penetration crashes in North
Carolina between 2001 and 2004 were examined in detail to determine causes of penetration or
rollover occurrence on low-tension, 3-cable median barrier systems. Results of the analysis are
provided below.
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9.4.1 Override Penetration Crashes
Override penetration crashes on the low-tension, 3-cable median barrier were much less
frequent than override penetration crashes on high-tension cable median barriers. Out of 71 cable
median barrier crashes with determinable failure causation, only 8 crashes involved passenger
vehicles overriding the barrier.
Out of the 8 override crashes, 5 involved vehicles striking the cable median barrier at
large CG trajectory angles approaching 90 degrees. Although the override occurrence was
usually associated with only larger passenger vehicles such as pickups, SUVs, and vans, a
Hyundai Tiburon (Tuscani) was also involved in an override crash. The vehicle swerved off of
the road to the right, overcorrected, and redirected into the median at approximately 86 degrees
before it vaulted off of the slope break point of the 4:1 median approach slope and overrode the
barrier, which was installed on the traffic-side approach slope. Such a crash is highly unusual
and likely exceeded the IS value required for testing at TL-3 impact conditions. No longitudinal
barrier system has yet demonstrated the capability of safely redirecting a vehicle with similar
impact conditions. Four other high-angle override crashes involved a large van and three pickup
trucks. A sample scene diagram of a pickup high-angle override crash is shown in Figure 98.

Figure 98. High-Angle Override Penetration Crash Example
The 3 other override penetration crashes consisted of very low CG trajectory angle, low
orientation angle crashes. In two crashes, the impacting vehicles were pickup trucks, and in one
crash, the vehicle was a large passenger car. The barriers were installed on relatively steep
approach slopes, with unmeasured slopes likely between 4:1 and 6:1 based on visual estimation.
The vehicles impacted the cable median barrier, sequentially bending the S3x5.7 (S76x8.5)
support posts downstream, then overrode the cables. The override was likely due to the following
two factors: (1) the low tension in the cables was insufficient to prevent sagging when multiple
support posts were removed from the system, and (2) the large vehicles with stiff exterior body
panels were less conducive to energetically-favorable cable engagement. This engagement was
frequently caused by crushing the vehicle exterior and retaining the cables against the sides of
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the vehicle. As the vehicle bent the support posts, it was likely that the vehicles bounced or rode
up the post after speeds were sufficiently reduced. Any vertical rebound of the vehicles increased
the vehicles’ CG heights and potentially drove cables downward beneath the wheels.
9.4.2 Diving Underride Crashes
A far more common type of penetration crash mechanism on the low-tension cable
median barrier was a diving underride crash. Many studies have been performed to improve the
performance of low-tension cable median barrier performance in V-ditches [e.g. 27, 28, 44].
Underride failures with contribution from V-ditches steeper than 6:1 have often been cited as the
most common failure of low-tension cable median barriers, and mitigation of diving penetrations
has received the most widespread attention.
Of the 71 low-tension, 3-cable median barrier penetration crashes with determinable
causes, 23 were due to diving penetrations. The low-tension, 3-cable median barrier utilized a
5
/16-in. (8-mm) J-bolt. A study conducted at the Midwest Roadside Safety Facility (MwRSF) on
the strength of the J-bolts, commonly referred to as hook bolts, determined that the peak
horizontal pullout load of the 5/16-in. (8-mm) J-bolt was approximately 719 lb (3.20 kN), and the
peak vertical pullout load was approximately 636 lb (2.83 kN) [46].
Most diving underride crashes occurred when the bottom cable was on the opposite side
of the post relative to the impacting vehicle travel direction. Although not recorded, several
estimates of frequency were made regarding back-side penetrations, and suggest that at least
60% of all underride penetrations occurred at locations where the lower cable was on the
opposite side of the post relative to the impacting vehicle.
The North Carolina penetration database supported this finding even though it was not a
true “random sampling” of penetration crashes. However, causes of the penetrations and the
associated crash circumstances in North Carolina were unknown to the researchers at the time of
the crash investigations. It was observed that 15 of the 22 North Carolina penetration crashes, or
approximately 68%, were crashes in which the bottom cable was located on the opposite side of
the post from impact. Of these, it was determined that 8 of the back-side crashes resulted in the
vehicles diving under the cables.
Although median slope rates did have an effect on diving penetration rates, median slopes
alone did not completely describe the risk of diving underride penetrations. Many of the sloped
medians were shallower than 6:1. One diving penetration occurred on a median slope of
approximately 10:1. In that crash, the vehicle was traveling at a high rate of speed and plowed
into the back-side slope of the the median approximately 4 ft (1.2 m) in front of the barrier, then
dove under the cables. Photographs from the crash site are shown in Figure 99.
In general, slopes steeper than 8:1 were most susceptible to cable median barrier diving
penetrations. Diving penetrations occurred less frequently if the impacting vehicle made contact
with the barrier on the approach slope. The critical location to cause diving penetrations was
approximately 3 to 6 ft (0.9 to 1.8 m) from the center of the V-ditch, based on analyses of ruts
made in the soil in the crashes in North Carolina. This determination was supported by literature
[28].
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Figure 99. Diving Underride Penetration Crash in North Carolina
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Although photographs were not available for crashes in the state of Missouri, median
profiles were estimated based on site-specific analysis and limited photogrammetric
reconstruction. In each Missouri diving underride crash, the median slope was steeper than or
equal to 6:1, and the back-side slopes were also steeper than or equal to 6:1. In every diving
underride crash in the database, back-side slopes were as steep as or steeper than the approach
slopes into the median. This suggested that the approach slope steepness has a significant effect
on the propensity to compress the suspension. However, the back side slopes had the strongest
correlation with diving propensity when cable barriers were located near the center of the ditch.
Steep back-side slopes caused more frequent penetrations than steep front-side slopes, and no
diving crashes were observed when the cable median barrier was installed on a shallower slope.
However, this type of installation may be subject to penetration, rollover, or other types of
failures.
Despite the effect of suspension compression on the propensity for vehicle penetration
through the barrier, the weak lower cable-to-post attachments strongly increased penetration
propensity. The attachments disengaged from the posts at low loads and allowed the cables to
slip above or below the vehicle. It was believed that in every recorded diving cable median
barrier crash in this database, the diving tendency would be significantly reduced or eliminated if
the bottom cable-to-post attachment strength was increased. This could have reduced diving
penetrations by as much as 50%. Increasing the release load of the bottom cable would likely
increase contact forces between the impacting vehicle and bottom cable, which could result in
better engagement and formation of the familiar cable crease observed on vehicles involved in
successful redirections. Additional examples of diving underride crashes are shown in Figures
100 and 101.
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Figure 100. Additional Example of Diving Penetration Crash
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Figure 101. Additional Example of Diving Penetration Crash
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9.4.3 Prying Underride/Through-Cable Penetrations
Unlike most high-tension cable median barrier systems, low-tension, 3-cable median
barriers were the most susceptible to through-cable barrier penetration. This type of penetration
was restricted to prying type, although median slope and vehicle geometry also contributed to the
penetration in some crashes. Median profiles of prying crashes varied dramatically from the
diving penetration crashes, since by definition suspension compression and rebound was not the
predominant cause of penetration in these types of crashes. Out of the 22 penetration crashes in
North Carolina, all penetrations occurring on the median approach slopes were prying
penetrations, and 5 of the 15 crashes where the cable median barrier was installed on the back
slope were prying penetration crashes. Additionally in Missouri, only 1 of the 18 prying crashes
occurred on the median back slope, while 2 prying penetration crashes occurred when the barrier
was impacted on the opposite-side shoulder. Conversely, 13 prying penetrations occurred on
either the approach slope or ditch center, and an additional prying crash occurred when the
barrier was installed on the adjacent shoulder of the divided roadway.
Frequently, at least two prying risk factors were present in prying penetration crashes.
Prying penetrations occurred when cables were lifted or separated and failed to engage the
vehicle. As with the high-tension cable median barrier systems, prying penetrations were
sensitive to impacting vehicle orientation angles. CG trajectory and orientation angles of vehicles
in all crashes were plotted, with prying penetration crashes highlighted for comparison, as shown
in Figure 102. No clear distinction could be made between the two crash distribution data sets.
As with most penetration crash conditions, oversteering into the barrier was approximately 5
times more common than overcorrecting, although conclusions were limited due to the small
data set.
Prying penetration crashes typically occurred via a combination of the following factors:
(1) cables located on the back side of the post released from many posts because lateral forces
exceeded cable-to-post attachment strengths; (2) large orientation angles promoted bumper
protrusion between or below the cables contributing to underride or through-cable penetration;
and (3) low contact forces prevented beneficial body panel crushing or headlight fracture,
causing poor cable-vehicle engagement. Back-side cable release most commonly occurred when
other cables failed to adequately engage the vehicle, so the entire redirection load was applied by
one back side cable. Examples of penetration crashes in which the impacted back-side cable was
removed from more than 10 posts downstream from impact are shown in Figures 103 and 104.
One unique penetration crash involved a Mitsubishi Montero equipped with a brush
guard mounted on the front bumper. Crash photographs are shown in Figures 105 and 106. The
vehicle struck the cable barrier system, and the angled surface of the brush guard forced two of
the cables below the front bumper and one above the hood. The cable that was lifted onto the
vehicle caused minor windshield damage and scratching on the vehicle’s A-pillar. However,
most of the vehicle damage was due to an unrelated rollover which occurred on the roadside of
the opposite travel lanes long after the barrier penetration.
Such an event was anomalous because very few impacting vehicles were equipped with
these guards. However, the effect of the brush guard in this crash was a microcosmic
representation of the effect of weak cable-to-post attachments on strong posts. Even large
vehicles, which were typically excellent candidates for redirection on cable median barriers,
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were at increased risk of prying penetration crashes at high orientation angles. This further
supports the conclusion that orientation angles can alter the energetically preferential interaction
of vehicles with cable median barriers. If a sufficient contact groove was not made before the
impacted cables began to slip on the vehicle, the likelihood of redirection was very low.
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Figure 103. Back Side (Middle) Cable Release from Many Downstream Posts Resulting in
Penetration
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Figure 104. Back Side (Middle) Cable Release from 11 Downstream Posts Resulting in
Penetration
154

June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13

Figure 105. Prying Penetration Failure with SUV Caused by Brush Guard
155

June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13

Figure 106. Brush Guard Prying Penetration with Cable Contact Striations on A-Pillar
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9.4.1 System Failures
Two cases of system failures were noted in the low-tension cable median barrier
penetration database. In both crashes, the vehicle adequately engaged the tensioned cables and at
least one cable formed a contact groove, fracturing the impacting corner headlight casing and
collapsing the grill and fender around the cable. However, in both crashes, the low-tension cable
splice failed, allowing the tensioned cable to rebound away from the vehicle. In one crash, the
back-side bottom cable engaged the grill and headlight. As the cable deflected with the vehicle,
the splice disengaged releasing the cable at a splice location. Similarly, in the other crash, the
back-side middle cable engaged the bumper and grill of the impacting vehicle, crushing the
fender and grill. As the cable deflected with the vehicle into opposing travel lanes, high tension
was developed in the cable and exceeded the splice limits. In both crashes, weak cable-to-post
attachments contributed to splice failure. Photographs of the first crash are shown in Figures 107
and 108.
Since this crash result was only recorded on low-tension cable median barrier systems,
better splices may be necessary for future low-tension cable barrier systems. A study of cable
median barrier hardware identified several other splices which could be used or adapted for lowtension cable barrier use [47].
9.4.2 Other Penetration Causes
Other penetration causes were identified that led to penetrations on low-tension cable
median barrier systems, including impacts with large vehicles (i.e., tractor trailers-or single-unit
trucks), and bouncing override penetrations due to median slopes. However, as with the hightension cable median barrier counterparts, bouncing override penetrations were impact condition
dependent, and no cable barrier system manufactured had been tested and approved to redirect
large vehicles (i.e., tractor-trailers).
Causes for bounce-over of low-tension systems were virtually identical to other systems.
Out of a recorded 70 cable median barrier penetrations on low-tension cable median barriers,
only 2 resulted in a bounce-over. These two penetrations occurred when the barriers were
installed near shoulders in relatively narrow ditches where vertical vehicle rebound was highest.
Bounce-over penetrations may also be reduced by easy release of the top cable. The lowfrequency of bounce-over penetrations is likely related to the low top cable release load.
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Figure 107. Splice Failure Penetration
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Figure 108. Splice Failure Penetration
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9.4.3 Discussion
Low-tension, 3-cable median barriers were the most susceptible barrier type to prying
and diving underride penetrations, and the least susceptible to override penetration based on
crash results obtained in this research effort. Strong cable-to-post attachments are essential for
bottom and middle cables in low-tension cable median barrier systems. By increasing the vertical
resistance of the lower cable, diving penetrations could be reduced. However, care must be taken
to prevent excessive stiffening of the cable against downward vertical motion on the post, or the
lower cable will become a trip point for rollovers.
The advantage of the weak top cable-to-post connection is that with a low vertical release
load, vehicles with low roof heights which passed beneath the cables did not experience
occupant compartment crush due to the top cable, and overrides were very infrequent when the
cables quickly released from the post but remained engaged with the vehicle. This stratification
of cable-to-post attachment strengths has not been optimized by any cable median barrier system
in use to date and could be necessary to further improve cable median barrier design.
There is no evidence yet that many (if any) penetration crashes were caused due to cables
which drooped in one location due to a previous crash. This may be due to excellent DOT
response of rapid barrier repair at crash sites, which prevented these conditions from occurring.
However, crashes in which two or more vehicles struck the cable median barrier only resulted in
penetration if one of the vehicles was either a tractor-trailer or was towing a trailer, based on the
available database. In both of these crash types, the vehicles which struck the barrier were not
within the designed performance limits of the barriers. Further, crashes in which multiple
vehicles struck the cable median barrier constituted only approximately 3% of all crashes in the
database. If such a correlation existed and penetration propensity was higher when vehicles
struck near previous crash locations, insufficient data were present in the database to indicate this
increase. Nonetheless, states with low-tension cable median barrier systems often mandate
barrier maintenance and repair within 48 hours of the crash notification. Even when repairs
happen up to two weeks after a crash, the repair timeframe appears to be adequate to prevent
penetration events caused by previous cable barrier crashes from occurring. Shorter repair
windows may be required during winter months when icy road conditions increase crash
frequency.
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10 PENETRATION CRASH SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
10.1 Introduction
Cable median barrier penetration propensity is affected by many independent factors.
These factors include vehicle geometry, crush stiffness, and suspension properties, system
stiffness, post strength, cable tension, cable-to-post attachments, cable heights, median slopes,
cable barrier offset from roadway, CG trajectory angle, and CG orientation angle at impact.
Identifying what combination of these factors, or additional unlisted factors, contributed to a
penetration crash can be daunting.
A series of simulations were created to identify the causes of cable median barrier
penetrations in three separate crashes with photographic evidence. Factors which culminated in
the penetration of the vehicle over, under, or through the cable barrier system were identified. It
was determined that in each of the simulated crashes, system placement was in compliance with
federal recommendations, system construction was acceptable, and impact conditions deviated
from the typical impact conditions which accentuated penetration risk.
All median measurements were made with respect to the point of departure. Angles were
always referenced from a tangent line to the road drawn at the location where the vehicle CG
departed the lane edgeline, and were positive when the vehicle rotated counterclockwise as
viewed from above. As a result, any median crash had a positive CG trajectory angle by
definition. Orientation angles varied from -180 to 180 degrees, with positive angles occurring
when the centerline of the vehicle was oriented toward the median and negative when the vehicle
centerline oriented at the CG was oriented away from the median.
10.2 Simulation 1: TL-3 Nucor Cable Barrier System
The first simulation considered an impact of a 2009 Mitsubishi Galant into a TL-3 Nucor
NU-CABLE cable barrier system. The median was comprised of five discrete segments, relative
to vehicle initial direction of travel: a 12.5-ft (3.8-m) wide flat, asphalt-paved shoulder; a 15.5-ft
(4.7-m) wide 6:1 approach slope, a 3.0-ft (0.9-m) wide flat grassy ditch bottom, a 19.0-ft (5.8-m)
wide 7:1 back slope, and a 13.5-ft (4.1-m) flat opposite-side shoulder. The system was installed
13.5 ft (4.1 m) from the approach slope break point. Since the system was installed on a 6:1
approach slope, the system location was acceptable according to FHWA approval letters b96,
b96a, b167, b183, b184, b184a, and b193.
The impacting vehicle lost control, swerving off of the road into the median. The vehicle
departed the road with a CG trajectory angle of 32 degrees and an orientation angle of 62 degrees
relative to the roadway. Based on a rudimentary crash reconstruction, the speed of the vehicle at
the point of departure from the lane was determined to be approximately 58.1 mph (25.6 m/s),
based on skid marks on the road and shoulder, tire marks in grass, post deformations, and vehicle
damage energy estimates. Photographs of the crash site are shown in Figures 109 and 110.
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Figure 109. Crash Scene Photographs, Simulation No. 1
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Figure 110. Post-Crash Vehicle Photographs, Simulation No. 1
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10.2.1 Component Models
The posts in the system were 4 lb/ft Rib-Bak ® posts manufactured from ASTM A499
steel with a yield stress of approximately 80 ksi (552 MPa) and a tensile strength of
approximately 100 ksi (689 MPa). Post models were comprised of four separate parts: base
flanges measuring 0.272 in. (6.9 mm) thick, a 0.143-in. (3.6-mm ) thick, dual-leg web, 0.227-in.
(5.8-mm) thick ribs, and a 0.196-in. (5.0-mm) thick short flange.
All post parts were modeled using type 2, Belytschko-Tsay shell elements in LS-DYNA
v. 971 R5.1 [48]. To simulate the soil stiffness, rigid tubes closely matching the dimensions of
the post were created. The tops of the soil tubes were located 1 in. (25 mm) below the ground to
allow for small deflections at the top of the ground, but posts in the real-world crashes tended to
fracture at the ground line or pull out of the soil or soil foundation tubes. The soil tube-to-post
clearance was approximately 0.12 in. (3 mm).
The ground slopes were modeled with rigid walls intersecting at sharp angles. This was
an approximation, since slope rounding was present at every slope transition. Although slope
rounding does minimize the sharp transition and reduces the abrupt reactions with the
suspension, the radius and position of the slope rounding was not known and could not be
measured from photographs or satellite photography.
During the crash event, two posts were completely fractured and retained by the hightension cables. To simulate post contact with the ground, each post web and flange section was
partitioned into upper and lower parts. The lower parts were used in contact definitions with the
rigid soil tube, and the upper part was included in the part set that could contact the ground.
Cables were attached to the posts with curved cable clips. The clips had diameters of
0.2725 in. ± 0.0010 in. (6.92 mm ± 0.025 mm). The clips were attached to the post with a lower
curved leg and an upper threaded shank with a nut. The clips were made of steel with 60 ksi (414
MPa) tensile strength. An approximate tensile load to cause rupture of one leg would therefore
be 3.5 kips (15.6 kN).
The clips were modeled using a process described in reference [50]. Solid element
models of a rod of equivalent diameter to the cable clips were created and simulated in tension,
bending, and torsion using material properties consistent with available material properties found
from Nucor clip specifications. The resulting tension-strain, bending moment-curvature, and
torque-rate of twist curves were inserted into beam element models of the clips using the
*MAT_MOMENT_CURVATURE_BEAM material model with a type 2 Belytschko-Schwer
beam element section. The nut on the end of the cable clip was modeled using solids and made
rigid. A rigid nut approximation was reasonable because nuts typically experience minimal
damage during impact, and the solid elements dominated the timestep.
Because contact between beam elements and shell element edges can result in node
snagging, beam elements with null material properties (i.e., zero-stress) were used in a ring
around each hole in the smaller flange. The holes in the post were oversized by 0.020 in. (0.5
mm), and the diameter of the null beam elements was 0.020 in. (0.5 mm). The cables were
modeled with beam elements according to the process described in reference [29]. The cables
164

June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13

were tensioned over 400 ms prior to impact using discrete beam elements, which were switched
from deformable to rigid just before impact.
The cables in the system comprised of models recommended in literature [29]. Cables
were tensioned to 5.0 kips (22.2 kN) over 350 ms prior to impact using discrete beams and the
*MAT_CABLE_DISCRETE_BEAM model with a ramp loading curve to apply a controlled
ramp load. The cable tensioner at the boundary of the cable was switched from deformable to
rigid approximately 50 ms before impact. Contacts between the cables and the posts and vehicle
were of the automatic node-to-surface type, and contact between cables and beam element cableto-post attachments utilized an automatic general contact type, which more accurately treated
beam-to-beam contact.
10.2.2 Vehicle Model
A Dodge Neon model created and maintained by the National Crash Analysis Center
(NCAC) at George Washington University (GWU) was selected for similarity with the
Mitsubishi Galant. Unfortunately, some major differences between the Mitsubishi Galant and
Dodge Neon vehicle model were observed.
The suspension properties of the Dodge Neon model were not capable of reproducing the
load-deflection reaction of highly-impulsive load applied by the opposite-side slope after the
vehicle overrode the barrier. As a result, the simulation was terminated after the vehicle
contacted the back slope.
Second, the front bumper of the Mitsubishi Galant was composed of a smooth-faced
aluminum bumper cover with a crushable plastic cartridge for energy dissipation. The Dodge
Neon model incorporated a thin plastic bumper cover and polystyrene bumper for energy
dissipation. To improve cable-to-bumper interaction, the front bumper of the Neon was
smoothed with a layer of shell elements over the front of the opening of the bumper and included
in the contact definitions. Additionally, the Neon bumper cover was large, measuring 13.4 in.
(340 mm) tall, whereas the Galant bumper cover was only approximately 9 in. (229 mm) tall,
and the Galant bumper cover was attached with screw-on tabs.
Finally, the weight, height, length, wheelbase, track width, and roll and yaw moments of
inertia of the vehicles were markedly different. Using data from the Expert AutoStats program,
the wheelbase of the Neon was 20 in. (508 mm) less than the Galant, the weight was nearly 900
lb (408 kg) less, and the track width of the Neon was 4 in. (102 mm) less than the Galant.
Nonetheless, the simulation was still able to approximate the override event sequence.
10.2.3 Results of the Simulation
Sequential photographs of simulation no. 1 are shown in Figures 111 through 114. The
vehicle projected over the top of the slope break point and struck the cable median barrier while
airborne. The top cable of the Nucor system contacted the vehicle’s bumper and was forced
below the bumper. The high tension in the cable pulled the bumper cover downward and pulled
against the attachments supporting the bumper cover. As the cable deflected, lateral force from
the cables caused the second cable to rebound, followed by the first. The vehicle then contacted
the back slope and rebounded upward, and the steering linkage was torqued, causing the vehicle
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to redirect downstream. The rear tires contacted the cables and fractured posts and continued to
deform the cables downward.
Most events in the simulation matched physical evidence from the crash. The vehicle
projected over the slope and overrode the cable; however, in the crash, the downward pull of the
cables deformed the bumper cover attachments, and ultimately tore the bumper cover off of the
vehicle. It is likely that, due to a combination of slope rounding and the differences in vehicle
profiles, that the top of the bumper cover actually slipped beneath the top cable facilitating
bumper cover removal. These crash results were anomalous. Without more accurate vehicle, tire,
bumper cover connection, and slope rounding models, such an event could not be replicated.
Nonetheless, the override tendency was clearly obvious based on the sequential photographs.
Two root causes of this penetration were identified. First, the high CG trajectory angle of
the vehicle into the barrier resulted in higher CG height at impact than was suggested by
Mongiardini et al. for sedan or small car vehicles [20]. As a result, the vehicle struck the barrier
at a much higher energy level and CG height relative to similar vehicles in nominal TL-3 impact
conditions.
Although the placement of the cable median barrier anywhere on a 6:1 slope is permitted
by FHWA and most state DOTs, agencies such as NCAC have recommended that low-tension
cable median barriers not be placed between 1 ft (0.3 m) and 8 ft (2.4 m) from the center of the
V-ditch [28]. Some state DOTs have mandated this practice for all cable median barriers.
However, some high-tension systems have been tested and approved for use anywhere in 6:1 Vditches, based on the expectation that a vehicle departing the road with a CG trajectory angle of
25 degrees and a speed of 62.1 mph (100 km/h) will not override most cable median barrier
systems based on nominal bumper trajectories. Following several cable median barrier placement
studies, FHWA issued a memo revising acceptable barrier placement locations. Detailed studies
analyzing vehicle trajectories in V-ditches have recently generated concern that MASH vehicles
can display sensitivities not witnessed in testing conducted according to NCHRP Report 350
[20].
Unfortunately, high-angle departures from the road generate very difficult scenarios for
capturing errant vehicles. This problem will be present for all sloped medians to some degree; for
6:1 V-ditches, significant deviations of the CG height relative to the ground are observable at 28
degrees, and for 4:1 slopes, significant differences between CG heights can be observed even at
20 degrees. In a limiting case, the angle of departure which generates a “free fall” condition will
result in bouncing as well as potential for override. An optimum solution to prevent these types
of override or underride crashes in V-ditches with slopes of 6:1 or steeper is to use taller, more
robust cable median barrier systems, such as TL-4 cable median barriers. States should consider
adopting TL-4 cable median barriers as a standard to prevent these overrides and underrides.
The second cause of this penetration was that the cable-to-post attachments for the Nucor
system were too strong, as detailed in Chapters 8 and 9. The high cable-to-post attachments
prevented the top cable from releasing from the posts, and dragged the top cables downward
beneath the vehicle. This was particularly evident from the post-crash photographs, which
showed two fractured posts displaced downstream of impact, still attached to the cables. The
cable-to-post attachment strengths should be stratified to prevent the top cable-to-post
attachments from becoming overly strong and dragging the cables downward. There are
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additional benefits to low top cable attachment strengths, including low risk of vehicle occupant
compartment crush during underrides, higher rates of cable entrapment preventing rebound into
adjacent travel lanes, and better reaction on sloped medians. An ongoing study has attempted to
identify the critical performance metrics for top and mid-post cable-to-post attachment heights
[49].

Figure 111. Overhead Sequentials, Simulation 1
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Figure 111 (cont). Overhead Sequentials, Simulation 1
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Figure 112. Downstream Sequentials, Simulation 1
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Figure 112 (cont). Downstream Sequentials, Simulation 1
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Figure 113. Downstream Behind Sequentials, Simulation No. 1
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Figure 113 (cont). Downstream Behind Sequentials, Simulation No. 1
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Figure 113 (cont). Downstream Behind Sequentials, Simulation No. 1
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Figure 114. Sequentials of Critical Impact Sequence, Simulation No. 1
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Figure 114 (cont). Sequentials of Critical Impact Sequence, Simulation No. 1
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10.3 Simulation 2: TL-3 Brifen Cable Barrier
The second simulated cable median barrier penetration crash considered a Brifen 4-rope,
TL-3 cable median barrier. The median profile at the point of departure consisted of five
segments: an 8-ft (2.4-m) wide flat shoulder, a 22.7-ft (6.92-m) wide, 9:1 approach slope, a 4.6ft (1.40-m) wide flat ditch center, a 22.4-ft (6.83-m) 8:1 back slope, and a 10.6-ft (3.23-m) wide
opposite-side shoulder. The cable median barrier was installed at the center of the 9:1 approach
slope.
The Brifen system, as previously detailed, involved 0.24-in. (6-mm) thick S-posts. roller
cable supports locked on the sides of the posts, woven cables between posts, and posts placed in
sleeves. The cable heights were at 19.7, 26.0, and 28.3 in. (500, 660, and 720 mm), with two
cables woven on opposite sides of the post at 26.0 in. (660 mm).
The vehicle, a 2000 Toyota Avalon, struck the cable median barrier with CG trajectory
and orientation angles of 16 and 152 degrees. Photographs of the crash scene are shown in
Figures 115 through 117. This vehicle never departed the ground during impact, and the low CG
trajectory angle and relatively flat approach slope enabled a straightforward crash reconstruction.
Based on frictional values and post deformation energies, researchers estimated that the impact
speed was approximately 50.7 mph (81.6 km/h).
10.3.1 Component Models
The vehicle model used in simulation no. 1 was also used in Simulation No. 2, but
oriented at a 152-degree orientation angle and a 15.9-degree CG trajectory angle. Also, the front
bumper cover slat was removed, since that portion of the bumper did not contact the cable
barrier. The ground slopes were also created using rigid walls, similar to those used in
Simulation No. 1.
The posts were modeled with type 2 Belytshcko-Tsay shell elements, with an element
length of approximately 0.39 in. (10 mm). The posts were modeled as two parts: one part below
ground was used in contact definitions with the foundation tube, and one part above ground used
in the contacts with the rigid walls representing the ground.
The cable supports, which were effectively rollers pinned to the sides of the posts, were
modeled using a thin, rigid, shell element casing. Shell elements were used in lieu of solid
elements since the cables, modeled with beam elements, are better suited for contact with shell
elements than solid elements. This effect was described in reference [50]. Rigid cable supports
on each post utilized tied to nodes on the posts to model the clip engagement.
The cable on the top of the post was placed in a U-shaped slot. However, as mentioned,
shell element edge contact with the beam elements can result in node snagging and instability.
Thus, the U-channel slot was expanded by 0.039 in. (1.0 mm) and beam elements with a 0.039
in. (1.0 mm) diameter were lined around the U-channel slot, and assigned null material
properties.
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Figure 115. Crash Scene Photographs, Simulation No. 2
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Figure 116. Crash Scene Photographs, Simulation No. 2
178

June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13

Figure 117. Post-Crash Vehicle Photographs, Simulation No. 2
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The cables in the system comprised models recommended in literature [29]. Cables were
tensioned to approximately 5.0 kips (22.2 kN) over 500 ms prior to impact using discrete beams
and the *MAT_CABLE_DISCRETE_BEAM model with a ramp loading curve to apply a
controlled ramp load. The cable tensioner at the boundary of the cable was switched from
deformable to rigid approximately 50 ms before impact. Contacts between the cables and the
posts, cable-to-post attachments, and vehicle were of the automatic node-to-surface type, and
contact between cables utilized an automatic general contact type, which more accurately treated
beam-to-beam contact.
Initial simulation results indicated vehicle capture instead of penetration. The vehicle
struck the cable median barrier and the cables deformed the right-front fender inward toward the
headlight housing. The low vehicle mass and yaw moment of inertia caused the vehicle to rotate
around the right-front corner, enabling the back of the vehicle to strike the system. Sequential
photographs of the vehicle redirection event are shown in Figures 118 and 119.
It was determined that the failure type in this penetration crash was an underride, likely
caused by the lower cable sliding up and over the headlight and hood before the vehicle was
redirected. The basic model of the Neon did not incorporate headlight glass into the model. The
simulated fender terminated adjacent to a gap which corresponded to the headlight casing
location in an actual vehicle.
A headlight assembly was modeled by creating a tangent surface to the hood and fender
that filled the hole above the bumper. The headlight was assigned glass material properties and
given a thickness of 3.5 mm. Because few material models of glass have shown acceptable
modeling performance to date, and because the glass in the physical crash did not fracture, the
glass material was prescribed to be elastic. The mesh was smoothed and attachment points were
created between the fender and the hood, although the modeled headlight casing was not
attached to the bumper cover.
10.3.2 Simulation Results
The updated simulation results are shown in Figures 120 through 122. The Neon
projected over the 9:1 slope and into the cable median barrier. The vehicle struck the barrier with
the right-front corner. The front headlight struck the bottom cable first, lifting the cable over the
top of the right-front headlight, and over the right-front corner of the hood. The remaining three
cables struck the right-front fender and hood and were also lifted above the hood. As the vehicle
progressed into the system, it struck four posts, and all four cables were forced above the hood
and roof. The struck posts dented the fender, door panel, and rear bumper, and struck the rightrear tire, just as occurred during the crash sequence.
Unfortunately, the differences between the Dodge Neon and the Toyota Avalon also
contributed to differences between the simulation and penetration crash. The curb weight of the
Avalon was 700 lb (318 kg) greater than the curb weight of the Neon model, the wheelbase was
2 in. (51 mm) larger, and the top bumper height of the Avalon was higher than in the Neon
model, but the center-of-headlight height was nominally the same. This led to a sharper front-end
profile of the Avalon than was present in the Neon model. However, results were still indicative
of the physical crash.
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Figure 118. Downstream Sequentials, No Modeled Headlight Cover, Simulation No. 2
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Figure 119. Upstream Behind Sequentials, No Modeled Headlight Cover, Simulation No. 2
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Figure 120. Overhead Sequentials, Stiff Modeled Headlight Cover, Simulation No. 2
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Figure 121. Behind-Barrier Sequentials, Stiff Modeled Headlight Cover, Simulation No. 2
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Figure 122. Downstream Behind Sequentials, Stiff Modeled Headlight Cover, Simulation No. 2
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Two major contributors to this penetration crash result were identified. First, the low
strength of the bottom cable-to-post attachment permitted the cable to rise up, over the headlight
and hood without damaging the vehicle. By simply supporting the bottom cable with no vertical
resistance load to lifting, the vehicle was able to pry the bottom cable up, and no other cable was
in an optimum position to prevent penetration. This problem could be rectified by adding vertical
resistance to the bottom cable on the post. Such a mechanism could be as simple as another snapon roller attachment placed above the bottom cable to retain it on the post.
When a vehicle struck a cable median barrier system such that the headlight made
tangential contact with the cables, a higher propensity for penetration always occurred. Side
panels, including fenders, are nearly always more stiff than the vehicle front ends. This is
because there is frequently crush room in front of the vehicle to safely bring a vehicle to a stop.
Other non-structural components at the front end of the vehicle, including a crushable bumper,
glass headlights which can fracture, and plastic components such as frontal grills or air dams
tend to promote good cable engagement with the vehicle by deforming or fracturing and
generating cable interlock locations. When the vehicle struck the barrier with an orientation
angle between 90 and 180 degrees; however, the impact location was highly eccentric from the
vehicle’s CG, which contributed to induced yawing and facilitated disengagement of the cables
from the vehicle front-end. Impact forces were not sufficient to cause fender crush or headlight
fracture because yaw-inducing loads were below the deformation or fracture limits of the frontend components. It is likely that these factors were largely responsible for the large penetration
rate for very high orientation angles.
10.4 Simulation No. 3: Generic Low-Tension Cable Median Barrier
The final crash simulated involved a low-tension, 3-cable median barrier constructed
similarly to the system drawings shown in Figures 78 through 83. Posts used in the system were
6 ft-3 in. (1,600-mm) long, S3x5.7 posts with holes drilled in the flanges to accommodate 5/16in. (8-mm) diameter J-bolts which supported the cables. Nominal cable mounting heights were at
21, 27, and 33 in. (533, 686, and 838 mm).
The median profile at the crash site consisted of four discrete slopes: a 4-ft (1.2-m) wide
concrete shoulder, a 19-ft 10-in. (6.0-m) wide, 11.4:1 approach slope, a 19-ft 10-in. (6.0-m)
wide, 11.4:1 back slope, and a 4-ft (1.2-m) wide concrete shoulder adjacent to the opposite-side
travel lanes. The system was installed 5 ft (1.5 m) up the backslope from the median center.
Post-crash photographs are shown in Figures 123 through 125. Based on scene diagram
and trajectory information, it appeared that the driver either became incapacitated or fell asleep.
The vehicle, a 2000 Mercury Grand Marquis, drifted off of the roadway with a CG trajectory and
orientation angle of 7 degrees. There were no visible signs of braking or steering throughout the
departure event. The vehicle passed through the bottom of the ditch, which increased the CG
trajectory angle to 11 degrees prior to impact because of the slope contribution. The vehicle
remained engaged with the bottom cable for a sufficient amount of time to remove the bottom
cable from more than 15 posts downstream of impact. The vehicle had a small steering angle to
the left, which resulted in the vehicle overriding the bottom cable, redirecting up the back slope
and colliding head-on with a different vehicle in the opposite travel lanes.
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Figure 123. Crash Scene Photographs, Simulation No. 3
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Figure 124. Crash Scene Photographs, Simulation No. 3
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Figure 125. Crash Scene Photographs, Simulation No. 3
189

June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13

10.4.1 Component Models
Similar to the Brifen and Nucor simulations, post models in Simulation No. 3 consisted
of shell element flange and web parts. Since the flanges of S3x5.7 posts were sloped, the
thickness of the flanges was tailored to approximate the bending section of the real flange using a
flat, constant-thickness flange approximation. The thickness of the shell flange was set to 0.26 in.
(6.6 mm), and was positioned such that the distance between the outer contact surfaces of the
front and rear flanges of the post were 3 in. (76 mm) apart, equal to the depth of a real post.
Because there was some surface soil displacement, the soil tubes were terminated
approximately 2.5 in. (64 mm) below the surface of the ground. This permitted the posts to
“rotate” through the upper effective 2 in. (51 mm) of soil. Some differences between the
deformed post energy of the crash and model were expected because of differences between
modeled and actual soil properties. The marginal contribution of soil, contributing to less than
1% of the overall energy dissipated, suggests that the modeling approximation was acceptable.
The 5/16-in. (8-mm) diameter J-bolt cable-to-post attachments were modeled using beam
elements, similarly to the cable-to-post attachments used in the Nucor cable barrier system.
Tension-strain, moment bending-curvature, and torque-rate of twist curves were determined
based on the behavior of equivalent solid element rod models subjected to bending, torsion, and
tension. The resulting curves were inserted into a *MAT_MOMENT_CURVATURE_BEAM
material model, and the bolts were connected directly to the mesh of the post since none of the
bolts fractured in this simulation. A comparison between the beam element models of the J-bolts
and the documented tests on J-bolts indicated a difference of less than 5% of the nominal vertical
and horizontal pullout strengths of the models and real bolts [46].
As with the other simulations, the cables in the system comprised models recommended
in literature [29]. Cables were tensioned to 950 lb (4.2 kN) over 400 ms prior to impact using
discrete beams and the *MAT_CABLE_DISCRETE_BEAM model with a controlled ramp
loading curve. The cable tensioner at the boundary of the cable was switched from deformable to
rigid approximately 50 ms before impact. Contacts between the cables and the posts and vehicle
were of the automatic node-to-surface type, and contact between cables and beam element Jbolts utilized an automatic general contact type, which more accurately treated beam-to-beam
contact.
A Ford Taurus model developed by NCAC was initially included in the model as a close
match to the Mercury Grand Marquis. However, simulations frequently resulted in instabilities
and early terminations, which originated with the vehicle model. Because improving the Taurus
model was outside of the scope of this effort, the Neon model used in simulation nos. 1 and 2
was substituted for the Taurus. The front-end geometries of the Taurus and Neon were similar,
but major structural differences were identified. The Taurus weighed more than 1,350 lb (612
kg) more than the Neon, was 40 in. (1,016 mm) longer with a 10-in. (254-mm) longer wheelbase,
and had a 4-in. (102-mm) wider track width. To accommodate the increase in mass, several
discrete masses were added to the system, and densities of frame elements were also increased to
match the weight of the modeled vehicle to the vehicle in the crash.

190

June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13

10.4.2 Simulation Results
Sequential photographs of simulation no. 3 are shown in Figures 126 through 129. The
vehicle followed a similar trajectory as the vehicle involved in the penetration crash. Upon
impact, the middle and upper cable were pried upward and over the hood, as the bottom cable
engaged the vehicle at the headlight location. The bottom cable crushed into the front fender less
than 1 in. (25 mm) as it was displaced laterally by the vehicle, was stripped off of 10 posts
downstream from impact, slipped down the vehicle bumper and fender, and was eventually run
over by the tires.
The Neon model did not incorporate explicit steering control or modeling capacity, and
had a considerably different front-end profile. Despite these shortcomings, critical features of the
simulation and crash test were similar. The middle and upper cables slipped over the hood and
roof in both events, and the bottom cable engaged the vehicle at the left-front fender corner. The
bottom cable was removed from enough posts downstream of impact to allow the cable to droop
when the vehicle trajectory became parallel with the system. The vehicle overrode the bottom
cable, resulting in penetration, and became free-wheeling.
This simulation illustrated two major problems with the low-tension cable median barrier
system. First, the bottom cable-to-post attachment is too weak to prevent these types of impacts
from penetrating through the barrier system. In the simulation, this was further accentuated by
the low but increasing CG trajectory angle, causing the middle and upper cables to make first
contact with the left-side fender instead of the front of the vehicle. This generated a highstiffness resistance to deflection, which generated the same fender stiffness problems observed in
simulation no. 2.
Secondly, the bottom cable height was too high to prevent underrides from occurring in
even flat medians. The bottom cable height of 22 in. (559 mm) was higher than the hood height
of 1% of vehicles involved in cable median barrier crashes. A 3-in. (76-mm) deflection of the
front end of the vehicle, which can occur due to suspension compression near the center of the
V-ditch and can even occur due to bouncing on the approach slope, would then increase
susceptibility to more than 5% of all vehicles involved in cable median barrier crashes. If the
high rate of penetrations which occur when the bottom cable struck the vehicle above the center
height of the headlight is taken into account, the risk increase for flat and sloped terrain in front
of the barrier increases to 1.5% and 21% of crashes, respectively.
Excessive deflection of the back-side cable and bottom cable underride together
accounted for over 70% of all low-tension cable median barrier penetrations based on data
collected in this study, though the precise rate is unknown. To alleviate these problems, the
bottom and middle cable-to-post attachments must be strengthened, and attachments with greater
energy absorption on cable release from the posts are strongly recommended. An increase in the
diameter of the J-bolt shanks, from 5/16-in. (8-mm) to 3/8-in. (10-mm), would result in an
approximately 75% increase in pullout strength from the post. Such a modification would likely
reduce backside-cable release-related penetration frequency by 50% or more, based on the
results of this simulation and the distribution of vehicle masses involved in cable median barrier
crashes shown in Figure 20.
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In addition, a fourth cable may be necessary for low-tension cable median barriers,
located between 15 and 18 in. (381 and 457 mm) from the ground. This additional cable could be
added to existing low-tension cable median barrier systems with one of two methods: an
additional hole could be drilled in the flange for an additional cable-to-post attachment, or a
hanging bracket could be attached to the bottom cable location to support the lowest cable. In
order to retain a 1,000-lb (4.4 kN) release force, the bracket could be strengthened with a cable
tie near the cable location. Both methods would require simulation for concept development and
full-scale crash testing to verify the crashworthiness of the design.
Fatalities are estimated to occur at a minimum of once per 40 miles (64 km) of barrier per
every 3 years with the current system construction. A non-fatal to fatal crash ratio of 199:1 is
expected in a given mile stretch, based on low-tension cable median barrier A+K rates of
approximately 0.5% K crashes. Maintenance cost increases of $100 per crash were expected, due
to the increased repair time and additional cable hardware. Additional costs per 40-mile (64-km)
stretch of road would then increase $20,000 per fatal crash in a 3-year period. By using this
method, ADTs, crash rates, and ROR departure frequencies are not necessary to complete this
analysis. Thus, a maximum cost estimate for one fatal crash would reasonably be $270,000 per
40 miles (64 km) of barrier per three years.
Considering that 50% of fatalities are caused by underride or low cable-to-post
attachment strength and expecting a 50% reduction in such penetrations due to these simple
modifications, a resultant reduction of 35% of fatalities is expected over this same stretch of
barrier. Using the FHWA fatal crash costs of $4,008,900 per fatal crash, a 35% reduction in fatal
crashes over this expanse of road over a 3-year period would result in a cost savings of
$1,403,115. The benefit-to-cost ratio of this modification to low-tension cable median barriers
would then be 5.2:1.
Since the cost per unit of roadway defined in this benefit-to-cost analysis is much higher
than is expected for state DOTs per fatality, and actual penetration rates for the barrier could
decrease by more than 70% based on the penetration analysis, the actual B/C ratio based solely
on fatality reduction should exceed 5.2. However, it should be emphasized that the current
bottom and middle cable-to-post attachments must be strengthened at the same time as an
additional cable should be added to the system. No top cable-to-post attachment changes are
currently recommended.

192

June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13

Figure 126. Overhead Sequentials, Simulation No. 3
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Figure 126 (cont). Overhead Sequentials, Simulation No. 3
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Figure 127. Downstream Sequentials, Simulation No. 3
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Figure 127 (cont). Downstream Sequentials, Simulation No. 3
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Figure 128. Downstream Behind Sequentials, Simulation No. 3
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Figure 128 (cont). Downstream Behind Sequentials, Simulation No. 3
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Figure 129. Critical Events Occurring in Both Simulation and Real-World Crash
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10.5 Discussion and Conclusions
Difficulties associated with simulating real-world cable median barrier crashes arise from
significant differences in vehicle front-end geometries, stiffnesses, material properties, weights,
and vehicle shapes and inertial properties. The purpose of the simulations was not to replicate the
actual crash results, but to replicate the mechanisms responsible for the penetration crash events.
Because of this, variations between the simulation results and the crash results were tolerated.
In the first two penetration crashes, problems with the cable barrier system and general
problems affecting all cable median barrier systems were both identified. High-angle crashes on
slopes alter the intended interaction of the vehicle with the barrier system. If the CG velocity
vector significantly exceeds the nominal value of 25 degrees used in full-scale crash testing,
previous studies evaluating the testing and design limits of barriers in 6:1 slopes are no longer
valid [e.g., 20]. In simulation no. 1, the high strength of the cable-to-post attachments also
prevented the cables from cleanly releasing from the posts. Thus, the cables were overridden and
the vehicle vaulted over the system.
Likewise, high orientation angle crashes can alter the outcome of a crash, as shown in
Simulation 2. Instead of contributing to beneficial headlight fracture and the interlock with the
deflected fender, very high orientation angle crashes can induce yawing or fail to engage by not
crushing the fender or fracturing the headlight. In addition, in the second simulation, the low
vertical release force of the bottom cable permitted the cables to slide up the post before impact
instead of interlocking with the vehicle.
In the third simulation, the penetration mechanism was relatively unique to low-tension
cable median barrier systems. The vehicle adequately engaged the bottom cable while the top
two cables slid over the hood and roof. The low cable-to-post attachment strength of the bottom
cable-to-post attachment was insufficient to retain the cable on downstream and upstream posts
from impact. Following cable release from posts downstream of the vehicle, the cable had
insufficient tension to remain at the contact height and drooped, permitting the vehicle to pass
over the bottom cable and redirect toward the opposing lanes.
Simulations of cable median barrier crashes are typically very challenging and require
careful examination of all the components in the system. For cable models, use of the model
developed by Stolle and Reid is recommended [29]. Tensioning was efficiently and quickly
produced in the cables using short sections of *MAT_CABLE_DISCRETE_BEAM parts with
ramped load curves, tensioning the cables over the first 50 ms of impact. Researchers determined
that for every 2 kip tension and 100 m length of cable simulated, one 6-in. (152-mm) length of
tension was required. Four tensioners were used in simulations 1 and 2, whereas only one
tensioner was used in simulation 3.
Cable to post attachments were also difficult to simulate. Each cable-to-post attachment
was independently simulated and evaluated to determine if minimum manufacturer-reported
maximum strengths and deformations were observed. Since beam elements have the best contact
definitions with other beam elements, beam-to-beam contact should be used whenever practical,
and beam-to-shell-edge contacts should always be avoided.
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In each simulation, early models of each crash event indicated that redirection was
possible. In the first simulation, the vehicle model incorporated a lower open section of the
bumper cover at the air dam. The opening in the bumper cover permitted adequate cable
engagement and the vehicle was redirected. This illustrated the effect that vehicle profile can
have on vehicle redirection. Likewise, in the second simulation, the simulated vehicle was both
lighter than the actual vehicle, and had no glass headlight. The vehicle was redirected in many
variations of impact location along the barrier, and cable tension.
In the third simulation, weight was the most significant differences between the simulated
and physical vehicles. When the vehicle was simulated at the nominal weight of the model, the
vehicle was redirected and did not override the cable. However, when additional weight added to
the model to bring the equal to the curb weight of the real vehicle, the vehicle did not redirect
nearly as quickly with a higher dynamic deflection, and the vehicle ultimately overrode the
cable. The increased energy at impact ultimately determined whether the vehicle was captured or
penetrated through the system.

201

June 20, 2013
MwRSF Report No. TRP-03-319-13

11 CAUSES OF CABLE MEDIAN BARRIER ROLLOVERS
11.1 Overview of Crash Data
Unlike cable median barrier penetrations, rollovers caused by cable median barriers have
not been well studied. Frequently when rollovers were observed during full-scale tests on cable
median barriers, results were largely dismissed as specific to an impact configuration or design
concept failure [e.g. 51, 52]. Nonetheless, rollovers are real concerns for impacts with cable
median barriers. In most states, rollover crashes were more severe but occurred less often than
penetrations. Rollovers typically occurred in 3% to 8% of all cable median barrier crashes.
Rollover events were particularly cumbersome to reconstruct; since, rollover causes were
subject to many more factors than were penetration crashes. An accurate determination for the
causes of the rollover was extremely difficult to obtain as median profile and smoothness,
vehicle roof stiffness, angle of roll eccentricity, vehicle weight, and trip speed all affect the path
of a rolling vehicle and the predominant locations of vehicle damage. Further, scene diagrams
represent estimates of responding officers regarding scene diagrams and are frequently inexact.
One trait of all rollover crashes on cable median barriers is that, at the time of rollover, all
vehicles were non-tracking. Vehicles involved in rollovers which initially contacted the barrier
with tracking impact conditions all yawed to non-tracking conditions before tripping.
Despite the difficulty in gauging trip causation, common factors were identifiable through
narrative, scene diagram, photographic, and median slope evidence. Common factors associated
with rollovers enable researchers and manufacturers to recommend improvements addressing
general classes of problems instead of addressing individual crashes. Rollover causes were
largely independent of which system was installed, although rollover frequencies varied between
systems. This finding was reasonable as all systems rely on three basic components: support
posts to maintain cables at desired heights; cable-to-post attachments to maintain cable heights
and transmit lateral and vertical load from cables to posts; and multiple tensioned cables. Similar
to the determination of the causes of penetrations, a detailed investigation and analysis was
conducted to determine the causes of rollovers on cable median barriers. A summary table of
rollover causes is shown in Table 34.
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Table 34. Causes of Rollovers with Cable Median Barriers
Rollover
Contributor

Description

Vehicle either impacts barrier installed on roadside shoulder
Steep Median and protrudes over median slope before a tire becomes
Slopes
snagged on the approach slope, or trips due to changes in
the median terrain when barrier is located within ditch.

Nucor

Number of Rollovers Recorded
CASS Brifen Gibraltar Generic

Total

Passenger
Cars

3

6

-

-

7

16

13%

8

20

2

-

7

37

37%

12

24

1

1

19

57

42%

1

2

-

-

2

5

25%

Tractor-trailers, buses, large trucks, camper vehicles, and
construction vehicles. No cable barrier is currently designed
Large Vehicle
for these types of impacts. Rollover crashes with these
large vehicles are tolerated and better than penetrations.

1

4

-

-

2

7

-

Total

25

56

3

1

37

122

36%

Vehicle contacts barrier with large oversteering orientation
Broadside Skid angle. Frequently, sideslip angles in these crashes are
approximately 90 degrees.
Vehicle struck cable median barrier and initially began to
redirect. During redirection, vehicle tire snags on post or
Contact with
becomes entrapped by cable(s). Can occur when
Post
orientation angle approaches +/-90 degrees during
redirection.

Other Effects

Rollover caused by other effects, such as end terminals,
tow-behind trailer attachments, or large exit angles
following redirection. Relatively infrequent events.

11.2 Rollover Analysis
11.2.1 Steep Median Slope Rollovers
When vehicles encountered steep median slopes (i.e., steeper than 6:1), rollover
frequency increased, as was discussed in Chapter 5. These types of rollovers may be difficult to
mitigate because the slope contributes to vehicle instability, thus new cable barrier designs alone
may not be sufficient to prevent these types of containment failures. The cable barriers
frequently captured the impacting vehicle during these crashes, but the vehicle tripped and rolled
before it was fully redirected.
There were three types of median slope-caused rollover failures. The first type was
caused by entrapment, in which an impacting vehicle struck the barrier and the front (or rear)
tires extended over the median slopes before the vehicle was redirected. Extension of the
vehicle’s wheels over the slope lowered the impacting end of the vehicle. Then, the subsequent
redirective forces resisting the vehicle pressed the wheels of the impacting end against the
roadside slope, potentially causing digging in on the slope or generating large frictional resistive
forces as the suspension compressed, potentially culminating in a frictional roll moment which
caused rollover. An additional scene diagram of a rearward vehicle rollover crash occurring at a
break point of a 6:1 approach slope is shown in Figure 130. The scene diagram was highlighted
to indicate the locations of the median slopes.
The second slope-related rollover failure type was due to vehicle orientation near the
center of a steep V-ditch. Vehicles were also captured during this type of rollover, but redirection
frequently resulted in yaw displacement of the vehicle around the impacting end. Wheels on the
other end of the vehicle were forced to climb the median approach slope, which generated large,
dynamic vertical and sideslip forces. Due to a combination of large trip forces, vehicle
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instability, digging in to the slope, post impact, or rough median terrain, the vehicle then tripped
and rolled.

Figure 130. Entrapment Rollover Crash in which Vehicle Extends Over SBP of 6:1 Slope
The third type of median slope rollover was caused when vehicles struck a cable median
barrier installed on a V-ditch back slope. After redirection, some vehicles skidded laterally into
the median and tripped due to the slope transition in the center of the median. An example of this
crash type is shown in Figures 131 and 132. In this crash, a Dodge Caliber struck the cable
median barrier with an orientation angle of approximately 110 degrees and a CG trajectory angle
of approximately 21 degrees. The vehicle displaced one post and yawed to nearly 180 degrees
before being redirected, then rebounded down the back slope and tripped. It is believed that the
vehicle made two and a half complete revolutions. Because the vehicle rolled through the center
of the V-ditch and back up the approach slope, vehicle damage was extensive.
Pickup trucks, vans, and SUVs were found to be the most susceptible to the median
slope-related crashes in which the wheelbase and suspension stroke were large. Passenger cars
were involved in only 4 out of the 25 potential median slope-related rollovers. Of these, two
were full-size cars, one was a mid-size “crossover” class vehicle, and one was a compact car.
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Figure 131. Example Rollover Crash Caused by High Redirection on Back Slope
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Figure 132. Example Rollover Crash Caused by Redirection on Back Slope (continued)
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11.2.1 Broadside Skid Rollovers
Rollovers which occurred when vehicles struck cable median barriers with broadside skid
conditions were much more common than steep median slope-related rollovers. Vehicles
involved in these crashes either impacted the cable median barriers with sideslip angles very
close to 90 degrees, or yawed nearly 90 degrees after impact before rolling over. Broadside skid
rollovers were distinct from both contact with post and median slope rollovers because the cables
were the primary contributor to rollover. Passenger vehicles were involved in 35% of these types
of rollovers, whereas SUVs, pickup trucks, and vans accounted for 65%. For those larger
vehicles which rolled due to large oversteering angles, SUVs alone accounted for 29% of all
rollover crashes.
Vehicle impacts at high orientation angles contributed to vehicle instability by increasing
the overturning moment applied to the vehicle frame. A model and schematic diagram of the
force interaction in a high-orientation angle crash is shown in Figure 133. During rollover
crashes, new, energetically-favorable roll axes were generated through which the applied
moments to the vehicle were maximized. The new roll axis was rotated with respect to the
longitudinal axis of the vehicle to incorporate the contribution of a small pitch moment at the
cable impact location.
Because of this shift in the vehicle’s trip axis, the leading back corner of the vehicle was
typically the first location to contact the ground. Frequently, first contact of the vehicle’s upper
body with the ground resulted in displacement of the upper frame rails, crushing near the rear-top
corner of the vehicle, roof slant, and often an accumulation of dirt, grass, or median materials at
the initial contact site. In addition to the increased pitch moment, vehicle-to-cable friction
interaction caused yaw moments, which tended to increase the orientation angle. Thus, if the
vehicle struck the barrier at a relative sideslip angle of 60 degrees, the frictional interaction with
the barrier tended to accentuate vehicle yaw toward a 90 degree sideslip angle, increasing
rollover propensity. Examples of oversteering rollover crashes are shown in Figures 134 through
136. In each of the crashes shown, the vehicle struck the cable barrier with the front end at a high
orientation angle then tripped and rolled. None of the crashes were caused by an impact with a
single post or series of posts. Median slopes contributed to some crashes, but wheels were not
entrapped on a slope in any of the crashes. Further, no trailer attachments or towed units were
present.
One crash involving a Jeep Grand Cherokee is shown in Figure 134. During this crash,
the vehicle struck the cable barrier with the left-front corner in an oversteering configuration,
yawed around the front end, and tripped as the vehicle approached a 90-degree orientation angle.
The right-rear corner made first contact with the ground, shattering the rear windshield and rightrear window. As the vehicle rolled, the roof was crushed, but most of the remaining damage to
the vehicle only occurred to the exterior body panels. A similar crash involving a Suzuki Grand
Vitara which also yawed around the front end before tripping is shown in Figure 135.
A second high-orientation angle rollover crash occurred involving an Isuzu Rodeo, as
shown in Figure 136. During this crash, as the vehicle descended into the V-ditch, the right-front
bumper corner engaged the cables. Combined with the large frictional moment from the tires, the
vehicle tripped with the right-rear corner leading, and made one complete revolution, coming to
rest on its tires. Most of the damage was concentrated on the right side.
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Figure 133. Impact at High Orientation Angle with Unbalanced Force Diagram
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Figure 134. Example Rollover Crash Caused by High Orientation Angle at Impact
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Figure 135. Second Example Rollover Crash Caused by High Orientation Angle at Impact
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Figure 136. Third Example Rollover Crash Caused by High Orientation Angle at Impact
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11.2.2 Contact with Post Rollovers
The most obvious cause of rollover crashes was attributable to vehicles contacting and
snagging on posts, which can form trip points. Unlike other types of rollover crashes, vehicle
contact with posts can accentuate rollover risk for all impacting vehicles, including small cars.
When comparing vehicle data within each barrier make, lighter vehicles were found to be more
susceptible to tripping, as shown in Table 34. Mid-size and small passenger cars comprised 24
out of the 55 rollover crashes caused by post snagging, or 44% of all rollovers involving vehicle
contact with posts. Furthermore, no large cars were documented with this type of crash result,
and only six out of the 29 SUV, pickup truck, and van rollovers related to vehicle contact with
posts had weights over 4,400 lb (1,996 kg).
Rollovers caused by contact with posts were unique because the rollover initiator was
wheel snag on a flange or web of the post. Although multiple compounding factors including
friction contributed to most rollovers, contact with post rollovers also occurred in wet and snowy
weather when roadside friction was reduced. The occurrence of these types of rollovers in lowfriction conditions indicates that even weak posts can contribute to vehicle instability, which was
noted historically [53]. Examples of post snag rollover crashes are shown in Figures 137 and
138.
Contact with post rollovers were the most sensitive to the make of cable barrier struck,
since post strengths were critical to facilitating rollover. Post shapes and cable tensions are
shown in Tables 35 and 36, and the several post section shapes are shown in Figure 139.
The cumulative rate of vehicle rollover on each system was plotted against calculated
yield moments about the X and Y axes shown in Figure 139. Bending moments were calculated
based on the assumption that no torsional warping occurred and that all loading occurred through
each post section shear center. Scatter in the weak-axis bending moment direction appeared to be
randomly distributed, as shown in Figure 140. However, a possible correlation was observed
when rollover frequency was plotted against yield moments about the X direction, as shown in
Figure 141.
Considering the large number of factors contributing to rollover events, these results
suggested that there may be a strong relationship between post strength in bending along an axis
parallel with the roadway and the frequency of rollover crashes. These results also indicate that
post bending strengths along axes perpendicular to the roadway (i.e., the Y-axes) do not have a
strong correlation with rollover frequency.
Note also that many rollovers occurring due to impacts with Nucor systems were caused
as posts accumulated in front of the vehicle after being lifted out of the ground or sockets, or
fracturing at the ground line. As the posts accumulated, the effective strong-axis strength of the
next downstream post increased. This effect, unique to Nucor systems, may have increased the
average rate of rollover if the cable-to-post attachment was weaker and if the posts-soil
interaction was stronger. If the Nucor result followed the trend of the other high-tension cable
median barrier systems, the expected rollover rate would be between 1.9% and 2.7%.
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Figure 137. Example of Post Snag Rollover Crash
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Figure 138. Example of Post Snag Rollover Crash
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Table 35. Summary of Post Characteristics in High-Tension Cable Guardrail Systems
Cable Barrier System

FHWA
Post Installation Option
Approval Letter

Post
Shape

Post Size

Post Material Galvanization

Yield Stress
ksi (MPa)

B-96
B-96A
(TL-3) Driven Post with
Nucor Steel Marion Inc.
B-167
Trapezoidal Soil Plate
B-183
Socked Post in Concrete
NU-CABLE
B-184
Base
B-184A
B-193 Revised

Trinity Highway Safety
Products, Inc
CASS

Hill & Smith Limited
Brifen Limited

215

WRSF

B-119
B-119A
B-119B
B-141
B-141A
B-141B
B-141C
B-141D
B-141E
B-157

In Concrete
Driven
Base-Plated
Driven Sleeve with Notch
Driven Sleeve with
Soil Plate

B-82
B-82B
B-82B1
B-82C
B-82C1

Driven Post
Post in Concrete Footer

Low-Tension, 3-Cable
Median Barrier

B-64
B-64 Sup
B-147

Driven Post
Socked Post-Rebar Tube
Socked Post withTube
in Concrete

6 kg/m (4 lb/ft) UChannel with
3/8 in. (10 mm) hole

U

7.5 kg/m (5 lb/ft) UChannel with
3/8 in. (10 mm) hole

C

3.96 in. x 1.97 in. x
0.1575 in. (100 mm x 50
mmx 4 mm)

S

S4x7.7 (S101x11.5)
with 11/16 in. (17 mm)
holes at groundline

S/Z

C

I
Plastic Sleeve in Concrete
Footer
Driven Post

Driven Post

3.93 in. x 1.26 in. x
0.236 in. (100 mm x 32 ASTM A36
mm x 6 mm)
3.93 in. x 2.17 in. x
ASTM A709
0.179 in. (100 mm x 55
Grade 36
mm x 4.55 mm)

A 36 Hot
Rolled

4

4

4

3

3

3

Plastic Section Modulus
Zx
3

3

Zy
3

3

3

in. (mm )

in. (mm )

in. (mm )

in. (mm )

in. (mm )

in. (mm )

Strong Axis
Bending
Moment

Weak Axis
Bending
Moment

Rollover Rate

80
(552)

51.6
(229)

1.176
(717)

0.606
(224800)

1.125
(477500)

0.496
(8121)

0.656
(10742)

0.519
(11782)

0.779
(17160)

39.6 kip-in.
(4483 kN-mm)

52.4 kip-in.
(5930 kN-mm)

3.2%
(~5.6% TL-4
System)

NA

80
(552)

66.1
(293)

1.423
(917)

0.641
(266671)

1.433
(596622)

0.605
(9913)

0.802
(13141)

0.862
(14129)

1.338
(21931)

48.4 kip-in.
(5472 kN-mm)

64.2 kip-in.
(7254 kN-mm)

N/A

36
(250)

26.5
(117)

1.259
(812)

2.907
(1209901)

0.615
(288554)

1.477
(24198)

0.704
(11542)

1.858
(30447)

1.858
(30447)

53.2 kip-in.
(6050 kN-mm)

25.4 kip-in.
(2886 kN-mm)

5.6%

36
(250)

27.0
(120)

1.285
(828)

2.781
(1157512)

0.188
(78364)

1.39
(22785)

0.131
(2148)

1.718
(28157)

0.263
(4301)

50.1 kip-in.
(5696 kN-mm)

4.7 kip-in.
(537 kN-mm)

A123

36
(250)

29.0
(128)

1.378
(888)

2.629
(1094355)

0.142
(59271)

1.336
(21887)

0.226
(3704)

1.702
(27889)

0.382
(6251)

48.1 kip-in.
(5472 kN-mm)

8.1 kip-in.
(926 kN-mm)

3.2%

Galvanized

36
(250)

31.1
(138)

1.481
(955)

3.359
(1398162)

0.562
(234088)

1.706
(27963)

0.519
(8512)

2.034
(33334)

0.791
(12965)

61.4 kip-in.
(6991 kN-mm)

18.7 kip-in.
(2128 kN-mm)

N/A

60
(410)

53.8
(239)

1.560
(1006)

2.232
(929049)

1.595
(663706)

1.373
(22506)

1.276
(20904)

1.688
(27654)

1.491
(24436)

82.4 kip-in.
(9227 kN-mm)

76.5 kip-in.
(8571 kN-mm)

N/A

36
(250)

11.1
(49)

0.529
(341)

1.869
(778000)

0.151
(62900)

1.187
(19450)

0.183
(2995)

1.421
(23285)

0.320
(5239)
42.7 kip-in.
(4863 kN-mm)

6.6 kip-in.
(749 kN-mm)

ASTM A 123

3.25 in. x 2.5 in. x 0.15
in. (83 mm x 63 mm x ASTM A570
ASTM F1043A
3.4 mm)
(A1011) Gr 60
slotted tube

INP 80

4

Critical Moment of
Inertia
Sx
Sy

NA
Nucor Steel
Marion Inc
Grade SP-80

ASTM A 36

Critical Moment of
Inertia
Ixx
Iyy

NA

C

0.1575-in. (4-mm) thick
C-post

Cold Rolled
from A36

A 123

80
(550)

38.9
(172)

0.840
(541)

1.034
(430199)

0.100
(41589)

0.646
(10593)

0.134
(2201)

0.827
(13544)

0.273
(4467)

S

S3x5.7 (S76x8.5) 72-in.
(1,829-mm) Long

A 36 Hot
Rolled

Galvanized

36
(250)

35.1
(156)

1.670
(1077)

2.520
(1048903)

0.455
(189385)

1.680
(27530)

0.391
(6400)

1.940
(31790)

0.656
(10749)

~3.7%
Predominantly
TL-3

N/A

4.9%

60.5 kip-in.
(6883 kN-mm)

14.1 kip-in.
(1600 kN-mm)

7.8%
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B-137
B-137A
B-137A1
Gibraltar
B-137B
B-137C (HSA)
Gibraltar Cable Barrier
B-137C (HSSD)
B-137D
B-147A
B-88
B-88
B-88A
Safence, Incorporated
B-88B
B-88C
Safence Cable Barrier
B-88D
B-88E
B-88F

U

Maximum
Critical Cross
Post Shear
Section Area
Capacity
2
2
kip (kN)
in. (mm )
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Table 36. Standard Cable Heights and Tensions

System
TL-3

Nucor Steel Marion Inc.
NU-CABLE

TL-4
6:1 Slope or
Flatter
TL-4
4:1 Slope

Trinity Highway Safety
Products, Inc

TL-3

CASS

TL-4

Hill & Smith Limited
Brifen Limited
WRSF

TL-3

TL-4

TL-3
Gibraltar

TL-4
3-Cable

Gibraltar Cable Barrier
TL-4
4-Cable
TL-3
Side-Mounted on
O-posts
TL-4
I-post
Safence, Incorporated
Safence Cable Barrier

Cable Design Tension
at 70ºF (21ºC)

Cable Heights

Cable Barrier System

TL-4
C-post
TL-4
C-post
MASH on 4:1
Slope

(in.)
15*
21 1/2
25 1/2
29 1/2
15
27
31
35
19
31
38
42
20 13/16
25 1/8
29 7/16
20 7/8
29 1/2
38 1/8
19 1/2
26
26
28 3/8
18 1/2
24 1/2
30 1/2
36 1/2
20
25
30
20
30
39
20
25
30
39
18.9
24.8
30.7
36.6
18.9
22
25.2
28.3
18.9
22*
25.2
28.3
19 5/16
30 15/16
34 11/16*
38 7/16
20 13/16
25 1/8
29 7/16

Low-Tension,
3-Cable,
TL-3
Non-Proprietary
*Optional cable shown
** 1st, 2nd, and 3rd cables are interwoven between posts
*** Posts are installed on alternating sides of system
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(mm)
381*
546
648
749
381
686
787
889
483
787
965
1067
529
638
748
530
749
968
495
660
660
721
470
622
775
927
508
635
762
508
762
991
508
635
762
991
480
630
780
930
480
559
640
719
480
559*
640
719
491
786
881*
976
529
638
748

lb

kN

5600

24.9

4600

20.5

4250

18.9

4800

21.4

3020

13.4

950

4.2
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Figure 139. High-Tension Post Section Shapes
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Figure 140. Y-Axis Yield Moment Relationship with Rollover Frequency
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11.2.3 Other Rollover Causes
Several other rollover causes were identified in the research study, although each cause
was relatively unique. For these remaining rollover crashes, the most frequent rollovers involved
large vehicles, such as tractor-trailers, buses, or single-unit trucks, as well as vehicles with towbehind trailers. The increased rollover frequency for tow-behind units was likely the result of a
high trailer center-of-gravity with respect to the towing vehicle. For example, the vertical CG
height of many ½-ton to ¾-ton pickup trucks ranged between 25 and 30 in. (635 to 732 mm), but
the storage floor height on most tow-behind units was at least the center axle height of the
vehicle, typically 16 to 18 in. (406 to 457 mm). As a result, tow-behind trailers dramatically
increased the effective CG height of the towing vehicle.
In particular, tow-behind camping units were particularly sensitive to rollovers. Over
60% of all vehicles with tow-behind campers were at least partially involved in a rollover event
in the database, although trailer-related crashes were infrequent.
11.3 Discussion
In general, rollovers occurred less frequently than penetrations. However, this was not
indicative of the difference in crash severities.
Rollover crashes increase risk of injury or fatality for the occupants of impacting
vehicles. Occupants utilizing safety belts experience risk due to large accelerations, occupant
compartment deformation or intrusion, or an appendage being pinned under the vehicle after
flailing. Unbelted occupants are at higher risk of fatality due to bouncing and tumbling within the
interior occupant compartment, as well as during ejection, in addition to the factors affecting
belted occupants.
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Rollover crashes contributed to more A+K fatalities than penetration crashes. After a
vehicle penetrates a cable median barrier and the barrier does not crush the occupant
compartment or contribute to rollover, then the vehicle can come to a stop in the median without
causing occupant injury. Penetration crashes resulted in property damage only (PDO) in 73% of
the crashes, and on average, 7.9% of penetration crashes were severe with the highest injury
severity of A or K. Using data only from states with complete data sets, 35% of rollover crashes
had a highest severity of PDO damage, whereas 17.3% resulted in A+K injuries. This indicates
that, in the event of a rollover, severe crash outcomes are almost twice as likely as if the vehicle
had penetrated through the barrier. Although prevention of cable median barrier penetrations is
necessary to reduce the risk of severe crashes with cable median barriers, rollover crashes have
higher associated severities in general and every effort should be made to mitigate these types of
crashes.
High orientation angle crashes tended to promote a chaotic rollover path with combined
roll and pitch motions. At high speeds, these types of rollovers were more severe on average than
the other rollover types observed in this database. At lower speeds, more energy was transferred
to the more energetic roll and pitch motions along the eccentric roll axis, as shown in Figure 133.
These crashes had lower average severities than for other rollover types. High-orientation angle
crash fatality risk was 50% greater than median slope fatality risk and nearly twice as likely than
the risk due to contact with posts.
One way to reduce rollover propensity is to place the cable median barrier near the center
of the V-ditch, within 4 ft (1.2 m) of the centerline. Whereas penetrations occurred more
frequently in ditch centers, particularly in narrow V-ditches, rollovers occurred approximately
20% less often in ditch centers than anywhere else in the median. Despite these competing
factors, median centers were associated with the lowest rates of severe and fatal injuries.
Moreover, penetration crashes are easier to prevent than rollover crashes in general, so factors
which reduce rollover frequency may still have high benefit-to-cost ratios by reducing overall
average crash severity even if the countermeasures increase penetration frequency.
A different method of reducing rollover frequency is to alter cable barrier post design.
The frequency of rollover events with CASS C-post systems was nominally higher than other
high-tension barrier systems at 5.6%, but rollover events on CASS systems with weakened
S4x7.7 posts only resulted in a rollover rate of 3.7%, as shown in Table 35 and Figures 140 and
141. Strong-axis post strength appeared to be closely related to rollover propensity.
Unfortunately, this presents a difficult design problem for engineers: strong posts, with high
strong-axis bending strengths, had higher rollover frequencies than weak posts with low weakaxis bending strengths. However, strong posts were able to exert more lateral force on the
vehicle during redirection, reducing the number of posts damaged in a crash and potentially
reducing dynamic deflection. This results in a trade-off between rollover mitigation and design
deflection.
The Gibraltar dataset was very limited. As such, few conclusions could be made with
regard to the Gibraltar rollover performance. However, Gibraltar utilized the strongest posts in
bending about the X-axis. There is cause for concern that crashes with Gibraltar systems may be
at elevated risk of rollover. Additional investigation with a broader accident database may be
necessary.
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12 DISCUSSION
12.1 Penetration Crashes
A maximum reduction in penetration crash frequency of 92% could be realized if all
passenger vehicle penetrations were prevented. Practically, this is impossible due to the wide
range of possible impact conditions and vehicle profiles the barriers would be subjected to.
Penetration events can even occur on concrete median barriers, which are frequently cited as a
replacement for cable median barriers with a history of penetrations leading to cross-median
crashes. However, many of these penetration crashes can be prevented through improvements in
barrier design, updated barrier placement guidelines, and by varying cable mounting heights on
the posts.
There is a major advantage of high-tension cable median barrier systems over lowtension systems. Following most impacts on high-tension systems, the cables retain sufficient
tension to minimize cable drop in the impact region where posts were disengaged from the
cables. Crashes into low-tension cable median barriers frequently resulted in cable drop after
impact. Some crashes involved two or more vehicles striking the low-tension cable median
barrier in succession in Washington, Missouri, and in some non-penetration crashes in North
Carolina. In many of these crashes, all errant vehicles were captured and redirected. However,
state DOTs reported that crash sites were unsightly and suggested that any additional crashes at
the same location could result in increased risk of penetration [23]. Higher-tension systems
provided some sense of confidence that additional impact events would not result in penetrations.
The Gibraltar cable barrier system, with wide post spacings up to 30 ft (9.1 m) and
installed on alternating sides of the cables, may exhibit a higher susceptibility to underride
penetration crashes. Vehicles impacting at the location of a post on the opposite side of the
cables can cause complete post disengagement. Although the hairpin cable-to-post attachment
was relatively strong, as shown in Figure 142, upward vertical bracket release could occur during
impacts with low-height, sharp-nosed and narrow front-profile vehicles, as shown in Figure 138.
For posts installed at the approved 20- to 30-ft (6.1- to 9.1-m) spacing, any cable-to-post
disengagement of a given post would result in a 40- to 60-ft (12.2- to 18.3-m) unsupported cable
length. With such large unsupported lengths, the barrier may experience an increased penetration
frequency due to median slopes, low-profile vehicles, or vehicle crashes under non-tracking and
high-orientation angle impact conditions. If more posts disengage from the cable, unsupported
cable lengths could render vehicular capture difficult. Furthermore, since lateral cable loads are
resisted by cable barrier posts, long unsupported lengths could contribute to excessive dynamic
deflections and low probabilities of capture. Higher cable tensions, which were intended to
reduce the likelihood of excessive cable deflections, alternatively increase the risk of rollover,
windshield and window crush, and excessive occupant risk, in addition to increasing the soil
foundation requirement of the cable anchors.
Whereas the Gibraltar cable barrier system may be more prone to underride in some crash
configurations, the vertical release load of the cable-to-post attachment may be sufficiently small
to prevent override penetrations. Based on a preliminary analysis, the hairpin bracket should
vertically release away from the posts when posts deflect laterally, and impacts at posts will less
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frequently cause the cables to be pulled down by the deflected posts. More analysis will be
necessary to conclusively determine the accuracy of this estimate.
12.2 Rollover Crashes
Rollover crashes were more severe than penetration crashes on average; since, most
penetration crashes involved vehicles coming to rest in the median with only property damage.
Severe penetration events were limited to crashes in which the occupant compartment was
deformed, barrier elements protruded into the compartment, or impacting vehicles were involved
in a cross-median crash. Rollover crashes much less frequently resulted in property damage only.
Low-speed, short-distance rollover events could also be severe if an occupant was ejected from
the vehicle.
The cable entrapment within the vertical slots of the CASS barrier was found to
contribute to penetration propensity when impacts at posts applied downward forces on the
cables, preventing vertical cable release. This effectively created a ramp to allow the impacting
vehicle to pass over the top of the barrier, which also was associated with a high rollover
frequency.
The weakened S-posts utilized in the CASS TL-3 and CASS TL-4 systems was
correlated with a decrease in rollover rates. Penetration frequency was unchanged for these posts.
The major difference between the CASS C-shaped posts and the CASS S4x7.7 (S102x11.5)
posts was a significant reduction in strong-axis post strength. Since the weakened/modified posts
were nominally more flexible at the ground line and yielded at lower loads under the same
impact conditions, the posts could not sustain lateral forces sufficient to cause rollover. This
proprietary design was reflective of the improvement that can be obtained by weakening a
nominally strong post section in terms of its strong-axis bending capacity. Note that the Nucor
flanged U-channel posts are not installed with the strong axis parallel with the roadway, and thus
strong-axis weakening is not expected to have a significant effect on rollover propensity.
Although this improvement would likely assist other cable median barrier systems, untested post
modifications are not recommended for use in any barrier system.
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Figure 142. Gibraltar System Details, TL-3 System [54]
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12.3 Barrier Placement and Median Grading
As stated in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.4, barriers placed in medians wider than 40 ft (12 m)
had optimal performance when installed near the center of 6:1 or 8:1 V-ditches. Penetration
crashes were reduced from over 10% on slopes flatter than 10:1 or steeper than 5:1 to less than
8% on slopes ranging between 9:1 and 6:1. Likewise, rollover frequency decreased from over
5% for slopes flatter than 8:1 and steeper than 4:1 to approximately 1% on slopes ranging
between 7:1 and 5:1. However, barriers placed in narrow medians may not experience the same
safety benefits observed in wide medians. Current standards are under development to establish
meaningful crash testing procedures for evaluating barriers installed within relatively narrow,
sloped median ditches [20]. However, crashes into systems installed in narrow, flat medians are
expected to have very similar outcomes to crashes into systems with wide, flat shoulders.
Many studies have been performed to determine optimum barrier placement within
medians located between divided highways [e.g. 26-28]. From these studies, the optimum
location for placing a cable median barrier is at or near the center of the V-ditch in order to
prevent the maximum number of nuisance impacts. Unfortunately, this barrier placement poses
problems for state DOTs in terms of erosion control and mowing concerns, as cited by most of
the states surveyed in this study. Most states prohibited the installation of cable median barrier
within 1 to 8 ft (0.3 to 2.4 m) of the center of the ditch, which was consistent with placement
guidance provided by FHWA. Barriers located near the center of depressed medians can cause
increased difficulty with the maintenance and repair work of damaged cable barriers. In addition,
post socketed and end anchor foundations may require greater depths, diameters, and/or
reinforcement as the ditch bottom generally has a higher moisture content than the adjacent
median slopes.
In response to these concerns, state design practice has historically tended toward
installing cable median barrier close to one or both of the two shoulders, or on an approach slope
or back slope as far away as possible from the travel lanes. Barrier placement alternatives were
determined from full-scale crash testing results. In addition, state DOTs have historically
installed cable median barriers near shoulders and on 6:1 or flatter slopes based on successful
crash testing of barriers installed on level terrain.
Unfortunately, systems installed near shoulders were more likely to be associated with a
severe crash than installations near the center of the median, as discussed in Chapter 5, Section
5.2.7. Approximately 15% of the crashes occurring with cable median barriers located on
shoulders near the travel way were severe, although the sample size was relatively small. The
severe crash rate was 4.4% for all crashes occurring further than 4 ft (1.2 m) from the center of
the median. In contrast, the severe crash rate for barriers installed near the center of the median
was 1.6%. Penetration frequency was 5.6% higher for barriers installed near the center of the
median than on approach or back slopes, but rollover frequency was 1.2% lower for this same
comparison. However, these conclusions applied to medians wider than 40 ft (12.2 m).
Flat medians enabled errant vehicles to oversteer and increase CG trajectory angles
before crashing into the barrier. As the CG trajectory and orientation angles at impact increased,
the likelihood of penetration or rollover increased as well. These roadside/median encroachments
were usually caused by avoidance maneuvers or panic reactions to on-road conditions and/or
situations.
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Steeper median slopes can allow errant vehicles to launch into the air beyond the slope
break point and potentially vault over a barrier. As a result, it would seem reasonable that the
distributions of CG trajectory impact angles and impact speeds for barriers installed near
shoulders as well as near V-ditch centers would be similar, although bumper and hood heights
with respect to the barrier may not be similar. Higher-speed impact events were found to increase
the severity of those crashes. Crash severity was also increased when vehicles were redirected
back into adjacent travel lanes. In addition, vehicle redirection into adjacent travel lanes was
more common when barriers were installed near median shoulders as compared to median
centers.
Barriers installed near median centers significantly reduced the risk of re-entering
adjacent travel lanes and potentially striking adjacent vehicles. Vehicles, which departed the road
at low angles and were able to regain control, were also less likely to crash into the barrier, thus
decreasing both nuisance hits and severe crash frequency. If barrier placement is not feasible
near the center of divided highways, it is recommended that barrier placement occur as far as
reasonably possible away from travel lanes using taller, more robust barrier systems.
The symmetric 6:1 V-ditch configuration also reduced the risk of override relative to
steeper median slopes due to reduced propensity for “bounce-over”. As a vehicle was projected
over the SBP and onto the front slope of a median, there was a physical separation which
occurred between the nominal and actual bumper height positions above the ground [27-28]. The
difference between actual and expected bumper positions in a crash increased with slope
steepness. Steep-sloped ditches not only promoted override conditions due to vehicular
launching over the SBP, but there was also a risk of the vehicle contacting the front slope and
redirecting up the back slope, causing a redirective “leap” into or potentially over the barrier.
A risk analysis was conducted based on median terrain to determine bounce-over
likelihood in 6:1 V-ditches wider than 40 ft (12.2 m). When allowing for a 20% difference
between observed and actual bounce-over frequencies, vehicles were over 10 times more likely
to underride the barrier than to vault over the barrier on slopes of 6:1 or flatter. Medians with 4:1
slopes more commonly resulted in “bounce-over” penetrations and overrides.
Some recommendations have been made regarding critical barrier placement in medians
when considering the NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH impact safety standards [28].
However, most prior crash testing studies were conducted using the NCHRP Report No. 350 or
MASH crash test conditions at roadside departure. Due to the wide distribution of crash speeds,
CG trajectory and orientation angles, and median slopes on a given section of road, barrier
placement recommendations must be broad and incorporate a large spectrum of possible vehicle
crash conditions.
All median barriers are roadside objects, and crashes with any roadside object can
potentially pose a risk to occupants of errant vehicles. It was noted that for high-tension cable
barrier systems, more than 50% of all severe injuries or fatalities were not caused by rollovers or
penetrations. Even for low-tension cable barrier systems, the barrier-related A+K crashes
constituted 30% of all serious or fatal crashes. As such, it is believed that a reduction in nuisance
crashes into cable median barrier can also dramatically decrease the frequency of serious
vehicle-to-barrier crashes.
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12.4 Full-Scale Crash Testing
12.4.1 Background
Full-scale crash testing guidelines have advanced significantly since the introduction of
such documents as NCHRP Report No. 153 [55] and the Transportation Research Circular
(TRC) No. 191 [56]. Prior to the acceptance of NCHRP Report No. 230 [57] in 1981, crash
testing was largely conducted ad hoc and according to engineering judgment. Standardized
testing vehicles and impact conditions were required according to the criteria presented in
NCHRP Report 230, but those guidelines were based on historical estimates of the practical
worst-case impact scenarios, using subcompact small cars and large sedans as test vehicles.
As the number of light trucks and utility vehicles increased in the late 1980s, it became
apparent that updates to the crash testing criteria were necessary. With the introduction and
acceptance of crash testing criteria proposed in NCHRP Report No. 350 in 1993 [31], the
standardized vehicles used to evaluate roadside appurtances at any test level were changed to an
1,808-lb (820-kg) 820C small car and a 4,409-lb (2,000-kg) 2000P pickup truck. These vehicles
were selected for several reasons: (1) the small car had a low mass and front hood height, which
could increase risk to occupants due to high decelerations, occupant compartment deformation,
or underride; (2) the larger and heavier 2000P vehicle was useful for testing structural adequacy
of roadside appurtances; and (3) the 2000P pickup truck was susceptible to instability, even
rollover. These guidelines remained in effect for well over a decade, until MASH was accepted
in 2009 [24].
With the introduction of MASH, criteria for conducting and evaluating full-scale crash
tests were proposed based on real-world studies of more than 890 run-off-road crashes [22].
Vehicle selection was determined based on the 2nd and 95th percentile vehicles purchased in the
United States based on data collected from vehicle sales between 2000 and 2004. A 5,000-lb
(2,268-kg) 2270P pickup truck and a 2,425-lb (1,100-kg) 1100C small car were chosen as the
most representative vehicles using similar arguments as were used following the acceptance of
NCHRP Report No. 350. An optional mid-size 1500A vehicle weighing approximately 3,300 lb
(1,497 kg) was also proposed if it was believed that barrier systems would be susceptible to
crashes with this sedan-type vehicle.
12.4.2 Crash Observations
The vehicles selected for use in full-scale crash testing according to the criteria presented
in NCHRP Report No. 350 and MASH were not selected based on a historically poor
performance with certain systems. As a result, crash tests have rarely been conducted with the
most critical vehicle types or crash conditions.
It has been frequently stated that the increased scrutiny applied to cable median barriers
examined in this study places the barriers at competitive disadvantage with respect to other
barrier systems. However, cable median barriers were the only barriers which show favorable
performance on 6:1 slopes, and have the potential for application in steeper slopes. Cable median
barriers will continue to be less expensive to manufacture and install in divided medians than
other median barrier types. If the concerns addressed in this study are satisfactorily addressed,
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the associated reduction in severe crash risk would make cable median barriers the safest barriers
available for use on divided roadways.
Furthermore, this study should be used as a springboard to apply this type of systemspecific analysis to other barrier systems en route to more specific, comprehensive guidelines for
roadside safety appurtance testing that can accurately predict worst-case scenarios and prevent
serious crash occurrences. Without sufficient scrutiny applied to barrier system containment
failures and methods to prevent such events from being propagated, it will be impossible to
reduce the current rate of roadside fatalities with any meaningful and purposeful direction. In
time, all barrier systems should be subjected to scrutiny on a crash-by-crash basis.
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13 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Cable median barrier crash data were collected from 12 state DOTs and analyzed to
determine mechanisms of cable median barrier containment failures resulting in penetration and
rollover crashes. It was determined that the composite rate of passenger vehicle penetration
through cable median barriers was approximately 9.9%, and rollover occurrence was
approximately 8.1%. Causation was also identified, and the crash database was segregated by
predominant failure mechanism contributing to barrier penetration or rollover. By creating
categories of penetration-related and rollover-related containment failures, the mutually
exclusive rates of penetration and rollover were determined to be 9.3% and 5.1%, respectively.
This observation led to a composite CMB containment failure rate of 14.6%.
Adverse weather conditions were determined to significantly reduce the propensity for
rollover and penetration crash frequency. Barrier penetration and rollover rates were decreased
by approximately 35% and 70%, respectively, during rain or snow precipitation. However, when
roads were wet or snow-covered, penetration propensity was decreased by 6% and 49%,
respectively, and rollover frequency was reduced by 76% and 47%, respectively. It is evident
that friction has a significant effect on crash outcome in both penetration and rollover crashes. It
was likely that the frictional contribution from adverse weather events decreased CG trajectory
angle into the barrier, which in turn reduced the IS value of the crash during storms. The rate of
penetration after storms was very similar to dry conditions, since vehicles returned to nominal
travel speeds. Lower IS values at the time of impact somewhat reduced the likelihood of rollover
and penetration. As a result, standard crash test conditions should not be altered from the
nominally dry condition used in full-scale cable median barrier crash tests.
CG trajectory and orientation angles at impact were explored through a limited study of
severe cable median barrier crashes in the state of Missouri. The high rate of high CG trajectory
and orientation angle impacts in the severe crash database indicated a need to evaluate cable
median barriers at higher CG trajectory and orientation angles. The 85th percentile impact
condition for severe cable median barrier crashes was 39 degrees relative to a tangent line on the
barrier. The currently-used 25 degree angle into cable median barrier installations only
corresponds to the 70th percentile CG trajectory angle. Severe crash databases have historically
been used to determine the “practical worst-case” impact conditions. These results are consistent
with methods used in NCHRP Report 665 [22].
The performance of each barrier system was not equal, but there was also no “silver
bullet” cable median barrier system. It was determined that the cable median barrier type with
the lowest rate of A+K crashes was the low-tension 3-cable median barrier. The lowest rate of
severity of high-tension systems occurred on the Safence 4-cable median barrier; however, only
one other TL-4 barrier was evaluated in detail. Of the TL-3 high-tension cable median barriers
evaluated, the Brifen WRSF had the lowest A+K ratio for crashes. The highest frequency of
A+K injuries was observed with the Nucor 3-cable median barrier. With respect to only
fatalities, both Nucor and Brifen systems were involved in fewer fatality crashes than with the
Trinity CASS system, which was strongly related to the increased rate of rollovers.
Insufficient information was present to make definitive conclusions about the Gibraltar or
Safence systems. The limited data available for Gibraltar systems suggested a high rate of
rollover crashes, which was consistent with the rollover model shown in Figure 141.
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Crash severities were related with containment failure rates, but the correlation was
limited. Although many fatalities occurring with cable median barriers were caused by crossmedian impacts or rollovers, other fatalities and serious injuries occurred in capture or
redirection crashes. The highest correlation of containment failure with crash severity occurred
with the 3-cable median barrier, with nearly 70% of all fatalities and serious injuries related to
either rollover or penetration. If containment failures were equally reduced for every barrier
system, the system with the highest expected rate of severe crash reduction would be the lowtension, 3-cable median barrier.
Penetration mechanisms were discussed in detail, and causes of penetrations were
determined and analyzed for each system. The penetration mechanisms were classified into
fundamental groupings: diving, prying, override, bounce-over, system failure, and large vehicle
penetration events. Of these, the diving and prying penetrations were common on every cable
median barrier system, while override penetrations were common on CASS and Nucor systems.
Generic cable median barrier crashes had the fewest number of override events, likely because of
the weak top cable-to-post connection, and insufficient data were available to make deterministic
conclusions about override penetrations for Brifen, Gibraltar, or Safence systems. Based on the
analysis of penetration mechanisms, higher bottom cable tension, lower top cable tension,
stronger bottom cable-to-post connections, and weaker top cable-to-post connections were
recommended.
Furthermore, it was noted that every future TL-3 cable median barrier system transition
may require the use of 4 cables, with the bottom cable located approximately 13 to 15 in. (330 to
381 mm) above the ground. The bottom cable should have strong resistance to lifting on the post,
but must be safely overridden when vehicles pass over the cable. To reduce the propensity for
override penetrations, the top cable should be located a minimum of 35 in. (889 mm) above the
ground.
Short post spacing was not strongly correlated with increased resistance to penetration.
The smallest post spacing observed in the database was located in Missouri on a stretch of lowtension, 3-cable median barrier. For approximately 1 mi (1.6 km) of barrier, the post spacing was
reduced to 4 to 6 ft (1.2 to 1.8 m) on center. The barrier was located adjacent to one shoulder and
protected vehicles from entering a median with estimated 4:1 slope. However, two severe
penetrations still occurred in this segment in a three-year period, both from the vehicles in
adjacent travel lanes. If post spacing alone could prevent penetrations, it is statistically unlikely
that a barrier with this small post spacing would encounter two severe penetration crashes in a 1mi (1.6-km) stretch of roadway in only three years. As a result, it is unlikely that the reduced
post spacing utilized on the low-tension, 3-cable median barrier can prevent penetration crashes
without additional modifications, such as stronger cable-to-post attachments.
Some systems, such as Brifen WRSF and Gibraltar, rely on cable engagement with the
flanges of adjacent posts in addition to or in lieu of strong cable-to-post attachments. In these
systems, post spacing may have a more significant effect on penetration propensity than in the
low-tension, 3-cable median barrier.
Rollover causes were also explored in detail. Whereas penetration events tended to occur
in similar patterns based on barrier type, rollover events were similarly irrespective to barrier
type. Rollovers which occurred on cable median barriers were most commonly caused by
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interaction with median slopes, high orientation angles at impact, or tripping on post members.
Several other factors, such as trailer attachments and tire loss, were also briefly discussed.
However, it would be infeasible to uniquely accommodate most of these infrequent rollover
causes. As with penetration events, rollovers caused by impacts with large vehicles were not
addressed, since no barriers in this study were designed to accommodate semi-tractor trailers.
Barrier improvements to reduce risk of rollover included the use of weak collapsing
posts, reduced overall cable tensions or differential cable tension, and graded medians which
favor moderate (i.e., 6:1 to 8:1) slopes for medians of 40 ft (12 m) or wider.
Cable median barrier installations are being erected annually at a rapid pace. Many cable
median barrier systems resulted in reductions in severe injury and fatal crashes due to crossmedian crash reduction. Nonetheless, modifications to full-scale testing conditions, barrier
design, and roadside design must be made to ensure optimal performance of each barrier system.
By implementing these design changes, it is expected that at least 50% of all cable median
barrier related severe crashes could be mitigated, and that penetration rate by passenger cars
could be reduced by as much as 80%.
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14 RECOMMENDATIONS
14.1 Modifications to Barrier Designs
14.1.1 Cable-to-Post Attachments and Vertical Positions
An untested design concept has been proposed by researchers to address cable median
barrier containment failures and involves a stratification of cable-to-post attachment strengths for
high-tension cable median barrier systems. The stratification methodology is an attempt to
reconcile post strength, post bending moment, vehicle geometry, vehicle crush strength, and
principles of controlled redirection via energetically-favorable capture zones on the vehicle for
optimum redirection performance for any barrier, whether located in a V-ditch or on flat ground.
This design methodology would implement low-tension cables with low-strength cable-to-post
attachments at the tops of the posts to minimize risk of excessively damaging the occupant
compartments of small cars involved in cable barrier crashes. The upper vertical cable release
loads should be low to prevent roof crush. Likewise, the upper horizontal cable release loads
could be less than or equal to the load required to form a plastic hinge in the base of the post.
Using this design principle, the top cable-to-post connection would be the weakest, but vehicles
could still be redirected with a single, top cable.
The bottom cable on the posts could likewise have cable release loads which is
proportional to the load required to initiate plastic hinge formation at the base of the post and
should be located no higher than 15 in. (381 mm) from the ground. The vertical resistance for the
bottom cable to be pushed down should be lower than vertical cable resistance to rising up the
post flange. Because of the low bottom cable height and resistance to vertical uplift, underride
events will be less likely. Furthermore, most windshield crown heights are at least 24 in. (610
mm) above the ground. As such, there is little risk of impacting vehicles to dive in the median
and underride the bottom cable if it is located no higher than 15 in. (381 mm) and if the cable has
a strong resistance to vertical rise. Fundamentals of this design concept are already being utilized
in some high-tension cable barrier systems, but potential improvements to energy absorption
through cable-to-post attachments, post strength, and post spacing can be made for every system.
The design concept is shown schematically in Figure 143.
Low-tension, 3-cable median barrier systems sustained the lowest frequency of large
orientation angle-related rollovers but the highest number of post snagging related rollovers. This
reduction is likely due to the lower cable tension and resulting lower lateral force on the vehicles
applied by the cables. Common S3x5.7 (S76x8.5) post sections used with low-tension cable
median barrier systems should be weakened, and improved cable-to-post connections should be
utilized in order to experience a significant improvement in safety performance. Bottom cableto-post attachments permitted frequent underrides and occasionally through-cable penetrations.
Both of these penetration types would be significantly reduced if the bottom cable-to-post
attachment was strengthened. The top cable-to-post attachment appeared to be optimal for the
low-tension, 3-cable median barrier since overrides were infrequent on this system. This cableto-post attachment strength should be evaluated based on cable tension and height above the
ground. Note that the nominal mounting height for the top cable in all low-tension, 3-cable
median barrier systems in this study was 33 in. (838 mm).
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Figure 143. Cable Median Barrier Stratification Concept
14.1.2 Cable Tension
One design alteration, which may alleviate some rollover propensity caused by highorientation angle crashes into high-tension cable barrier systems, is to reduce cable tension. A
reduction in cable tension would decrease the lateral force imparted to a vehicle at the point of
impact. Vehicles entering a V-ditch frequently have a pitch and roll displacement associated with
the angled orientation in the ditch. As a result, interaction with cables in the ditch may cause an
increased trip propensity due to roll and pitch moments imparted to the vehicle by the cables.
Lower cable tension would permit a more gradual cable engagement with the vehicle and thus
may reduce rollover propensity.
14.1.3 Number of Cables
One design improvement which would aid a low-tension, 3-cable, TL-3 median barrier
system would be the addition of a fourth cable. The added cost of the fourth cable is an initial
fixed cost which would not greatly increase annual maintenance costs associated with barrier
repair. However, the anticipated safety improvement obtained by considering an additional cable
is expected to be very high. Cost savings due to reduction in severe injuries and fatalities should
far exceed the increased cost that the additional cable would add to system installations, as
discussed in Chapter 10.
In steeply-sloped medians or to reduce the rate of tractor-trailer penetrations, a fifth cable
should be considered for every cable median barrier system.
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14.1.4 Summary of Design Improvements
Several cable design improvements for cable barriers are recommended for further
evaluation and are shown in Table 37.
Table 37. Summary of Barrier Design Improvement Recommendations
Barrier System

Nucor NU-CABLE

Trinity CASS

Component

Problem

Recommended Design Improvements

Cable to Post
Attachments

Strong attachment prevents cable release after post
is struck or deflects, causing continued engagement
and post pullout from the ground or post fracture.

Eliminate nut from upper and middle clips. Redesign lower clip to
release at a load near to the bending capacity of the post.

Post Embedment

Frequent post pullout from ground or sockets.

Cable Heights

Insufficient number of cables to prevent
penetrations.

C-Shape Posts

Frequently contribute to rollover.

Post Slot

Cable Spacer

Cable to Post
Attachments
Brifen WRSF
Cable Weave

Blue Systems Safence

Override
C-Shape Posts
Post Slot
Cable Spacer
Post Spacing

Extend embedment depth to optimum length determined by
component testing. Deepen embedment in socket to optimum length
determined by component testing.
Increase the standard number of cables in the TL-3 design to 4.
Place the top cable at least 35 to 38 in. (890 to 965 mm) above
ground, and the bottom cable at approximately 13 to 15 in. (330 to
381 mm).
Drill weakening holes at ground line in corners of post to facilitate
post collapse and reduce the strong-axis yield moment. Consider
breakaway alternative instead of post deformation as primary failure
mechanism.

If vehicles make first contact with post instead of
Weaken the flange or web via slot or saw cut adjacent to middle or
cables, posts can be pushed down while still retaining
upper cable(s) to reduce risk of posts pushing cables downward.
cables, increasing rollover propensity.
Vehicles which "dive" under cables are subjected to
Add additional bottom cable to prevent underride. Consider
large vertical loads which can crush occupant
independent cable suspension within the slot or removal of at least
compartments or increase ridedown accelerations.
one cable from the slot.
Add physical attachment to resist vertical displacement of bottom
Bottom cable attachments using "roller" to maintain
cable. Lower bottom cable height to 13 to 15 in. (330 to 381 mm) to
cable height contributes to diving and prying
reduce underride potential. Vertically separate 2nd and 3rd cables in
underride failures.
TL-3 system.
Cable weave on bottom cable has contributed to
Consider eliminating bottom cable weave or reduce height of bottom
rollover when wheel on impact side of vehicle
cable.
overrides cable and causes pinch point at post.
Large passenger vehicles can override system.
Increase height of top cable in TL-3 system.
Similar concern as Trinity CASS.

See comments on Trinity CASS.

Large post spacing significantly increases risk of
Decrease standard post spacing. Limit maximum post spacing to 10
penetration by reducing lateral constraints on cables.
ft (3.0 m) on centers.

Cable hangar can be pried upward, lifting all cables
Cable attachments should be independent, to allow cables to release
up and releasing them from the post, contributing to
from posts without adversely affecting all other cables.
Gibraltar
override.
Impacts at back sides of posts entrap cables and
Prevent impacts centered on the back sides of posts from pushing
Alternating Posts
create ramps, facilitating rollover and penetration.
cables downward.
Tube post section does not completely collapse on
Add weakening element to tube posts to completely collapse after
Post Strength
weak-axis impact and forms ramp contributing to
impact.
rollover.
Bottom and middle cables release from posts at low
Increase bottom and middle cable pullout load vertically and
Cable to Post
loads, causing extensive cable displacements when
horizontally. Consider use of a retrofit strengthener which adds
Attachments
one cable redirects vehicle, and can increase
pullout resistance.
penetration propensity.
Low-Tension 3-Cable
Add fourth cable between 13 and 15 in. (330 to 381 mm). Apply
Median Barrier
Barrier is susceptible to diving and prying underride
Cable Heights
stronger cable-to-post connection resisting vertical uplift and back
failures.
side pullout.
Slot, cut, or alter posts to make weaker. Apply weaked tube or pipePost Strength
Post strength frequently contributes to rollover.
section posts which will flatten completely when impacted.
Cable Hangar
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14.2 Barrier Placement in Medians
Many medians have slopes which may vary widely, even within a section spanning only
one mile (1.6 km). As such, it is impossible to know a priori the actual slope in front of or
behind a barrier before it is installed in the median. Thus, every barrier system should be crash
tested and evaluated on the front and back slopes of a 4:1 V-ditch in the most critical
configurations, which were determined and are discussed in Reference 20. Crash testing on the
4:1 slope or in a narrow 6:1 V-ditch may still be necessary if it is recommended for use on slopes
shallower than or equal to 6:1 because of median geometry variations. These matrices should
more adequately ensure that cable barriers can accommodate errant vehicles traversing sloped
medians under tracking conditions.
Note that placing cable median barriers along both shoulders will not necessarily prevent
all penetrations, cross-median crashes, or rollovers. Penetration crashes were nearly as common
when barriers were impacted at the shoulders as occurred in the center of the ditch. Rollover
crashes commonly occurred with low CG trajectory angles but high orientation angles. Rollover
frequency was also greater when cable barriers were located adjacent to shoulders than in other
locations since roadways typically have higher-friction surfaces which can increase the tripping
moment on the vehicle and cause larger changes in CG trajectory angle with the same steering
input applied. Whenever convenient, it is recommended that cable median barriers be placed as
close to the center of the median as possible.
14.3 Full-Scale Crash Testing
14.3.1 Full-Scale Crash Testing on Slopes
Due to the wide range of possible impact conditions which could occur on any cable
median barrier, a variety of underride and override barrier impact conditions should be
considered likely unless impacts with similar conditions cannot be observed with regular
frequency in real-world crash databases. Override penetrations, underride penetrations, and
rollovers were observed for barrier systems regardless of approach slope, back slope, and median
placement. Using crash data as indicators, it will likely be necessary to utilize much of the crashtesting matrix recommended in Reference 20. Testing in accordance with these matrices will
likely prevent many future penetration and rollover crashes.
14.3.2 Impact Conditions
Based on the impact conditions observed in this report, the 85th percentile CG trajectory
angle involved in serious cable median barrier crashes was 39 degrees. Since the severe crashes
followed the trend of all penetration crashes, based on the observation of Missouri and North
Carolina data, full-scale crash testing to evaluate propensity for penetrations should be conducted
at the higher CG trajectory angle of 39 degrees in future testing.
Based on the plot of impact angle shown in Figure 11, many rollovers in Missouri were
observed when the initial orientation angle was approximately 45 degrees. In fact, the only
severe crashes which occurred with orientation angles between 35 and 55 degrees were either
penetration or rollover crashes. An orientation angle of 45 degrees is recommended for full-scale
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crash testing, since crashes occurring at CG trajectory angles greater than 10 degrees were
frequently oversteering crashes.
In order to test system susceptibility to low-CG trajectory angle, high-orientation angle
crashes with SUV and light truck vehicles, the 50th percentile CG trajectory angle of 18 degrees
is recommended. This angle is lower than the current 25-degree angle used in full-scale crash
testing, but it should still be representative of a practical worst-case impact condition when
combined with the 45-degree orientation angle.
The currently-used impact speed of 62.1 mph (100.0 km/h) appeared to be representative
of the 85th percentile condition, although an actual speed distribution was not available. Impact
speed estimates in each crash were provided by responding officers in Ohio. The median
estimated impact speed was 60 mph (97 km/h), and the average estimated impact speed was 58.1
mph (93.5 km/h). Furthermore, the speed limit on interstates in Ohio was only 65 mph (105
km/h). This data suggested that impact speeds used in full-scale crash testing should not be
reduced.
14.3.3 Vehicle Selection
The crash testing of cable barrier systems according to the TL-3 test criteria found in
NCHRP Report No. 350 may not have been tested with the most critical vehicles. Although it
may be argued that the 2000P pickup truck used in NCHRP 350 crash testing is critical based on
vehicle analysis results, barrier systems should also be evaluated with widely-purchased vehicles
which have the greatest propensity to cause barrier failure. Many of the vehicles shown in Table
28 are no longer being produced. As a result, an analysis of newer vehicle features consistent
with the critical features identified in Chapter 7 should provide guidance for future vehicle crash
testing efforts.
Very few small car crash tests have been conducted under recent impact safety standards
on cable barrier systems. These crashes were not believed to be critical. Based on crash data
collected in this study, small car crashes were only critical if an occupant made contact with the
barrier, the vehicle penetrated over, under, or through the system, if cables crushed the occupant
compartment or caused rapid decelerations, or if the vehicle tripped and rolled over. All of these
conditions were infrequent in the available database of real-world cable barrier crashes. A small
car test would likely waste valuable research money without providing much critical barrier
performance insight.
14.3.4 Summary of Full-Scale Crash Testing Recommendations
The recommended impact conditions for consideration in future full-scale crash testing of
cable median barriers are shown in Table 38.
These crash tests are recommended to replace the current TL-3 MASH crash test nos. 310 and 3-11 which are required for cable barrier systems and should be conducted on level, flat
terrain unless otherwise specified. These tests are intended to supplement V-ditch testing of cable
median barriers [20].
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However, current limitations on crash testing procedures may limit the ability of agencies
to conduct non-tracking and partially-skidding crash tests. Until the necessary apparatus are
developed to conduct crash testing with the recommended impact conditions, full-scale crash
tests should be conducted at the CG trajectory angles identified in Table 38 and in fully-tracking
conditions. Additional research to develop crash testing apparatus to conduct full-scale crash
tests with off-tracking conditions will be necessary.
If the roadside safety community intends to reduce the number and frequency of cable
median barrier containment failures, updates to existing testing criteria should be considered to
reflect the more realistic “practical worst-case” impact scenarios. Whereas data per each system
were not historically available, better data are now available to guide the redesign of systems to
obtain the maximum possible safety improvement. The matrix provided in Table 38 is expected
to cover the most critical crash conditions. Test no. 3-10A may incorporate a small car if a small
car is shown to be most critical, but currently there is no plan to incorporate a separate crash test
specifically for small cars.
Table 38. Recommended Crash Testing Impact Conditions for Cable Median Barriers
Test No.

3-10A

Impact Speed, CG Trajectory
Orientation
V (mph)
Angle, φ (deg) Angle, ϴ (deg)

62.1

39

45

3-11A

62.1

39

45

3-11B

62.1

7

7

Vehicle Class

Description

Passenger Car

Passenger car penetration prying/underride test. Impact
should occur 2 ft (0.6 m) downstream of post.
Recommended vehicles include: Acura Integra,
Chevrolet Impala, Chevrolet Lumina, Dodge Intrepid,
Ford Escort, Ford Taurus (model years before 2008),
Honda Accord, or Subaru Impreza.

High-angle override test. Impact should be 4 in. (102
SUV, Pickup
mm) upstream of post. Recommended vehicles include
Truck, or
Chevrolet Blazer, Ford Explorer, Ford Escape, Toyota
Commercial Van
4Runner, Toyota Tundra, or commercial van vehicles.
SUV, Pickup Low-angle override test. Should be conducted in ditch on
Truck, or
6:1 approach slope. Vehicles should be similar to those in
Commercial Van test 3-11A.

Figure 144. Representative Crash Testing Impact Diagram
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